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A theological consideration of ethical issues raised by human genetic manipulation, 
with particular reference to gene therapy." 
Human genetic manipulation is considered in terms of genetic testing and 
screening, gene therapy and enhancement, and reproductive cloning. Deontological and 
utilitarian approaches to ethical decision-making prove less than satisfactory. An 
alternative approach, involving theological explorations into fundamental moral 
questions, is used. 
Human beings are like other creatures in being; embodied, in limited control of 
their lives, and mortal. Humans are distinct from other creatures in reflecting the image 
of God. Responsibility in human life is considered in terms of stewardship and 
freedom. To be human is also to be an individual. 
Theologies of progress suggest that working together with God towards our own 
salvation is our human calling and destiny. Theologies of realism recognise the failings 
of human beings and our inability to help ourselves. Moltmann's 'theology of 
anticipation' holds in a paradoxical whole human limitations and our ability to work 
with God towards anticipations of his coming kingdom. 
A theological response to the limitations of medicine and health is explored 
through situations of disability and premature death. The Christian story, expressed in 
terms of tragedy and hope,' provides a context in which to accept the limitations of 
genetic technologies and genetic health. 
These theological explorations are applied in detail to the situations of genetic 
therapy and enhancement, in somatic and germ line cells. Suggestions are made 
regarding legislation. 
The Christian story of tragedy and hope suggests a way of living which involves 
co-operation rather than competition with those who are genetically different. The 
Church can befriend and support those caught up in genetic tragedy, whilst celebrating 
our common hope. 
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Chapter 1: HUMAN GENETIC MANIPULATION 
AN INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Less than f i f ty years after the elucidation of the molecular structure of DNA, scientists the world 
over are capable of manipulating this complex molecule and altering the genetic make-up of living 
things. A wide range of transgenic' organisms have been developed. Micro-organisms produce human 
growth hormone and insulin for medical uses. Tomato plants have fruit which does not overripen. Soya 
plants are resistant to herbicide and to attack by predators. Sheep produce human blood-clotting factors 
in their milk, and pigs are bred with a view to providing hearts for human transplants. Meanwhile human 
molecular genetics also advances. DNA profiling, or 'fingerprinting', is used to identify individuals, for 
forensic or other purposes. The 'Human Genome Project', originally considered far too ambitious, wil l 
have sequenced the entire human genome by 2001. Genes responsible for a variety of genetic diseases 
and predispositions have been identified, and DNA sequences patented and marketed. These advances 
are startling in themselves, and raise their own moral issues, but they only form the back-drop for the 
focus of this thesis. 
'Human genetic manipulation', for the purpose of this thesis, is to include genetic screening and 
testing, gene therapy and enhancement, and human reproductive cloning.2 These techniques described 
very briefly here, are covered in more detail later.3 The identification of a number of genes known to 
cause disease enables groups of people to be screened, or individuals tested, for the presence of these 
genes, at a variety of stages of life. This technique is perhaps most significantly used in the testing of 
foetuses, together with the practice of 'therapeutic abortion' for those affected by serious genetic 
abnormalities. Small sequences of DNA can be added to people's cells in order to 'mend' defective 
genes causing disease; the early stages of clinical trials are already underway. Theoretically extra DNA 
could also produce 'enhancements' in the human body. Human reproductive cloning, the production of a 
1 See glossary for scientific and medical terms and abbreviations. 
2 The term 'manipulation' is deliberately used rather than 'engineering' to avoid an over-simplistic, mechanistic 
view of human genetics. The main emphasis of the thesis is concerned with gene therapy and enhancement. 
Genetic screening and testing and human cloning are considered as they raise issues in common with those raised 
by the deliberate addition of genetic material to the human genome. 
3 Ch.2.2. 
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baby from the genetic material of a single adult cell, is not currently legal but has been shown to be 
feasible in other mammals, primarily through 'Dolly' the sheep. The moral implications of these 
manipulations wi l l be considered in the light of Christian theology. In this introductory chapter I 
consider the significance of such technology, in personal, cultural and ecclesial terms, and explore 
discussions of the moral issues which have taken place to date, before giving an outline of the whole 
thesis. 
1.2 Human genetic manipulation - its significance 
The significance of human genetic manipulation is considered in three areas. Firstly, I explain 
my interest in this subject. Secondly, I explore the cultural significance of these advances. It is not just 
scientists who wi l l be affected by the advances of human genetics; it wi l l affect all our lives. Finally, I 
describe the ways in which the Christian church is, and can be, involved. 
i) Personal 
As a schoolgirl I was fascinated by the account of Watson and Crick's elucidation of the 
structure of DNA. 4 This interest influenced my decision as an undergraduate to read biochemistry, with 
an emphasis on molecular genetics. Subsequent doctoral research involved developing a molecular tool 
to investigate the ways in which genes are 'turned on and o f f in a particular bacterium.5 The time I left 
practical science, to explore a vocation to Christian ministry, coincided with the publication of the 
Warnock Report.6 This report was the result of investigations by a government-appointed committee into 
advances in artificial human reproduction. So began my interest in the ways in which human 
reproduction and genetics raise significant moral questions. These are moral questions which can affect 
many ordinary people, and yet which can be obscured by scientific, philosophical and theological 
language. As someone who could at least begin to understand both the science and the theology, I felt 
that perhaps I could enable other people to understand the moral issues raised. Even in the fifteen years 
since the Warnock Report things have changed greatly, and these changes have had cultural implications. 
4 James Watson, The Double Helix. 
5 Audrey King. "Streptomyces gene fusions involving the Eschericia coli B-galactosidase gene." (University of East 
Anglia, Ph.D. thesis, 1983). 
6 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 1984. 
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ii) Cultural 
DNA and genes are no longer subject matter reserved for scientific papers. Pictures of DNA 
fragments separated in a gel, and the concept of evolution, have been used to advertise cars. Television, 
radio and popular newspapers report regularly on matters relating to genetic manipulation. Most recently 
this has concerned genetically modified (GM) foodstuffs, fuelled by Prince Charles' interest and 
involvement in the subject Media reporting seems to swing wildly between two extremes. The horrors 
of "Frankenstein foods" and Hitler's eugenics programme, are found to vie with ideas that human beings 
now have the power to change the world. Scientists can be accused of 'playing God', or encouraged to 
become 'masters of the universe'. 
The power of molecular genetics is indeed very great. The development of genetic technology 
has been likened to the harnessing of fire. 7 Parallels are also seen between the power of molecular 
genetics and that of nuclear energy.8 To whom should this power be entrusted? The scientists, the 
government, the multi-national pharmaceutical companies, or even the consumers in the street? Unless 
people are aware of the power, the potential and the problems this technology raises, how can they voice 
opinions? Meanwhile things are moving very fast; twenty five years ago it was estimated that the 
information available in the field of genetics doubled every two years9, now the only way people can 
keep up is through computers and the internet. The power of genetic technology is very great, and it can 
affect everyone. 
Every human being is the result, at least in part, of the genetic material they inherited from their 
parents. Genetic technology can be used at, and impinge on, almost any stage of life; in the womb, post-
natally, before marriage, before conception, whilst healthy, i l l or dying. Knowledge of human genetics 
affects us all, and is beginning to change the way we think. 
Human genetic technology is already influencing the way we think of ourselves, our children 
and other people. An announcement that a gene 'for ' homosexuality has been found, encourages us to 
regard our life as being determined by our genetic material. The discovery of a genetic test for breast 
1 Jeremy Rifkin, The Biotech Century; Harnessing the Gene and Remaking the World, p. 11. 
8 Ibid, p.231, and Roger Shinn, "Between Eden and Babel", in Ronald Cole-Tumer (ed), Human Cloning; Religious 
Responses, p. 106. 
9 Joseph Fletcher, The Ethics of Genetic Control; Ending the Reproductive Roulette, p.xvii. 
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cancer, leads young women to undergo radical mastectomies rather than face the risk of developing 
cancer by the age of sixty. The ability to test for Down's syndrome in the foetuses of older mothers, 
leads to a dramatic reduction in the number of children bom with this disease and assumptions 
concerning the nature of life worth living. A combination of IVF and genetic testing results in the 
implantation of an embryo with a pre-defined genetic make-up, and children can become regarded as 
consumer goods. Dolly the sheep reveals a new technology, and there is no shortage of people wishing to 
're-create' a person through cloning. Each of these events influence our society which is already 
orientated towards individual achievement and recognition, consumer choice and satisfaction, and 
guaranteed, instant results. Subtly, human genetic technology is already influencing the way we think 
about ourselves. It can prompt questions about the meaning, purpose and value of life, and the 
significance of what it is to be human. For this reason, among others, the Christian churches have been 
involved in offering both insight and support. 
iii) Ecclesial 
The Christian faith has always claimed to understand something of what it is to be human, and 
of the meaning and value of human life. The Church has an important role to play in contributing to the 
debate about the morality of human genetic manipulation. Such involvement has already been made 
through contributions to government investigations. Anglican clergy serve on the Human Genetics 
Advisory Commission and the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. 1 0 A working party of 
British Roman Catholic Bishops produced a report on human genetic intervention.11 The Church of 
Scotland has been particularly active in this area; publishing a booklet and organising a day conference 
on Human Genetics, and publishing a web-site in the light of the 'Dolly-event'. 1 2 It w i l l be important for 
the Church to maintain this contribution as technologies develop and increase, and i f legislation relating 
to gene therapy or human cloning is formulated. The Church can play a prophetic role in challenging the 
10 Revd Dr John Polkinghorne serves on the HGAC and chairs the Cloning Working Group. The Rt Revd Dr 
Michael Nazir-Ali serves on the HFEA. 
11 Genetic Intervention on Human Subjects. The Report of a Working Party of the Catholic Bishops' Joint 
Committee on Bioethical Issues. 
12 William Storrar and Iain Torrance (eds), Human Genetics; A Christian Perspective, 1995. 
"Bio-ethics for the New Millennium " conference at Aberdeen, January 1999. 
"Looking back a year AD (After Dolly) - where are we now? " http://dspace.dial.pipex.com/srtscot/clonyear.htm 
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assumptions society makes about what it is to be human and about the significance and value of human 
life. 
The Church has another role to play, not at the institutional level, but at the parochial level. The 
assumptions, beliefs and values of society, which are influenced by, and reflected within, genetic 
technologies, can also be influenced by the life and witness of a local body of Christians.13 
But how are Christians to know when to encourage this technology and when to stand against it? 
What ethical framework can be used in approaching these issues? In what way wil l Christian comment 
be any different to that from secular society? There are a number of ways to approach the moral 
questions raised by human genetic manipulation. I discuss two 'classic' examples and suggest an 
alternative. 
1.3 Approaches to the moral debate 
In the early 1970s an awareness grew that advances in medical treatments were resulting in the 
perpetuation of genetic defects in the population, and meanwhile the possibilities of human genetic 
manipulation were beginning to be explored. In the light of these events, Paul Ramsey and Joseph 
Fletcher wrote what have become 'classic' works on the morality of human 'genetic engineering'.14 
Their approaches are very different. As a deontologist, Ramsey's views depend on principles which he 
sees as being valid no matter what the consequences. As in effect a utilitarian, Fletcher makes his 
decisions in the light of the consequences of an action. These two approaches are still applied to genetic 
technology today. ) 
i) A matter of principles 
Ramsey saw two principles as being relevant to any consideration of human genetic 
manipulation. Firstly; the unitive and procreative goods of human sexuality should not, in principle, be 
separated.15 Secondly, no human being should be exposed to experimental medicine without consent.16 
13 ch.7. 
'4 Paul Ramsey, Fabricated Man; The Ethics of Genetic Control. 
Joseph Fletcher, The Ethics of Genetic Control; Ending the Reproductive Roulette. 
There are also a number of secular approaches. A good summary of these is found in John Wyatt, Matters of Life 
and Death; Today's healthcare dilemmas in the light of Christian faith, pp.36ff. 
15 Fabricated Man, p.32. 
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The human sexual act is seen by Ramsey as both an act of love, and a procreative act, in as much 
as each act tends towards these natural ends but does not necessarily achieve them.1 7 He derives this 
principle, not from empirical observation, but from Scripture. By contrast with those who would refer to 
a creation-based argument and Genesis 2.23f, Ramsey uses the New Testament as the basis for this 
principle, referring to John 1 and Ephesians 5.1 8 Just as God's great love led to his great creative acts, so 
in the same way human love leads to procreation.19 To separate, in principle, the two goods of human 
sexuality would be to refuse to recognise the image of God's creation in our own procreation.20 
Ramsey's second principle, concerning human medical experimentation, is based on the 
understanding that although God gave humankind dominion over all the animals at creation, no divine 
command, or even permission, allows one person to exercise the same sort of dominion over another.21 
To conduct any sort of medical experiment on a human being without their consent would be to reduce 
them to the level of an object, rather man a person. Any reproductive technique which, in being 
developed, would necessitate experiments which could result in deformed babies (who could never give 
consent to such experiments) is seen as morally wrong. These techniques in themselves may be perfectly 
ethical, but their development would be unethical because of the possible harm caused to a resultant 
zygote, foetus, or baby. This objection is based on an additional premise, that personhood begins at 
fertilization. 2 2 
Ramsey's principles seem very clear, and yet his application of them could appear arbitrary. In 
particular, this is seen as he,considers which actions would result in an ' in principle' separation of the 
goods of sexuality. On the one hand, to deny oneself the option of parenthood for genetic reasons would 
not be seen as separating these two goods. This could be likened to the denial of sexual relations in 
16 Fabricated Man, p.87. This principle is covered in more detail in Ramsey, The Patient as a Person; Explorations 
in Medical Ethics. 
V Ibid. p.87. 
18 Ibid. p.37. 
19 Ibid. p.38. 
20#tf.p.39. 
21 Ibid. p.87. 
22 ibid, p . l l f . 
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celibates, which can be "to the glory of God." 2 3 Continence, using three contraceptives at once, or 
sterilization, are all legitimate ways in which such birth control can be achieved without, apparently, 
separating the goods of sexuality.24 Ramsey even suggests that the action of two carriers of the same 
genetic disease who set about having their own children "can only be called genetic imprudence 
[which] is gravely immoral". 2 ' By contrast, his objections to cloning human beings (maintaining a cloned 
population would necessitate avoiding sexual procreation), and to the use of AID (in which different men 
would be involved in providing the procreative and unitive goods), are based on the understanding that 
these actions would involve a separation of these two goods.26 What yardstick has been used in order to 
deduce whether or not an action causes a separation of the two goods of human sexuality? 
More recently other theologians have used the concept of immutable principles in their moral 
decision-making concerning human genetic manipulation. Oliver O'Donovan distinguishes between 
humans begetting children and making them, suggesting that the latter process is morally wrong as it 
would involve the separation of the two goods of human sexuality.27 Waters writes of a "normative 
ordering of procreation" in which children "grow out of an enlarging relationship to which they in turn 
contribute in establishing a family". 2 8 As reproductive cloning would break the principle of this 
normative ordering he sees it as being morally wrong. 
ii) A consequential approach 
In direct contrast with Ramsey, Fletcher makes utilitarian judgements according to the assumed 
consequences of any actions He believes this is a more rational approach. Principles are regarded as 
"[b]land a priori assertions of opinion we cannot either verify or falsify". 2 9 He accuses those who make 
reference to principles of having opted out of the decision-making process.30 In Fletcher's 'situation 
ethics', the best action or policy to adopt is determined through measuring the human need it serves, or 
23 Fabricated Man, p.59. 
24 Ibid. p. 120. 
25 Fabricated Man, p.57. 
26Ibid. p.l07andp.l33. 
27 Begotten or Made?, pp.1,75. 
28 Brent Waters, "One Flesh? Cloning, Procreation, and the Family" in Cole-Turner (ed), Human Cloning, p.83. 
29 The Ethics of Genetic Control, p.88. 
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the human well-being it brings about; health and happiness are what count.31 This may sound an 
admirable ethical policy, but it does have its problems. 
Firstly, the ethical conclusions one arrives at are very much dependent on the range of 
consequences considered. For example, Fletcher rejects the principle that a foetus should be regarded as 
a person, and therefore the consequences of any action from the point of view of the well-being of the 
foetus need not be considered.32 He is therefore able to conclude that "pregnancy when wanted is a 
healthy process, pregnancy when not wanted is a disease - in fact, a venereal disease"; and that " [ i ] f the 
State is morally justified in repelling an unwelcome invader, why should not a woman do so when 
burdened or invaded by an unwelcome pregnancy".33 Here it is only the woman who is pregnant for 
whom consequences have been taken into account By contrast, when considering a situation in which a 
child with a "birth defect" may be born; it seems that the consequences of such a birth should be sought 
well beyond the mother, as far as society at large.34 Fletcher cites the cost of caring for a retarded person 
during their lifetime, and suggests this money could be better spent on "normal but disadvantaged" 
children.3 5 How does one decide how widely the consequences need to be considered, and who qualifies 
to be included in each 'situation'? 
The second difficulty lies in one's ability to predict accurately the results of particular actions. 
Ramsey makes this criticism. He describes a situation in which it is assumed that increasing the 
population's intelligence would be beneficial. However, unless the number of altruists in the population 
were also increased, this would not necessarily be so. The result could be a breed of highly intelligent 
criminals. It may even be that the implications of genetic manipulation are so complex that the 
consequences can never be predicted: "[o]nly God knows.... enough to hold the future in His hands."36 
Consequences are also difficult to predict because we do not have total control over the situations we 
3 0 The Ethics of Genetic Control, p.l 19. 
3 1 Ibid, p.31 and p. 169. 
3 2 The Ethics of Genetic Control, pp.132-142. 
3 3 Ibid. p. 142 and p. 157, his emphasis. 
Mlbid. pi5If. 
^Ibid. p. 160. 
3 6 Fabricated Man, p. 130. 
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consider. Research scientists and medical practitioners may intend great good through the use of gene 
therapy, but they are not in total control of the consequences of such manipulation. 
Thirdly, for all Fletcher's disparaging views of those who have principles, it is obvious that he 
uses principles too. How else would he be able to decide which consequence was better than another? 
His principle is that the highest good is that of human well-being; health and happiness.37 Another 
principle which Fletcher uses states that foetuses need not be regarded as human persons. Holding this 
principle can seem to be as "a priori" and "pre-judiced" as Ramsey's principle of personhood beginning 
at fertilisation. 
Finally, i f moral decisions are to be made according to the criterion of 'human well-being', how 
is this quality to be measured? Fletcher suggests it can be assessed through a person's: "health, survival, 
growth, joy, social interest, self-realisation, and so on.". 3 8 But wi l l this always be the case? Can it be 
assumed that anything which contributes to my ultimate well-being wi l l always f i l l me with joy? And 
can such self-centredness and selfishness truly be the sum total of morality? An action which has 
consequences which may be bad for individuals or communities may still be the right thing to do. 
For all the pit-falls of the utilitarian, consequentialist ethic, it is still very popular today. John 
Harris, the English philosopher, is a strong advocate of human genetic manipulation on the ground that it 
can be used to avoid needless suffering. (In parallel with Fletcher, Harris does not include foetuses in his 
consequential calculus).39 Also from a utilitarian viewpoint, Jeremy Rifkrn interestingly comes to a 
different conclusion. He has lobbied in America for caution in all fields of genetic manipulation for some 
time. He believes that the consequences of using such technology may not be as rosy as Harris 
imagines.40 This surely illustrates the difficulties of accurately predicting consequences. 
Neither the principled, nor the consequential approach seem an ideal way to approach the moral 
issues raised by human genetic manipulation. An alternative approach is needed. 
37 The Ethics of Genetic Control, p. 120. 
38/&,</. p .31. 
39 See Ch.3.7 (iii), below. 
4 0 The Biotech Century. 
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iii) An alternative approach 
It is not easy to find clear-cut rules from within the Christian faith which would make simple 
any decision-making about human genetic manipulation. Nor is it necessarily right, nor easy, to 
determine which particular manipulations would create the most happiness in the most people. An 
alternative approach, whilst making no claims mat it is the sole legitimate Christian approach, can 
provide a broader overview, and insight from a range of theological perspectives. The approach involves 
three separate steps. First, the relevant genetic techniques are considered, and the main moral questions 
they raise identified. Second, a range of theology is explored for useful insights which shed light on 
these questions. Finally, the theological insights are drawn together and applied to a particular 
technology. This forms the basic outline of the thesis, but first, some explanation is given concerning the 
choice of theological perspectives used. 
An exploration of the significance of the imago Dei necessitates an examination of the 
disagreement between Karl Barth and Emil Brunner.41 A small number of theologians are deliberately 
sought for their view than humankind is not only in a position to, but called to, be active in changing its 
future. 4 2 As a balance and check, more 'realistic' theologies are also explored.43 Ecofeminist theology is 
a very specific and radical form of theology, which has its own failings. It does, however, provide 
challenging material in terms of its emphases on responsibility not domination, co-operation not 
competition, embodiment, and an understanding of death.44 Stanley Hauerwas provides not only his 
distinctive narrative approach to theology, but also much insight into health, medicine and suffering. 4 5 
Frances Young gives a challenging theological insight into the contribution of disabled people in 
4' Natural Theology: Comprising 'Nature and Grace' by Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the reply 'No!' by Dr. 
Karl Barth. 
42 Theodosius Dobzhansky, Heredity and the Nature of Man and The Biology of Ultimate Concern. 
Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations Vol.9, Ch. 14, "The Problem of Genetic Engineering" and Vol.21, Ch. 1, 
"Profane History and Salvation History". 
The ecofeminist theologians (note 44). 
43 Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History: A Comparison of Christian and Modern Views of History. 
Oliver O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics. 
44 Sallie McFague, The Body of God, and Super, Natural Christians: How we should Love Nature. 
Rosemary Radford Ruether, Gaia and God: An Ecofeminist Theology of Earth Healing, and Sexism and God-Talk: 
Towards a Feminist Theology. 
45 Stanley Hauerwas, Naming the Silences: God, Medicine and the Problem of Suffering, Suffering Presence and 
Truthfulness and Tragedy. 
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communities.4* Perhaps the most helpful and influential theologian is Jiirgen Moltmann. Not only does 
he explore theology in the light of recent scientific and ecological advances, and in the light of his 
experience with handicapped people, but his eschatological work provides a theological approach 
between the extremes of 'Progress' and 'Realism'.''7 This exploration is certainly not exhaustive, but it 
takes a wide enough sample to gain a breadth of theological insight which can be usefully applied to the 
moral issues of human genetic manipulation. 
1.4 Thesis outline 
In Chapter 2 I describe the techniques of genetic testing and screening, gene therapy and 
reproductive cloning. I categorise the moral issues which they raise in terms of issues relating to human 
nature, eugenics and health. In the following three chapters I make a theological exploration of these 
areas. Chapter 3 considers what it is to be human; in relation with God, with ourselves and with the rest 
of creation. Chapter 4 explores theological responses to humankind being able to alter its own future. 
Chapter 5 seeks theological insight into the interrelated areas of medicine, health, and wholeness. In 
Chapter 6 I draw together these theological explorations and apply them to the specific situation of gene 
therapy and enhancement, making suggestions concerning legislation in this area. The final chapter 
forms a post-script for the Christian church, considering roles which the church can play for all those 
affected by human genetic manipulation. 
46 Frances Young, Face to Face; A narrative essay in the theology of suffering. 
4 7 Jttrgen Moltmann, God in Creation: An Ecological Doctrine of Creation, The Future of Creation and The Power 
of the Powerless. 
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Chapter 2: GENETIC MANIPULATION - A MORAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I describe the main genetic technologies which could be applied to 
human beings, and the uses to which they could be put. These technologies are: genetic testing and 
screening, gene therapy, and cloning. In addition, the moral issues which these technologies raise wi l l be 
identified. The areas of morality considered are those concerning human nature, eugenic implications 
and health issues. First, I describe the context of the development of human genetic technologies. 
In the last hundred years huge advances have been made in the prevention and treatment of 
infectious diseases in the Western world. A great increase in standards of hygiene and nutrition, 
combined with the growth in our understanding of the ways in which micro-organisms infect and affect 
us, and the development of vaccinations and drugs (particularly antibiotics) to counter such infection, 
have together reduced the incidence of infectious disease. As a result we are now far more aware of 
those diseases caused, not by infectious agents, but as a result of genetic changes. 
In Britain about one child in thirty is born with a genetic problem of some kind. Over a third of 
registered blind people are blind for genetic reasons, and more than half of all cases of severe mental 
handicap have an inherited cause.1 About four thousand diseases are now known which are caused by a 
disruption to a single gene.3 Those most well known include: Duchenne muscular dystrophy, 
haemophilia, cystic fibrosis!, sickle-cell disease, Tay Sachs and Huntington's disease. The frequency of 
each particular inherited disease is relatively rare, but there are many of them and their effects can be 
devastating.3 Other diseases appear to be caused by the effect of more than one gene combined with 
environmental factors/ In these cases the presence of a certain mutation wi l l only ever indicate a 
1 Steve Jones, The Language of Genes, pp.284f. 
2 J. Robert Nelson, On the New Frontiers of Genetics and Religion, p.41. 
3 See Glossary. 
4 For example coronary heart disease, diabetes and certain cancers. 
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person's predisposition to a disease. There are no standard cures for inherited diseases; there is only the 
possibility of the relief of symptoms or (in a few cases) preventing the symptoms from developing.5 
Alongside our increasing awareness of diseases with a genetic cause, there has been an increase 
in our knowledge of the make-up of the human genome, and the location and nature of disease-causing 
genes. The "Human Genome Projecf' is a multi-national, multi-billion dollar venture aiming to establish 
the sequence of the entire human genome by the early years of the next millennium. This wil l involve 
'reading' and recording over 3 billion units of genetic information, enough material to f i l l 12 copies of 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. Within these 3 billion units of genetic information there are approximately 
one hundred thousand genes, the information for which only accounts for 3-5% of the total information 
stored in the human genome. The function of the remaining 95% of DNA is still a mystery. One of the 
fruits of the Human Genome Project has been a steady growth in the identification of disease-causing 
genes, and the nature of their mutations. This information can help in establishing the cause of, and 
therefore methods of treatment for, these inherited diseases. Another use of such information is in testing 
or screening for the presence of disease-causing mutations in the genomes of individuals or groups of 
individuals. 
Genetic manipulation in bacteria, yeast, and latterly plants and animals, has led the way to the 
development of techniques which wil l make possible the manipulation of the human genome. Early 
clinical trials for the treatment of simple genetic diseases in humans, through the addition of particular 
DNA sequences, are already underway. It is also theoretically possible to use genetic manipulation to 
'improve' the human genome, and to make changes which wil l be passed on through subsequent 
generations. 'Dolly' the sheep has also revealed the feasibility of another means of genetic manipulation 
in humans, in that it may now be possible to produce a baby which wi l l be a genetically-identical clone of 
an adult person. 
Genetic testing and screening, gene therapy and cloning are now described in more detail, and 
their potential applications for human beings. 
5 Ranging from the careful diet for phenylketonuria sufferers and insulin injections for diabetics (very effective) to 
physiotherapy (limited effect) or heart-lung transplants (risky, limited availability) for cystic fibrosis patients. For 
many genetic diseases (over 80%) there is no treatment at all, including Huntington's and Tay Sachs diseases. 
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2.2 Genetic manipulation - techniques 
i) Genetic testing and screening6 
It is now a quite simple procedure to identify those people who are suffering from, wi l l suffer 
from, or are carrying recessive genes for, a number of inherited diseases.7 DNA can be extracted and 
analysed from just a small number of cells, such as those released by a mouth-wash, extracted through 
amniocentesis or chorionic villus sampling, or even a single cell removed from an embryo in vitro. There 
are a number of reasons why one might want to test a particular individual, or screen a particular group. 
a) Genetic testing 
PRESYMPTOMATIC TESTING 
This involves testing for the presence of a particular gene before it begins to have any obvious 
effect on a person. Not all inherited diseases show their effects from birth. Boys who have Duchenne 
muscular dystrophy seem normal until the age of about 6 years, and those who have Huntington's disease 
only begin to show symptoms in early middle-age. Genetic testing can allow a person to determine 
whether they are likely to suffer from an inherited disease well before any symptoms are obvious. As 
many genetic diseases remain unrreatable, the value of such information has been questioned. However, 
it can help people to plan for the future, for example in the case of those at risk of Huntington's disease 
who are planning to have children. It is interesting to note that although a test for the Huntington's 
disease gene has been available since 1987, only a few hundred of the many thousands of people known 
to be at risk have chosen to be tested.8 
TESTING CARRIERS 
Huntington's disease is a condition which is inherited dominantly, i.e. only one copy of a 
defective gene is necessary for the disease to be manifest. Other conditions are inherited in a recessive 
manner. Recessive inheritance requires both copies of a gene to be defective before the genetic disease 
wil l manifest itself. Those people who have only one copy of a mutant gene, and are not affected by the 
6 The ethical issues raised by this technology are considered only in as much as they overlap with those raised by 
gene therapy. For a detailed ethical consideration of genetic testing and screening, see: British Medical 
Association, Human Genetics: Choice and Responsibility. 
7 These include; cystic fibrosis, Duchenne muscular dystrophy, Huntington's disease, Tay Sachs, sickle cell disease 
and some forms of inherited breast cancer (Riflcin, The Biotech Century, p.27). 
8 Jones, The Language of the Genes, p.295. 
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disease, are called 'carriers' because they can pass this mutant gene on to their descendants. Cystic 
fibrosis is inherited in a recessive manner. I f two people from families known to suffer from cystic 
fibrosis (but themselves healthy people) were exploring the possibility of starting a family, they may well 
want to discover whether either or bom of them were carriers. 
FOETAL TESTING 
A combination of chorionic villus sampling and DNA analysis can now allow foetuses to be 
tested for a number of inherited conditions (embryos in vitro can also be tested). These include not only 
single-gene mutations, but also chromosomal abnormalities. Tests of this sort are offered to those 
thought to be at particular risk (because of information from family histories, or the mother's age). The 
difficulty with foetal testing currently is that so few inherited diseases can be successfully treated, even i f 
identified before birth. The only 'treatment' which can be offered today is that of a 'therapeutic 
abortion'. 
b) Genetic screening 
Screening populations for particular conditions is already an important medical tool. Pregnant 
women are routinely screened for their rhesus blood group, and adult women are regularly screened for 
the presence of cervical cancer. One particular genetic condition has been screened for in this country 
since 1973. Phenylketonuria (PKU) is a disease which prevents people from metabolising a certain 
chemical found in everyday food! A build-up of derivative chemicals in the body causes brain damage 
leading to severe mental handicap. A l l babies in this country are screened for PKU at birth; those found 
A 
to be suffering from i t can be fed a particular diet which prevents brain damage occurring.9 
PKU is one of the few genetic conditions which has a successful treatment. Many genetic 
diseases for which it would now be possible to screen large numbers of people (detecting both sufferers 
and carriers) have no treatment Would the knowledge gained from screening programmes be valuable or 
destructive? Both are possibilities, as is illustrated by examples of genetic screening already conducted in 
the United States. 
9 This screen has been available for so long because it depends on detecting high levels of a certain chemical in the 
baby's blood, rather than a mutation in the PKU gene. 
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Sickle cell disease is a recessively inherited abnormality of red blood cells which is particularly 
prevalent in certain ethnic groups, especially those of African origins.1 0 The symptoms of the disease 
include: pain throughout the body, swelling of hands and feet, and damage to eyes, lungs, hips and 
shoulders (all due to misshapen red blood cells clogging blood vessels). In the 1970s many US states 
conducted screening programmes for sickle cell disease; black people were required by law to submit to 
such testing. The screening was handled very badly, due mainly to insufficient (comprehensible) 
information being given to those screened. The whole process was seen as a means to racial 
discrimination. Many carriers mistakenly thought they had the disease, and became stigmatised and 
discriminated against in terms of employment, insurance and marriage." 
By contrast, a positive example of the use of genetic screening can be seen in the case of Tay 
Sachs disease. This is also a recessively inherited disease which is mainly observed in a particular ethnic 
grouping. Those suffering from Tay Sachs are by and large Jews who have their ancestral roots in 
Eastern Europe. Tay Sachs is a severe example of inherited disease. Mental and physical deterioration 
occurs in early infancy, bringing death in early childhood. In this situation, the request for genetic 
counselling came from within the Jewish community itself. Combining the screening programme with 
very good counselling and public education, resulted in the incidence of Tay Sachs being reduced by 
90%. 1 2 About 25,000 Ashkenazic Jews are tested annually. 
As the information regarding the human genome grows, and the number of genetic tests 
available to us increases, more genetic conditions wil l be open to screening programmes. The biologist 
Steve Jones questions the value of gleaning such information as most people carry mutations of some 
description, and there is little which we can do with the knowledge.13 This situation may become 
significantly different i f the technology of gene therapy comes to provide an effective cure for genetic 
disease. -
!0 This is probably because carriers have some protection against malarial infection. 
1 1 Tom Wilkie, Perilous Knowledge; The Human Genome Project and its Implications, pp.99ff. 
' 2 / i i r f ,p . l l3 . 
'3 The Language of Genes, p.288. 
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ii) Gene therapy 
The (currently) incurable nature of genetic disease has been mentioned. The alleviation of 
symptoms can be achieved in some situations, but a cure wi l l only ever be effected by changes to the 
genetic make-up of sufferers. Altering somatic cells wi l l not transmit genetic changes to subsequent 
offspring. Germ line therapy would produce a change which would be inherited. Using similar 
techniques to those of gene therapy, it would also be possible to add improvements to the human genome. 
a) Somatic cell therapy 
Clinical trials are already underway in this country exploring the use of gene therapy to cure 
monogenic diseases such as cystic fibrosis and SCIDS.'4 
Severe combined immunodeficiency syndrome (SCIDS) is a disease caused by a defect in both 
copies of the gene which carries the information needed to make an enzyme known as A D A 1 5 . ADA is a 
vital ingredient needed by cells of the immune system in order to fight infection. Infants suffering from 
SCIDS seldom live very long; even the common cold can be fatal to them. Mercifully it is a very rare 
disease, occurring in approximately 1 in 250,000 births worldwide.1 6 Attempts have been made to 
increase the life-span of SCIDS children by avoiding infectious organisms (the child lives in a sterile 
'bubble') or by boosting the immune system (through bone marrow transplants and, more recently, 
injections of artificial ADA). In September 1990 a four-year-old girl in the United States made medical 
history by receiving revolutionary gene therapy treatment. Some of the child's bone marrow cells had 
been removed from her body, a 'good' ADA gene added to them, and the cells reintroduced into her 
body. The girl is still alive, and is able to attend school. A number of other children have since been 
treated in the same way. The precise efficacy of the gene therapy in this situation is not known, as the 
child also receives regular injections of ADA enzyme.17 
'Cystic fibrosis affects about 1 in 2,000 babies born in Caucasian populations.18 The disease is 
caused by the loss of a single protein from a certain type of cell in the lung and digestive system, causing 
1 4 William Clark, The New Healers, p.122-133 give details of other trials. 
15 Adenosine deaminase. 
16 Wilkie, Perilous Knowledge, p. 17. 
17 Jones, The Language of the Genes, p.293. 
18 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genetic Screening - Ethical Issues, p. 108. 
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problems in digestion and a sticky mucus to accumulate in the lungs. Children suffering from cystic 
fibrosis are prone to chest infections, the only treatment currently available is antibiotics and regular 
physiotherapy. The average life expectancy of those suffering from cystic fibrosis is about 30 years. A 
more drastic (and more risky) form of treatment is that of a heart-lung transplant which, i f it takes, is 
considerably more effective. Attempts have been made to use gene therapy to cure this disease. It was 
originally thought that a simple nasal spray would be sufficient, but there are difficulties in delivering 
sufficient DNA into the cells which need it. Scientists assume that it is simply a matter of time before the 
practical details are sorted out, and gene therapy can be used on a routine basis.19 
For some monogenic diseases, it is not the absence of a 'good' gene, but the presence of a 
'defective' gene which causes the problems. This appears to be the case in Huntington's disease.20 
Huntington's disease could not be cured simply by the insertion of effective copies of the HD gene into 
cells of the central nervous system. A cure could only be achieved by the removal of the 'defective' 
copies of the gene from all such cells. This would be a far more complicated, i f at all possible, matter.21 
Another area in which the use of gene therapy is being explored is in the treatment of cancers. 
Cancer is not a simple monogenic disease like cystic fibrosis or SCIDS. Most cancers are caused by a 
combination of a number of genetic and environmental factors. Nevertheless, attempts are being made to 
treat cancer by the addition of genetic material, generally this extra DNA causes the cancer cells to 
'commit suicide'.2 2 The theory of gene therapy for cancer treatment may not be as simple as that for 
monogenic diseases, but its use may be far greater because of the higher incidence of cancer. In 1997 
,.-) 
over half the 204 gene trials approved in the US were for the treatment of cancers.23 
Gene therapy in somatic cells has already been developed as far as clinical trials because it has 
no effect on the inheritance of future generations. This very fact may cause a higher incidence of genetic 
disease in a given population. I f the girl from America who first received gene therapy survives to child-
19 Clark, The New Healers, p. 133. 
l&Ibid, p.216. 
21 The possibility is being explored in the case of sickle cell disease, blood cells being far more accessible. The 
defective gene is not so much removed as inactivated. (Lee Silver, Remaking Eden; Cloning and beyond in a 
Brave New World, p.232). 
22 Clark, The New Healers, pp. 134-160. 
23 "In sickness and in health in New Scientist, 25.10.97., pp.20f. 
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bearing age, she wi l l pass on to her children the same defective gene which caused her to suffer from 
SCIDS in the first place. It has been suggested that somatic gene therapy is no real cure because it simply 
serves to increase the number of disease-causing genes in the population. An alternative form of gene 
therapy, that which would alter a person's reproductive cells and so would be passed on to subsequent 
generations, is also theoretically possible. 
b) Germ line therapy 
It may be possible to alter the genetic make-up of an embryo in vitro, or a foetus in utero, so that 
a disease-causing mutation is repaired not only for the baby which develops, but also for all her 
descendants.24 At the moment there is a complete moratorium on such treatments in this and many other 
countries. But the reasons behind the ban appear to be more practical than moral. The Clothier 
Committee was set up by the Department of Health to look into ethical issues raised by the possibility of 
gene therapy. In 1992 its Report recommended a ban on any genetic modification of embryos that could 
be passed on to future generations because of "insufficient knowledge to evaluate the risks to future 
generations".25 Future experiments on animals, and human cells in culture, may convince us of the safety 
of germ line therapy. It is therefore important to consider if, and under what circumstances, it would be 
right to use this technique. 
c) Genetic enhancement 
The more we discover about the human genome and its functioning, the more it becomes likely 
that we wil l become able to change human characteristics as well as simply repair dysfunctional genes. 
Individuals already spend considerable amounts of time, energy and money attempting to influence their 
physical, mental and emotional state. Not surprisingly the possibility of using genetic manipulation as a 
means to the same ends has been considered. The concept appeals to a significant proportion of people 
24 This has been achieved in animals - hence the sheep with special milk and the pigs designed as organ donors, 
amongst many others. The feasibility of germ line therapy has recently been questioned due to the difficulty of 
achieving 'pure lines' of manipulated individuals. (Storrar and Torrance (eds), Human Genetics, p. 17). The 
concept of germ line therapy will still be considered in this thesis, because of the possibility of unintentional 
(albeit partial) manipulation of germ cells, and also because the feasibility of this technique may well change in 
the future. 
25 The Clothier Report, 5.1, 5.2, 7.2. 
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today; Rifkin cites a Harris poll taken in 1992 in which 43% of Americans "would approve using gene 
therapy [sic] to improve babies' physical characteristics".26 
The genetic factors involved in facial features, body form, intellectual ability and general fitness 
are likely to be far too complex, as well as having a range of environmental influences, to be able to be 
readily influenced by genetic manipulation. However, there are other characteristics which may be more 
easily changed. It may be possible to increase our natural resistance to infectious disease by adding to, or 
altering, the genes involved in the immune system. Genes involved in the ageing process may soon be 
located. Delaying the functioning of these genes, or removing them from the human genome, may have a 
significant effect on the human life-span. Genes could be added to the genome which would offer 
protection against pollution or cancer-causing agents. It may be possible to manipulate genes involved in 
brain activity to reduce our need for sleep, or increase memory capacity. It would appear that the general 
public would be in favour of the use of genetic enhancements, however, the Clothier Committee 
recommended that gene therapy should not be used to change normal human characteristics.27 
iii) Cloning 
The cloning of human beings has been considered a theoretical possibility for some time. 
Science fiction novels like Brave New World and The Boys from Brazil have cloned people central to the 
plot. 2 8 Almost thirty years ago serious theological and ethical consideration was being given to the 
possibility of human clones.29 Nevertheless, the announcement in 1997 of the birth of 'Dolly', a sheep 
cloned from a cell from an adult sheep, captured the imagination of the world's press. The threat of 
clones of Hitler jockeyed for position with the promise of clones of Claudia Schiffer. No-one appeared 
interested in the potential of this technique for the cloning of transgenic sheep which would secrete 
human proteins in their milk (the motivation behind the research). Far more exciting was the possibility 
of cloning human beings! 
The governments of powerful nations were immediately requested to make comment and draft 
legislation. The Human Genetics Advisory Commission and Human Fertilisation & Embryology 
26 The Biotech Century, p.l 43. 
27 The Clothier Report, 4.22, 7.5. See also BMA, Human Genetics, p. 198. 
28 Written by Aldous Huxley and Ira Levine. 
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Authority in the UK published a consultation document in January 1998 seeking public opinion on the 
matter.30 It was seen that cloning could be used for a number of reasons: to 'replace' a dead child, in 
order to obtain an organ donor for a sibling, by an individual hoping to 'cheat' death, by lesbian or 
infertile couples wanting children genetically their own. 3 1 
The subsequent report, issued in December 1998, pointed out that the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 already forbids human reproductive cloning using the technique used to produce 
Dolly. 3 2 Having been influenced gready by the results of the consultation, the report supported a 
complete ban on human reproductive cloning, but recommended that changes to the 1990 HFE Act 
should be made to allow 'therapeutic cloning'. 3 3 Indicating the extent to which the report's conclusions 
were influenced by public opinion, it was also recommended that "the issues are re-examined again in, 
say, five years time, in the light of developments and public attitudes towards them in the interim". 3 4 
Recent experiments in animal cloning suggest that it may be a while before the techniques of 
mammalian cloning wi l l be sufficiently safe for use with human beings.35 I f the technology does become 
sufficiently developed, and i f public opinion were to change as a result, would this mean that human 
reproductive cloning would be a morally appropriate thing to do? Or are there any moral implications 
which need to be considered irrespective of 'public opinion'? 
Having described the techniques of genetic testing and screening, gene therapy, and cloning, 
consideration is now given to the moral issues they raise. These issues can be grouped into three main 
29 Ramsey, Fabricated Man, p.62ff, (1970). Fletcher, The Ethics ofGentic Control, p. 154f (1974). 
30 Cloning Issues in Reproduction, Science and Medicine - A Consultation Document. 
31/iuf. 8.3, 8.5. 
32 Cloning Issues in Reproduction, Science and Medicine - A Report, 3.4. Reproductive cloning (that used to bring 
about the birth of a cloned baby) was distinguished from 'therapeutic cloning' (which could be used to provide 
cultured cells for the treatment of serious disease), 5.1. 
33 ibid, 4.4 and 9.3. Therapuetic cloning will not be considered further in this thesis. It raises distinct ethical issues 
not to be covered here. 
34 Ibid, 9.7. 
35 A very small proportion of embryos having received a nuclear transfer actually develop into a viable foetus 
{Cloning Issues in Reproduction, Science and Medicine - A Consultation Document, 2.2), there may also be 
complications relating to aging ("Worn away " in New Scientist, 29.5.99., p. 12). 
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areas. They relate to our understanding of what it is to be human, to the concept of eugenics, and to our 
understanding of health. 
2.3 Genetic manipulation - moral issues 
Some of the ethical issues raised by genetic manipulation are practical, relating to the 
implementation of the techniques. These issues include those of safety, financial matters and the use of 
genetic knowledge. In terms of safety; the insertion of new fragments of DNA into a genome happens at 
random, and can destroy important sequences. This could have implications for the health of the gene 
therapy patient, or for future generations i f the effect is not felt immediately. One of the ways in which 
DNA is introduced into chromosomes is through the use of viruses. These viruses wi l l have been altered 
so that they do not cause disease, but there is the possibility of them being able to become active again. 
Some human genes which are regarded as 'defective' may actually be vitally important in certain 
situations; removing these genes through gene therapy could be detrimental in the long-term (as in the 
case of the sickle cell gene affording resistance to malaria). Safety issues relating to cloning have already 
been mentioned.36 In financial terms; sequences of DNA and transgenic animals have been patented. 
Genetic technology is incredibly expensive; gene therapy may therefore become an issue of the use of 
limited resources in the National Health Service.37 In terms of genetic knowledge; despite the amazing 
genetic technology available, 100% accuracy can never be guaranteed in tests for disease-causing genes, 
new or rare mutations can slip through the net of the test. What is the value of such knowledge i f there is 
still no treatment for such diseases, or i f one is found to be a carrier of a relatively rare disorder? Who 
should have access to genetic information: other family members, potential marriage partners, insurance 
companies, employers? Practical questions such as these wil l be considered only when they impinge on 
the deeper, more fundamental moral issues raised. 
Some very basic moral questions are raised by genetic testing, gene therapy and human cloning. 
These are the questions I intend to address, they include: What does it mean to be human? Is it right to 
alter the course of human evolution? What do we mean by 'health'? and What are we aiming at through 
our use of medicine and genetic technologies? 
36 Previous footnote. 
37 See Ch.3.7 (ii), below. 
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i) Issues of human nature 
a) Determined or free? 
The Human Genome Project and associated genetic research is providing a new dimension of 
insight into human nature. Walter Gilbert, one of the pioneers of DNA sequencing, has suggested that 
when we have read the entire human genome, then we wil l know what it is to be human.38 The 
assumption behind this statement is that human beings are the sum of their genes. In the light of 
acquiring so much genetic information about ourselves, we could be reduced to believing that we 'are' 
the 3 billion letters which make up our genome. A person could be defined by the mutations she carries. 
We may come to have an increasingly deterministic attitude towards ourselves. Already suggestions 
have been made that genes 'for ' schizophrenia, alcoholism, homosexuality, criminality and manic 
depression have been found. 3 9 But are human beings simply robots, made and functioning according to 
the instructions in their genomes? It is really true that we have no control, that we are unable to influence 
the way our lives work out, that we are simply machines set to run a pre-determined course? Can we 
blame everything on our genes, or is there a way in which we are actually responsible for our own lives? 
What does it mean to be human? 
b) A question of worth 
Human life has been considered to be unique, even morally superior to animal l i fe . 4 0 This is 
due in no small part to the traditional Christian understanding of the early chapters of the book of 
Genesis. The value of human life is called into question in two ways by recent genetic advances: by 
comparing human and animal genomes, and through the testing of foetuses for genetic abnormalities. 
As our genetic knowledge of humans and a huge variety of other creatures grows, it becomes 
increasingly obvious that humans share much of their genetic make-up with animals, plants and even 
bacteria.^ The DNA of human beings and chimpanzees differ only by about 1.6%.41 This is especially 
startling as there is a 2.6% difference between the genomes of the almost indistinguishable willow 
warbler and chiff chaff. Where then is the unique value, the moral worth, of the human being to be 
38 Wilkie, Perilous Knowledge, p.182. 
39 John Kilner, Rebecca Pentz and Frank Young (eds), Genetic Ethics; Do the Ends Justify the Means?, p.78 and 84. 
4 0 Wilkie, Perilous Knowledge, p. 176. 
4 1 Jones, The Language of the Genes, p. 129. See also "The greatest apes " in New Scientist, 15.5.99, pp.26-30. 
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found? Some animal rights campaigners regard any understanding of humans having unique value as 
being 'speciesist', on a par with sexist, racist and ageist views.4 2 Is there any reason for unique value 
being afforded to human beings? At what stages in life is this value to be found? 
It is now possible to test human foetuses for a number of genetic anomalies. As most genetic 
diseases have no effective form of treatment, there is little that can be done on receiving a positive test 
result. "Therapeutic abortions' are offered as a means of avoiding a life of suffering. This action implies 
there are human lives which are not worth living, and/or a foetus does not afford the same moral value as 
a baby. 
The question of the value of human life lies at the heart of the issues raised by much of the 
genetic technology available to us now. It is the question which Wilkie sees as being of crucial 
importance. 
This then may be the final challenge posed by the Human Genome Project: to redefine 
our sense of our moral worth and to find a way of asserting, in the face of all the 
technical details of the genetics, that human life is greater than the DNA from which it 
sprang, that human beings retain a moral value which is irreducible and which 
transcends the sequence of 3 billion base pairs within the human genome.43 
What does it mean to be human?'' 
c) Masters of the universe? 
The powerful and creative genetic technology available to humans can lead to delusions of 
grandeur. It may appear anything is possible, that we can design and make any form of life, that we can 
be 'masters of the universe'. I f only we had sufficient knowledge, and could develop the necessary 
technologies, then we would be able to do anything, we could design the world the way we want it to be. 
This attitude is commonly seen as springing from the Enlightenment, and in particular the work of 
4 2 Richard Ryder, Animal Revolution: Changing Attitudes towards Speciesism, cited in Andrew Linzey, Animal 
Theology, p. 196. 
43 Perilous Knowledge, p. 191. 
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Francis Bacon.44 The value of knowledge, and the use to which it can be put, was seen by Bacon in terms 
of humanity needing to overcome the limitations and 'ruin' which nature brought upon them; "Nature 
may be - and must be - mastered".45 Taking this way of thinking we see genetic disease as the 'ruin' 
thrust upon us by nature. We could fight this, applying the genetic knowledge we have gained, and 
perhaps bring about a human population free of genetic disease. Our genetic limitations are seen as 
restrictions forced upon us by nature; these too could be fought using enhancement and cloning 
techniques. We could overcome disease, and the limits of our genetic make-up. We could become 
'masters of the universe'.46 
Is the Baconian way of thinking valid and realistic? Is it true that nature is 'out to get us', that 
we need to fight against its forces? Is it true that i f only we knew enough we could apply our knowledge 
to overcome the limitations and the 'ruin' of this life? Can we become masters of the universe? What 
does it mean to be human? 
ii) Eugenic issues 
Any attempts to use genetic manipulation to fight disease or to escape our limitations wil l have 
eugenic implications. An awareness is needed of the significance of eugenics, and the ways in which it is 
already affecting our lives. There is no doubt that humans have already altered the course of their own 
evolution by indirect means. For instance, Jones suggests the invention of the bicycle was "the most 
important event in recent human evolution"!4 7 But to what extent would it ever be right for us to take an 
active role in directing our evolution? 
a) A historical perspective 
The term eugenics (from the Greek eugenes, meaning well-born) was first coined in 1883 by 
Francis Galton (a cousin of Charles Darwin). 4 8 His assumption was that; "What Nature does blindly and 
4 4 Allen Verhey, "Playing God", in Kilner, Pentz and Young (eds), Genetic Ethics, p.62f. Also Gerald McKenny, 
To Relieve the Human Condition; Bioethics, Technology, and the Body, p.2-5. 
4 5 Allen Verhey, "Playing God", in Kilner, Pentz and Young (eds), Genetic Ethics, p.63. 
46 It is a scenario very much like this which Silver envisages in Remaking Eden. 
4 7 The Language of the Genes, p.315. Bicycles increase our rate of outbreeding. 
4 8 For more detail see; Enzo Russo and David Cove, Genetic Engineering; Dreams and Nightmares, p. 166-176. 
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ruthlessly, man may do providently, quickly and kindly". 4 9 This could be achieved through positive 
eugenics (the planned reproduction of the fi t) and through negative eugenics (the prevention of 
reproduction of the unfit). Eugenics became remarkably popular and influential in countries including 
Britain and America during the first half of this century. 
An experiment in positive eugenics begun a century ago warns that the outcome may not always 
be that expected. Elizabeth Nietzsche (sister to Friedrich) selected a group of people whom she saw as 
ideal specimens on the grounds of the 'German purity of their blood'. They were sent to a remote part of 
Paraguay in order to found 'New Germany', a new superior race. A century later their descendants, far 
from being a 'master race', are poor, in-bred and diseased.50 
Meanwhile, it has been negative eugenics which has been practiced the most. At the time when 
Hitler was sterilising the mentally i l l , America, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway and two provinces in 
Canada were doing the same. (In America, many state sterilisation laws called for the sterilisation of 
cmninals, the feeble-minded, inebriates, the blind, and the deformed, as well as the mentally ill .) Not 
unnaturally, the attractions of eugenics paled in the light of Hitler's overt 'Racial Hygiene' programme 
during the Second World War, but it cannot be said that the influence of the movement has been totally 
lost. Rifkin warns that "America's eugenics past is a sobering reminder that ' i t can happen here'."51 To 
some extent it already is. 
b) The present reality 
Attempts at positive eugenics are being made today. In California there is a sperm-bank known 
as the 'Repository for Germinal Choice' which contains sperm samples donated by Nobel Prize winners 
and members of Mensa. This sperm is available, presumably at a suitably high price, to those women 
wishing to give birth to 'genetically superior' babies.52 Admittedly this process may not have much 
eugenic effect, as we have seen through Elizabeth Nietzsche's experiment, but it does show that people 
are in favour of the principle. 
49 Cited in Jones, The Language of the Genes, p.282. 
50 Jones, The Language of the Genes, p.282. 
5 1 The Biotech Century, p. 117. 
5 2 Andrew Kimbrell, The Human Body Shop; The Engineering and Marketing of Life, p.77. 
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The effect of negative eugenics is certainly being felt in the present. People can now be tested to 
see i f they are carriers for a recessive disease, or can have their foetuses tested to see i f they wil l suffer 
from a disease, and can make their reproductive choices in the light of such knowledge. This applies 
especially for those diseases which are prevalent in particular ethnic (or other) groupings. Testing and 
genetic counselling, and testing combined with the use of 'therapeutic abortions', has already 
significantly reduced the incidence of Tay Sachs disease among Ashkenazi Jews, and of thalassaemia 
among people from Cyprus.53 Testing older pregnant mothers in Denmark has led to a five-fold decrease 
in the number of children born with Down's syndrome.54 These incidences do not arise out of any desire 
to alter the genetic make-up of a population, they are all choices made by individuals concerning then-
own offspring. Nevertheless they are having a eugenic effect. 5 5 How may this effect be felt in the future? 
c) Whither the future? 
Attempts at positive eugenics through the breeding of the ' f i t ' with the ' f i t ' have been shown to 
be limited in their success. More accurate, and presumably more successful, positive eugenics could be 
achieved through the use of germ line gene therapy and cloning. Gene therapy and genetic enhancement 
which bring about changes to the genetic make-up of germ line cells wi l l influence future generations. 
For this influence to be felt in all subsequent offspring, it wi l l be necessary for the 'engineered' to breed 
with others 'engineered' in the same way. Otherwise the genetic alteration wi l l be diluted throughout the 
general population, and its effects lost. One way to ensure a particular genetic combination could be 
passed on to future generations would be through the process of cloning. 
Current practice and future possibilities raise the question over whether it is right for humankind 
to make a deliberate attempt to alter their future. Do we have the capacity to engineer ourselves a better 
future? Would it be right for us to attempt to do so? Is 'eugenics' still a dirty word to be associated with 
Hitler, or does it offer us hope? 
53 See above 2.2 (i) b and Wilkie, Perilous Knowledge, p. 100. 
54 Jones, The Language of the Genes, p.286. 
55 It has been suggested that this is simply restoring the process of natural selection which used to operate before 
modern medicine provided the means to keep alive those with genetic abnormalities (Peter Singer and Deane 
Wells, The Reproduction Revolution; New Ways of Making Babies, p. 172). 
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iii) Health issues 
The third area to be considered has already been touched on, through the issue of human value 
and the implications of therapeutic abortions, that is the area of health and 'normality'. Genetic medicine 
is already a distinct field in its own right. Molecular tests and genetic counselling are available to those 
in need. The more we learn about the nature of genetic diseases, the more we are able to find strategies 
for combatting them; such strategies could include gene therapy. Both 'therapeutic' cloning and 
reproductive cloning could have medical uses, especially in the field of organ or tissue transplantation. 
Genetic technology raises moral questions concerning health and medicine; questions concerning the role 
of medicine and the nature of health. 
a) Christianity and Medicine 
In the light of Christian belief, it is not surprising that there has always been a central tension, 
almost a necessary paradox, in the Church's approach to medicine. On the one hand there is a 
recognition of God's providence. In this context, purpose is seen in illness acting as a spur to repentance, 
or being a means by which faith is tested and strengthened. This view is captured magnificently in 'The 
Order for Visitation of the Sick' found from the Book of Common Prayer.56 Today such verbose 
language may not be used, but the belief that God uses illness or disability to bring people back to 
himself, or to strengthen faith, remains.37 
On the other hand, there have always been Christians involved in the medical profession. 
Healing is seen as an effect and a.sign of God's mercy.38 A scriptural ( i f Apocryphal) justification for 
doctors is found in Ecclesiasticus Ch.38.39 Caring for and treating those who are i l l is an extension of 
Christ's healing ministry, and a response to the commandment to love our neighbour as ourselves. Our 
present physical bodies may not be of eternal significance, but this does not mean to say that the state of 
them is irrelevant. In the light of this tension, what is it that we should expect of medicine? 
56 As pointed out by Stephen Pattinson in Alive and Kicking: Towards a Practical Theology of Illness and Healing, 
p.46. 
57 Michael Beates "God's Sovereignty and Genetic Anomalies" in Kilner, Pentz and Young (eds), Genetic Ethics 
p.52-54. McKenny, To Relieve the Human Condition, p.221 f. 
58 p a u i Tournier, from "A Doctor's Casebook in the Light of the Bible " quoted in Stephen Lammers and Allen 
Verhey (eds), On Moral Medicine: Theological Perspectives in Medical Ethics, p.21. 
59 Karl Barth, from "Church Dogmatics IIU4 " quoted in Lammers and Verhey (eds), On Moral Medicine, p.8. 
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b) Advances in medical technology 
The question concerning the role of medicine has been highlighted in recent years by a rapid and 
widespread growth in medical technologies. An expectation has developed that medicine can, and 
should, treat anything.60 Evidence of this expectation is seen in the five-fold increase in the per capita 
cost of running the Nation Health Service between 1960 and 1994 (inflation having been accounted 
for). 6 1 How are these technologies best to be used? Is it our moral duty to use them at any and every 
opportunity? I f gene therapy becomes standard treatment, wil l it be the duty of doctors to use it in all 
cases of genetic abnormality or difference? As germ line gene therapy would be more effective in 
removing genetic abnormalities from a population, would this be regarded as morally preferable? I f 
health advantages could be given to people by adding new genes, would this be a good use of a medical 
technology? Should cloning be used to produce lines of very healthy people? 
c) . Expectations of 'health' 
The question of the role of medicine begs the question of our understanding of the nature of 
health. What is it that medicine is aiming to achieve? One could say; 'healthy people', but then how 
would 'health' be defined? In 1948 the World Health Organisation defined it as: "a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity". 6 2 There is 
value in regarding health not simply as the absence of disease, but the understanding of 'complete' well-
being has perhaps contributed to health becoming something of an idol in today's Western culture. 
Glossy magazines, advertisements, television and films all promote an image of health involving 
beautiful, fi t bodies. Health clubs, fitness regimes, plastic surgery, even ordinary foodstuffs are promoted 
as being sources of 'health', and pander to this idolisation. 
Medical treatments can even contribute to this tendency as is seen in the case of human growth 
hormone in America.6 3 Normal growth in children is dependent upon, amongst other factors, the 
presence of human growth hormone (hGH). There are some children who are born without the ability to 
60 Wyatt, Matters of Life and Death, p.32. 
6l72>iV/,p.35. 
62 From the preamble to the constitution of the WHO, quoted in Lammers and Verhey (eds), On Moral Medicine, 
p. 157. 
63 From Donal O'Mathuna, "The Case of Human Growth Hormone" in Kilner, Pentz and Young (eds), Genetic 
Ethics, pp.203-217, Rifkin, The Biotech Century, pp.140-142, and Wilkie, Perilous Knowledge, pp.135-138. 
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make this hormone, who without any therapeutic treatment wi l l develop into dwarves (having not only 
very short stature, but also complications with their internal organs). The treatment for such a situation is 
injections of hGH, originally extracted from human pituitary glands, and latterly produced by genetically 
modified bacteria. In the 1980s, two American drug companies were awarded patents for the genetically 
modified form of hGH. Partly through marketing strategies, and partly through parental pressure, 
demand for hGH has expanded to 'normal' children who are shorter than average for their age. These 
children do produce hGH, but due to other factors (genetic or environmental, or both) are significantly 
shorter than normal. The drug companies have redefined 'normal shortness' as an illness, arguing that 
the bottom 3% in height of any age group are in need of hGH treatment. These children are being given 
expensive, weekly injections, even though there is no real indication that they make a significant 
difference to their height. This example indicates the extent to which parents may desire genetic 
enhancement for their children simply because they fall below average in some particular characteristic, 
implying that a healthy life has to be an average or normal life. 
Similarly, using the WHO definition, the parental desire for a 'healthy' baby can effectively 
become that for a 'perfect' baby. The influence of this way of thinking is already being felt through our 
ability to diagnose and abort those babies we would rather not bring to birth. The most common response 
to a serious genetic pre-natal diagnosis is abortion.64 Yet a 'serious genetic illness' may not be the only 
situation leading to such a decision. In Russia, apparently pregnancies have been terminated because the 
/; 
foetus carries genes causing a predisposition to diabetes.65 A genetic predisposition to excess weight, was 
considered by 40% of Americans surveyed as sufficient reason to abort a foetus.66 What is health? To 
what ends should we be using medical technologies? 
64 Liz Hepburn, "Genetic Counselling" in Maureen Junker-Kenny and Lisa Sowle Cahill (eds), The Ethics of 
Genetic Engineering, p.35. 
65 Jones, The Language of the Genes, p.286. 
66 Eberhard Schockenhoff, "First Sheep, then Human Beings? " in Junker-Kenny and Cahill (eds), The Ethics of 
Genetic Engineering, p.88. 
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Human genetic manipulation raises moral questions concerning; being human, eugenic practices, 
and health and medicine. In the following three chapters I explore theological themes which wil l help to 
answer these questions. I turn first to the question of what it is to be human. 
i 
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Chapter 3: ON BEING HUMAN 
3.1 Introduction 
The possibilities, and practice, of using molecular genetic technologies, as described in the 
previous chapter, have raised a number of questions relating to the moral significance of human life. 
Who are we? Are we no more than machines run on the software of our genetic inheritance? What is our 
worth? Are we the pinnacle of the evolutionary process, or no more significant than any other form of 
life? What is our purpose? Should we exploit to its fullest, or decide never to use, the awesome 
technology at our fingertips? A theological understanding of what it is to be human may help to address 
these fundamental moral questions. In this chapter I explore what it is to be human in terms of: our 
continuity with, and yet difference from, other animals, our responsibility within creation, and the 
variations within the human race. Finally, reference wi l l be made to the implications such theological 
understandings have for the field of human genetic manipulation. 
3.2 On being in continuity with other animals 
The discovery that all living creatures share the same genetic material (DNA), which uses the 
same genetic code to give instructions, for the making of proteins, points towards a common origin of all 
life on earth. Recent advances in cosmology and particle physics similarly point towards a common 
origin of all matter. There is no/reason why these discoveries should conflict with the Christian doctrine 
of creation. Eco-feminist theology is an example of ways in which recent advances in scientific 
understanding have been incorporated into Christian thinking.1 
The common origins of all animals, including humans, are also seen in the common molecular 
basis to the whole of our lives. Humans are remarkably similar to other animals, not only in the way 
genetic information is stored and processed, but also in the way in which food is digested, bodies are built 
up and grown, off-spring are conceived, and ultimately our bodies die. This brings us to a common 
biological and theological observation about all animals; that they are limited creatures. Human beings 
' Alternative approaches can be seen in the works of John Polkinghorne, for example Science and Christian Belief; 
Theological Reflections of a Bottom-Up Thinker, and Keith Ward, God, Faith & the New Millennium; Christian 
Belief in an Age of Science. 
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are just like any other animal in being embodied, in being limited, and in being mortal. Human beings, 
for all their skills, abilities and intellect, are still creatures. 
i) Embodied 
One of the main emphases of feminist theology is the importance of bodies and a recognition of 
embodiment.2 Humans are far more than mere spiritual or intellectual beings; we are also physical, we 
are embodied. In the past religious or philosophical thought has regarded the human soul or mind as of 
greater importance, greater significance and greater influence than the human body. Feminist theologians 
criticise traditional Christian theology for tending to be 'otherworldly' and emphasising the salvation of 
the individual soul, rather than recognising that the Christian hope involves a hope for the whole of 
creation.3 The Christian faith seen in its fullness bears witness to the importance of our embodiment; this 
is seen in God's work of creation bringing about bodies, in Jesus Christ's taking on our flesh, and in the 
resurrection promise of transfigured bodies.4 
The reality and significance of human embodiment needs to be taken into consideration in 
discussions concerning the morality of genetic manipulation. Moltmann writes of embodiment being the 
"end of all God's works".5 Thus the Christian life is not about trying to find a gnostic escape from our 
bodies, but about living life in all its fullness within our bodies.6 It is natural that there are limitations to 
our bodies. These limitations need to be recognised and honoured. A body can inform a soul/mind as 
much as vice versa, we need to learn to listen to our bodies.7 In addition, the state of our physical 
existence does matter. We;cannot spiritualize away our illnesses, our disabilities, our suffering; they are 
real, they do matter.8 It is important that genetic diseases are treated seriously. They may be rare but 
their effects on people can be devastating. 
2 Margaret Farley, "Feminist Theology and Bioethics" in Ann Loades (ed.), Feminist Theology; A Reader pp243ff., 
McFague, The Body of God, Elisabeth Moltmann-Wendel, I am My Body. 
3 McFague, The Body of God, p. 102 and p. 109. 
4 Moltmann, God in Creation, p.245f. 
5 Ibid, pp.244-275. 
6 Compare Ch.4.3 and Ch.5.3. 
7 Moltmann-Wendel, lam My Body, p.3, Moltmann, God in Creation, p.260. 
8 McFague, The Body of God, p. 18. 
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The fact that we are bodies necessitates limitations in our lives. Two of these limitations are 
explored below. 
ii) On being in limited control 
The huge strides in human intellectual achievements and technical abilities over the last two 
hundred years can lead to a mistaken belief that we are in total control. As a society and as individuals 
we think we are in control of our environment, of other creatures and of ourselves. 
For Reinhold Niebuhr, it was the horrific events of the two world wars which provided 
conclusive evidence that for all our advances, humans are still limited creatures.9 He saw that a level of 
control over nature may have been achieved (although this in itself is limited: witness the devastation still 
wrought in the world through earthquakes, tornadoes, bush fires, drought and flood) but humans still had 
little control over their own nature. Humanity's advances in knowledge, and apparent conquest of nature, 
had not seen a parallel development in the wisdom, and ability, necessary for the conquest of human 
nature. Nor was it simply a case that social wisdom was not keeping apace with technical advances. 
Humans are creatures with creative ability, but they are not creators who are in total control, either of 
themselves, of other people, or of that which they create. 1 0 Niebuhr suggests that it is a significant part 
of the recalcitrance of the human heart that rather than recognise our limitations, and live with care in the 
light of them, we have the tendency to attempt to defy our limitations and to live without our Lord and 
Creator. This is what it is to sin.1 1 
Niebuhr also suggests that our creatively limitations are shown in natural distinguishing features 
of humanity which (he thought) no amount of technology could erase: sexual, ethnic, and linguistic 
differentiation.1 2 Confirming his observations about our tendency to fight our natural limitations, a 
significant amount of effort and technology over the last 50 years has been applied to overcoming the 
first two of these 'distinguishing features'. It is highly likely that genetic technology also wil l be used in 
attempts to overcome sexual and ethnic differentiation. The gender of embryos in vitro and foetuses in 
9 Faith and History; A Comparison of Christian and Modern Views of History. Niebuhr's theology has been 
described as 'Christian Realism'. 
Wlbid. p.70 and p.83. 
U Ibid. p. 121. 
Ulbid. p.75f. 
33 
utero can easily be established, and although not legal in this country, selective implantation or abortion 
could take place. Genetic manipulation of individuals could take place in order to alter their apparent 
ethnic origins. These possibilities raise questions regarding the significance of our individual 
physiological structure. Does the physiology with which we are born (e.g. our gender or our 
physiological ethnicity) have an absolute claim on us, or could it be changed in some circumstances? Are 
such limitations God-given and not to be fought, or can they be surmounted through individual choice? 
Writing towards the end of the twentieth century, many human advances and human failings 
later, Oliver O'Donovan recognises the same limitations in human life. He describes humanity's 'fallen 
state' in similar terms to those of Niebuhr, recognising our refusal to adopt the role given to us by God, 
and our resultant confused moral knowledge: 
man has refused the role assigned him by his Creator. Knowledge wil l therefore be 
inescapably compromised by the problem of fallenness, the defacement of the image of 
God, and by the fallen creature's incapacity to set himself right with good wi l l and 
determination.13 
Writing around the same time, many feminist theologians find such traditional language offensive. They 
regard the dichotomy of good and evil as part of the 'error of patriarchalism'. Especially as the 'evil ' 
side of humanity is often regarded as 'female'. 1 4 The only way in which nature can be thought of as 
fallen is in the way that it has been marred and distorted by human misdevelopment (rather than it being 
evil in itself). 1 5 Neither McFague nor Radford Ruether ever refer to humanity as fallen, yet they still 
recognise that human beings are capable of, indeed are prone to commit, sin. For Radford Ruether, to 
sin is to create, and preserve socially, dysfunctional or distorted relationships, leading to victimization 
and tyranny. Such relationships can be with the earth, with our ecological community, and with each 
other16, with one's own body, with those who are different from oneself, with nature, and with God/ess.17 
In a similar way, McFague sees sin "as it always has been understood in the Jewish and Christian 
13 Resurrection and Moral Order; An Outline for Evangelical Ethics, p. 8 If. 
14 Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk p. 160. 
15 Ibid. p.91. 
^Ibid. p.88. 
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traditions, living a lie". 1 8 'Living a lie' entails refusing to see or to accept where we f i t in the common 
creation story, a refusal "to accept our proper limits so that other individuals of our species as well as 
other species can also have needed space"." In contrast to more traditional Christian theology, McFague 
sees sin only as a dysfunctional relationship with God in as much as, using the model of the world as 
God's body, to sin against any other body is to sin against God. 2 0 In their recognition of human sin, 
albeit using slightly different language, the ecofeminists also recognise that humans are not in total 
control, they recognise our tendency to misuse power, to victimise and tyrannise. (Both theologians do, 
paradoxically, seem to imply that human beings could ultimately overcome this tendency.)21 
Each theologian sees sin as being a tendency to try to overcome the natural, proper limits of 
human life. It is important to recognise two different human limitations which are being discussed here. 
As humans, we are in limited control of our own behaviour, we have 'recalcitrant' hearts - this is 
expressed theologically in terms of our sinful nature. As humans, we are also limited in our bodily 
nature; in what we can do, what we look like, the way our bodies work. These limitations are not the 
result of the 'ruin' of nature which must be mastered22, but rather they are the result of the creative work 
of God. These natural, proper limits are given to the human race for our own benefit, it is within the 
confines of these limitations that we function best.23 In considering genetic technologies, it is important 
to attempt to establish what our 'proper' limits are; those limits which it would be totally inappropriate, 
sinful, to try to defy. Having established these limits, and recognising human failings, it would seem 
necessary to draw up suitable legislation (even across international boundaries i f possible) to guard 
..•) 
against those who would seek to defy these limits. 
iii) On being mortal 
One of the most obvious examples of our creaturely limitations, is that of mortality. No matter 
how much control we may have over disease, health or lifestyle, we cannot avoid death. It is an 
17 Sexism and God-Talk, p. 161. 
18 The Body of God, p. 110. 
Wlbid. p.l 13. 
20 Ibid, p.l 14. 
21 See Ch.4.2, below. 
22 See Ch.2.3 (i) c, above. 
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unavoidable fact of human life. And yet, of all our creaturely limitations, it is death which humans 
attempt the most to defy, in particular through our use of medicine. Hauerwas observes that there is httle 
on which society as a whole can agree today, "but almost everyone agrees that death is a very unfortunate 
aspect of the human condition which should be avoided at all costs".24 
Within feminist theology, the attempt of the individual to escape mortality, is seen as part of the 
patriarchal mind-set. Any Christian concept of apocalypticism, including the final resurrection and 
eternal life, is seen as based on the fantasy of escape from mortality.2 5 By contrast, the ecofeminist view 
of death recognises that it is a natural part of life, part of the interrelatedness and interdependence of all 
life. What is seen as being of importance is the life of the whole universe rather than the life of the 
individual. Christian redemption is understood as; "the fulness of life within these finite limits." 2 6 For 
Radford Ruether, human life is only 'everlasting' in the sense that when we cease to exist as an individual 
the matter of which we are composed is recycled, giving rise to new forms of life within the world. 2 7 A 
similar sentiment is expressed by McFague using the 'body of God' model for the universe.28 I do not 
agree with this particular view. The ecofeminists argue that we are more than our sequence of DNA 2 9 , so 
surely I am more than the atoms which make up my body. Just because after my death the chemical 
constituents of my embodiment wi l l be recycled within the earth, does not imply that I wi l l continue to 
exist. Each day of my physical life atoms from my body are being lost and replaced, and yet T still exist 
as an identifiable individual. In their approach towards death, as in their approach to redemption, these 
feminist theologians are not prepared to see God doing a totally new thing. However, I do believe that 
we can learn from their insistence that death is a natural process, and not something which is to be 
regarded as failure; it is a 'proper limit' . The current fear of death is leading geneticists to search for 
ageing genes in order to delay the process, perhaps even hoping to achieve immortality. The ecofeminist 
perspective on death as a natural process could challenge this trend. 
2 3 Wyatt, Matters of Life and Death, p.50 and p.62. 
2 4 Naming the Silences, p.99. 
2 5 Radford Ruether, Gaia & God, p. 83. 
2 6 Ibid, p. 139. 
27 Sexism and God-Talk, p.257. 
28 The Body of God, p. 176. 
29 McFague, Super, Natural Christians, p.77. 
36 
There is much about the limitations of human life which remind us of our continuity with other 
animals, yet at the same time it is almost universally recognised that human beings are also distinct from 
other animals. It w i l l be important to establish the moral significance of this distinction. 
3.3 On being different from other animals: the imago Dei 
Speaking biologically the difference between human beings and other animals can be expressed 
in terms of our intelligence, our use of language and abstract concepts, or our capacity for self-
consciousness.30 Speaking theologically the difference is often expressed in terms of human beings 
having been created in the image of God, the imago Dei.31 Human beings' uniqueness in having been 
created thus was confirmed and fulfilled through the incarnation. Jesus Christ, God become a human 
being, was the perfect example of what it is to be human, what it is to bear the imago Dei. In this section 
I explore the meaning of this term, and its significance in relation to human genetic technologies. 
i) Substantial and relational theories 
In a very useful historical survey of the theories concerning the imago Dei, Ramsey suggests 
there are basically two types of theory: the substantial and the relational.32 According to the former, the 
image of God is to be found "within the substantial form of human nature". It is something which is 
essential to the make-up of human beings; one of the faculties or capacities which distinguishes humans 
from all other animals Various suggestions have been made as to the particular faculty or capacity 
involved, either something physical (the size of the brain, the upright stance, or the prehensile thumb), or 
some inner capacity (reason, conscience or free-will). This 'substantial' or 'structural' understanding of 
the image of God uses an analogy with plastic or pictorial arts, such as sculpture or painting. Just as these 
art forms use a model which has the "form" or image of that which is to be fashioned; so in the same way 
it is seen that something about human beings is modelled in the image of God. 3 3 
Ramsey sees a significant difficulty in the substantial theories in that they tend to blur the 
distinction between humans and God. The theories imply; "Man is, no doubt, smaller than God, but 
30 McFague, The Body of God, p.60 and p. 122. 
31 Genesis 1.26f. 
32 Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, pp.250ff. 
33 Ibid, p.254. 
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quintessentially they are the same".34 Yet Ramsey sees Genesis 7.22-23 as saying that humans are made 
of the same substance as other living creatures, not of the same substance as God. This distinction is not 
nit-picking, it has obvious ethical implications. To consider oneself of the same substance as God, one 
could be led to act as one's "own God in microcosm".35 
Whereas the substantial theory uses the analogy of a model, the relational theory uses that of a 
mirror reflecting an image. This view suggests there is nothing within the make-up of humans which 
constitutes the image of God. Only when humans form responsive relationships with God, then the 
image of God is reflected in their lives and their actions. It is not so much that humans are made in God's 
image, or even that they bear God's image - but rather that through relationship with God they reflect or 
live within his image. This view does not deny that human beings have a number of unique capacities, 
but recognises that in themselves these capacities do not reflect God's image; "nothing about man not 
presently involved in response to God can be called God's image."36 
ii) The imago Dei, Barth versus Brunner.37 
In recent history perhaps the most famous clash between theologians holding differing theories 
regarding the image of God, was that between Emil Brunner and Karl Barth. While Barth held a purely 
relational view, Brunner proposed a view in which the image of God contained both substantial and 
relational elements. 
// 
EMIL BRUNNER 
In Natural Theology Brunner argues that the image of God is found in humans in two different 
ways; he uses the terms 'formal' and 'material'. 3 8 The 'formal' aspect of God's image involves 
something structural, that which makes them different from/superior to all other creatures - the humanum. 
Scriptural support for this view is thought to be found in Genesis 1.26 and Psalm 8. Brunner sees the 
3 4 Basic Christian Ethics, p.252. 
35 Ibid, p.254. 
16 Ibid, p.255, my italics. 
37 The clash can be seen in all its glory in Natural Theology, which was first published in 1934. The theological 
wranglings continued in the later works of these men; in particular in Brunner's Man in Revolt and Barth's Church 
Dogmatics. 
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formal image in humanity's 'capacity for words' and 'responsibility' (or 'subjectivity'). These 
characteristics (and therefore the formal image of God) are retained by humans despite their rebellion 
against God, despite their sinful behaviour, despite the ' fa l l ' . 
By contrast, the 'material' aspect of the image, which is to be found within a person's 
relationship with God, is understood to be totally destroyed by the ' fa l l ' . It is the formal image of God in 
a person, retained despite sin, which Brunner sees as being the 'point of contact for the divine grace of 
redemption'.39 When, through his grace, a person's relationship with God is restored; then the material 
image of God in her is also restored.40 
KARL BARTH 
By contrast, Barth sees it is as essential that the image of God in humankind is purely relational. 
He maintains there is nothing inherent in what it is to be human (as against a snowflake or the sea) which 
involves bearing God's image - but rather, the image is revealed only through acknowledging and serving 
God. 4 1 Anything structural or substantial would imply that salvation is not purely a gift of God's grace. 
This image is totally destroyed by sin. Rather than reflecting God's image, a rebellious person reflects 
either their own wi l l , or the wi l l of an idol. 4 2 (Even though the image of God is totally destroyed through 
a person's sin, Barth nevertheless recognises that there is still something unique about human nature; 
"even as a sinner man is man and not a tortoise"43, but this uniqueness in no way reflects the image of 
God). When through the grace of God, a person enters into a relationship of trust and obedience with 
God - tnen the (material) image is reflected in their life. This is not a damaged or destroyed image being 
repaired, it involves a totally new creation; a death followed by new l i fe . 4 4 There is an eschatological, a 
'now but not yet', element to this. Each individual Christian is 'being transformed into his likeness', it is 
38 In his later works, The Divine Imperative (Macmillan, 1937), and Man in Revolt (trans. Olive Wyon, Lutterworth 
Press, 1939), Brunner abandoned these particular terms - but he still appears to have held much the same 
understanding of God's image in humans. 
39 Natural Theology, p.31. 
40 Jbid. p.34. 
41 Ramsey's paraphrase of Barth's view, Basic Christian Ethics, p.258. 
42 ibid, p.278. 
43 Natural Theology, p.79. 
44 Ibid, p.74 see also pp 92-94. 
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an on-going process as each continues to subject her/himself to God, to receive his grace and the power 
of his Spirit. 4 3 
Barth argues against Brunner's concept of the Imago on two grounds. Firstly, he questions 
whether the 'formal' image is purely formal, or whether there has to be an element of the material to it, 
because a 'point of contact' for God's grace seems to imply a relational aspect. I f a person can see 
something of God in creation, or history, or their conscience, the material (relational) aspect of God's 
image cannot be completely lost. This is Barth's major criticism of Brunner's theory.46 Secondly, and 
more practically, Barth is concerned with the implications for those human beings without the 'capacity 
for words' and 'responsibility'. The implication of Brunner's concept would seem to be that they are not 
made in the image of God Barth was particularly concerned about new-bom children and the mentally 
handicapped: "Are they not children of Adam? Has not Christ died for them?"47 A third objection is 
made by Ramsey, who questions whether our supernatural relationship with God can be completely 
destroyed without other aspects of human nature also being affected.48 Recent advances in the 
understanding of human life have come to see that each individual is an interrelated whole, body, mind 
and soul. The reality of this is borne out by our own experience - our sinful nature does affect our 
rational nature, our free wi l l , and our moral judgements. This leads Ramsey to conclude: " I f the unity of 
human personality be taken seriously, then the only way to avoid a notion of 'total' sinfulness is to have 
no notion of sin at a l l ." 4 9 / 
I! 
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iii) Further explorations of the relational image. 
There is a strong Christological element in (he relational view of the image of God. Jesus Christ 
is seen as the image of the invisible God, as he alone has lived in perfect relationship with the heavenly 
Father.30 Jesus effectively recreates the image in which humankind was originally made, and it is he who 
provides that 'point of contact' through which God's grace may reach humanity. 
45 2Cor.3.18, also Col.3.10 and lCor.15.49. 
46 Natural Theology, pp.l20f. 
47 ibid, p.89 
48 Basic Christian Ethics, p.282. 
49 Ibid, p.284. 
50 Col. 1.15, also 2Cor.4.4 and Heb. 1.3. 
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Ramsey observes that to be in good relationship with God, inevitably implies being in good 
relationship with one's neighbour, this is seen in Jesus' l i fe . 5 1 This theme is followed more deeply, and 
expanded on, by Geoffrey Brown with reference to Barth's Church Dogmatics.52 
Brown suggests mat Barth's doctrine of the image of God is concerned not only with man's 
relationship with God - but also with relationships within the Trinitarian godhead, and relationships 
between human beings. As we come to understand something of the relationships within the godhead, so 
we learn something of what it means to live within God's image with other human beings. The internal 
relations of the godhead - Father, Son and Holy Spirit - reveal a freedom of God to be himself, reflecting 
an equality of power, authority and glory. So human relationships within the image of God wil l reflect a 
similar freedom for self-determination, and affirmation of the equality of persons. The Christological 
emphasis of Barth's doctrine; seeing Jesus Christ as the true human being, the One through whom we too 
may come to live within God's image - informs our understanding in a similar way. Jesus Christ revealed 
the true image of God through his relationship of love and service with his Father, and his relationships of 
love and service with other human beings.53 Finally, recognising that it is through the grace of God 
alone that we exist and that we reflect God's image, serves as a theological basis for the solidarity of, and 
need for mutual respect between, fellow human beings. 
iv) The image of God and genetic manipulation 
SUBSTANTIAL THEORIES . 
Any substantial view of the image of God is misleading in suggesting that a human being is 'of 
the same substance' as God. As current genetic technology and understanding is advancing so rapidly, 
and with such power, it is not exactly surprising that we may be lulled into thinking we are like God. 
And yet human beings are not of the same substance as God, but rather of the same substance as all other 
living creatures - totally reliant on the grace of God for our existence and the fulness of our life. 
5 1 Basic Christian Ethics, p.259 
52 "Clones, Chimeras, and the Image of God: Lessons from Barthian Bioethics ", in John Kilner, Nigel M. S. 
Cameron and David Schiedermayer (eds), Bioethics and the Future of Medicine, pp.23 8-249. 
53 Ibid, p.242. 
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The most significant difficulty arising from a substantial concept of the image of God, when 
relating it to ethical issues of genetic manipulation, concerns the status of those human beings who would 
be judged not to bear God's image. I f the image of God is to be found in the human ability to walk 
upright, what does this say about the crippled? I f the image is to be found in a person's responsibility 
and capacity for words, what does this say about the unborn child, the mentally defective, the senile, the 
comatosed? Are these people to be regarded as beyond the pale of humanness? In deciding on the 
capacities which result in a person bearing God's image; we decide for ourselves which people we choose 
to regard as 'human beings'. 
RELATIONAL THEORIES 
Those who hold to the relational view of the image of God object to the exclusiveness of any 
substantial view; the image of God is nothing to do with what a person may have achieved or has the 
potential to achieve, but rather to do with what God has given. It is through God's grace that someone 
exists, and through his grace that, in a relationship with God, they can reflect his image. The substantial 
view is rejected because it denies the image of God in certain human beings. I f it is important, however, 
in terms of moral decision-making, to know who reflects God's image, then the relational view is no 
more helpful. On the one hand, the relational view is clear in specifying that it is only through a 
relationship with God that one can reflect his image. But on the other hand, it is certainly not the role of 
any person to pass judgement onthe status of his neighbour's relationship with God. Some who hold this 
relational view seem to err on the side of universalism54; others leave the problem to God, referring to his 
election, his decision, his calling. 5 5 The concept of human beings reflecting God's image through 
relationship, is therefore of no help to ethical decision-making i f one attempts to discern those who may 
or may not be reflecting his image. This doctrine may be of greater help through an exploration of the 
implications a relationship with God has on one's relationship with one's neighbours. 
To be in relationship with God inevitably means to be in relationship with one's neighbour. 
This truth can be seen within the prototype of the Trinity, in the life of the 'one true human being', Jesus 
5 4 Brown, "Clones, Chimeras, and the Image of God" in Kline, Cameron and Schiedermayer (eds), Bioethics and 
the Future of Medicine, p.243. 
55 Joan O'Donovan, "Man in the Image of God; The Disagreement between Barth and Brunner Reconsidered" in 
Scottish Jounral of Theology (39), p.456f. 
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Christ, and within the teaching of Scripture. To be a recipient of God's grace in one's own life, wil l result 
in the desire to share that grace with others. Those who seek to truly reflect the image of God in their 
lives, wil l need also to pay attention to their relationships with other people. 
Ramsey provides some very helpful insights in this area through a consideration of Human 
Rights.56 He suggests that from a Christian viewpoint 'rights' are not exactly the best place to start 
Christian ethics require a shift of emphasis from 'rights' to 'duties', and this means; "When a man stands 
most in the image of God he is least concerned about his own value".3 7 To reflect the image of God 
is to be in a relationship of love and service with God which naturally spills out into a relationship of love 
and service with one's neighbour. This implies that value is found not in the person bearing God's 
image, but in the person loved by the one bearing God's image. 
Infinite value is placed upon the neighbour's personality, value is created and realized 
there, whenever, in the service of God, a person forgets his own claims and becomes in 
some measure a Christ to his neighbour. To be in the image of God means to do the 
work of love in valuing one's neighbour.58 
In other words, reflecting God's image by living in a relationship with God inevitably brings with it 
responsibility; responsibility to live in good relationship with one's neighbour, one's environment, and 
oneself. ,/ 
3.4 On being responsible 
The responsibility of human beings reflecting God's image to offer love and service to their 
neighbours has already been touched upon. This section looks at our responsibilities towards the whole 
of the created order, and also towards ourselves. 
5 6 Basic Christian Ethics, pp.351-366. 
57 Ibid. pp.353f. 
58 Ibid. pp.354f. 
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i) Human stewardship 
The Biblical creation story speaks not only of God making human beings in his image, but also 
of God giving them responsibility for the world in which they live. 5 9 In the past the commands to 
'subdue', 'have dominion over', and 'be master over' the world have tended to be misinterpreted as 
'dominate' or even 'exploit'. Nature has been regarded as existing as a resource for humans to use, to 
manipulate, to control.6 0 In recent years this imbalance has begun to be redressed, not least as a result of 
ecofeminist theology.61 
McFague and Radford Ruether see a parallel between the domination of women by men, and the 
domination of nature by human beings.62 An ecological understanding of the world highlights the 
interdependence of all life, but the unique human ability of self-consciousness gives us a responsible role. 
Right relations are to be found in responsibility, not in domination. The rest of creation exists for humans 
to live responsibly alongside, not for humans to use as it wishes.63 
McFague sees that recent advances in science have resulted in a decentre-ing and recentre-ing in 
our understanding of the place of humanity within the whole created order. We have been decentred in 
as much as humans are no longer regarded as the point and goal of evolutionary history, but we have 
been recentred by rediscovering our responsibility as stewards of l i fe . 6 4 Somewhat ironically, having 
been determined to play down the position of humanity in creation, McFague recognises our role as 
stewards of the earth as being very significant, giving us; "a far higher status than being litde lower than 
the angels, subjects of a divine king, or even the goal of evolutionary history".6 5 
59 Gen. 1.26-28. 
60 Lynn White Jr. maintains that Western Christianity "bears a huge burden of guilt" for our current ecological crisis 
through a wrong understanding of Gen. 1.28 ("The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis " in Science, 155. 
1967, pp. 1203-1207). This may be an overstatement, other factors (economic and social) will have contributed to 
this attitude. Cultures with other religious backgrounds have been equally ecologically unsound. 
61 It is this branch of theology which will be considered here. A more responsible attitude towards creation is also 
to be found in more recent mainstream theology, for example Jttrgen Moltmann, The Future of Creation, ppl28f. 
and God in Creation, p. 139; Oliver O'Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, p.52. 
6 2 Sexism and God-Talk, pp.82ff. and Super, Natural Christians, pp.l50f. 
63 Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, pp.87f. 
64 The Body of God, p. 197. 
65 Ibid, p.201. 
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In the past the living world has been so dominated, oppressed and misused that McFague 
suggests we regard it as the "new poor", taking special care of it as Christians do the oppressed, the 
outcast, the vulnerable.66 This does not mean that we cannot use the living world in any way. The 
ecological discovery of the interdependence of all living things would contradict such a suggestion, but 
our use must be tempered with respect67 McFague helpfully distinguishes between looking at creation 
with an arrogant eye, and looking at it with a loving eye.68 An arrogant (patriarchal) eye looks at 
everything in terms of being either 'for me' or 'against me'. This simplification of reality is made in 
order to control, to see creation in terms of what it can do for me or ways in which it can be used by me, 
it treats the other as object. By contrast, a loving eye acknowledges and respects the other as subject. It 
is prepared to acknowledge the integrity and the interests of the other, as well as the complexity, mystery 
and difference of the other. Treating nature as a subject rather than an object does not mean that we 
cannot use it at all: "we wil l , of course, use earth others, as we use human others, but we wi l l do so 
remembering that they are subjects".69 McFague is realistic in recognising that nature is more than 
"butterflies and redwood trees", that our relationship with nature cannot be all "love and harmony", 
because within nature there are also "killer bees, poison ivy, cancer cells and the AIDS virus". 7 0 In 
considering the role of science, McFague acknowledges that scientific knowledge need not be 
exploitative, it is important to learn about the living world in order to exercise proper responsibility 
towards i t . 7 1 She does, however, regard molecular biology as being the most extreme example of the 
drive to reduce nature to object. Its reductionist views regard organisms simply in terms of their DNA 
rather than as complex inteiractive, interdependent living beings. "A tree is not just its DNA any more 
than we are."72 These insights are helpful, but more work is obviously needed in terms of what they 
mean practically. How does one respect and yet use nature, use and yet not dominate, care and yet kill? 
What does this mean when intending to grow maize which is resistant to a herbicide, to clone transgenic 
sheep producing a drug in their milk, to sell tomatoes containing a gene from a fish, when faced with the 
66 The Body of God, p. 165 
& Ibid. pp.l66f. 
68 Super, Natural Christians, pp.32ff. 
& Ibid. p.lll,seealsop.l51. 
p . 152. 
71 Ibid, p.76 and p.154. 
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tragic effects of genetic disease in a new-born baby, or hoping to destroy cancer cells through gene 
therapy? At least in part, this wi l l involve recognising that the great variety of living things only survive 
through a highly complex network of interrelationships and interdependencies.73 As a result, all attempts 
to alter the genetic makeup of any creatures, bug, plant, animal or human, wil l need to take into 
consideration this finely tuned ecological network. 
McFague's criticism of the reductionism of molecular biology leads into another area of human 
responsibility, namely human freedom. 
ii) Human freedom 
One of the classic Christian doctrines is that of human freedom. Whilst believing in the 
sovereignty of God, at the same time human beings are understood to have genuine responsibility and 
freedom in their lives. Augustine of Hippo upheld the reality of this truth in his theological battle with 
the fatalistic beliefs of Manichaeism (also recognising a bias towards evil within our free will , in response 
to the Pelagian heresy).74 
Recently this Christian belief has been denied through a tendency towards genetic determinism. 
Newspaper headlines and radio bulletins convincingly inform us of the discovery of genes 'for' a variety 
of mental conditions and personality characteristics.75 Scientists at the forefront of human genetic studies 
can be as much to blame as newspaper headline-writers for this attitude. James Watson (co-discoverer of 
•[ 
the double-helix, and heavily involved in the Human Genome Project) is reported as having said, "We 
used to think our fate was in our stars. Now we know, in large measure, our fate is in our genes."76 
There are even examples of genetics being used as a defence in a murder trial, and being sought to solve 
the problem of homelessness!77 
72 Super, Natural Christians, p.77 
73 McFague, The Body of God p.46. 
74 Gerald Bonner, St Augustine of Hippo: Life and Controversies. 
75 See Ch.2.3 (i) a, above. 
76 Rifkin, The Biotech Century, p. 154. 
77 Kilner, Pentz and Young (eds), Genetic Ethics, p. 80 and p235. 
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Christian theology claims individuals have freedom and responsibility. A proper understanding 
of human genetics supports this view. There are very few situations in which it can be said: I have gene 
' X ' therefore I wi l l exhibit 'x ' in my life. The action of the vast majority of genes must be seen in a 
broad context; in combination with the effects of a number of other genes and environmental factors, and 
in the context of the development of the whole human body.7 8 With a humorous touch, Polkinghorne 
asserts that a clone of Adolf Hitler would be just as likely to grow up to be an industrious house-painter 
as to be a dictator; "[tjhere is no simple genetic determinism of who we shall be".79 
I f there is no simple genetic determinism, then humanity needs to be responsible. Responsibility 
is a virtue, not a status; it is something which needs to be worked at. We need to be responsible, not only 
for our own actions, but also for the environment in which we live. Many diseases come about as the 
result of subtle interactions between genetic predispositions and environmental triggers. There is no 
point in trying to eradicate the genetic predispositions (through selective abortion, genetic therapy or 
selective breeding) i f one is not also prepared to eradicate the environmental triggers (e.g. by taking 
exercise, eating fruit and vegetables, not smoking ). We need to be responsible. 
3.5 On being individual 
A wide range of difference and variety is to be found within the human race. These differences 
have seldom been celebrated or enjoyed, more often they are feared and sought to be removed. People 
have been discriminated against as a result of their race, their creed, their gender, their class and their 
• i 
A 
disability. Recently things have begun to change. Consider those people who suffer from disabilities. It 
is now illegal in this country for an employer to discriminate against someone because of their disability. 
The political correctness movement, which began in America, has changed much of our terminology. 
There have been 'disability rights' campaigns, and people have even claimed the 'right to abnormality'.80 
Ironically, at the same time there is a striving for perfection in human lives. Women are being offered, or 
are asking for, abortions because their babies are thought to be carrying a genetic abnormality which is 
seen as unacceptable. The screening of IVF embryos can ensure a certain quality of embryo to be 
78 Elving Anderson, "Resisting Reductionism by Restoring the Context", in Kilner, Pentz and Young (eds), Genetic 
Ethics, pp.84-92. 
79 "Cloning and the Moral Imperative" in Cole-Turner (ed), Human Cloning, p.37. 
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implanted. The possibility of genetic enhancement leads us ever further up the path towards striving for 
perfection. An exploration of human variability wi l l be made by considering the issues of standards and 
labels, and a Christian approach to difference. 
i) Standards 
Many of the possibilities opened up through genetic technology have raised questions about 
standards and expectations in human life. At the highest extreme is the attitude that we are striving for 
perfection. Many adults would be realistic, and recognise that they cannot be perfect, and yet they wi l l 
expect exactly this standard of any baby they have. Genetic manipulation has played a large part in 
generating this expectation, and appears to take little account of the natural limitations and variations in 
human life. 
What makes the new language of molecular biology so subtly chilling is that it risks 
creating an unattainable new archetype, a flawless, errorless, perfect being to which to 
aspire - a new man and woman, like us, but without the warts and wrinkles, 
vulnerabihties and frailties, that have defined our essence from the very beginning of our 
existence.81 
Or perhaps there are those who would simply say that they want their baby to be 'normal', but 
what exactly does this term mean? Statistically speaking 'normal' wi l l refer to something in the range of 
'average'. There are always, by definition, samples which fall above or below the average. Seldom do 
people mind i f their children are above average in any quality, but what of those who fall below average? 
The marketing of hGH injections has led to the bottom 3% of any height range being regarded as 
'abnormal' and in need of such injections.82 This illustrates a reluctance to accept the normal range of 
variability within a particular quality. I f it should become possible to screen foetuses for qualities such as 
height, weight, beauty, intelligence, sporting prowess, artistic ability, would we want to screen out the 
foetuses found in the bottom 3% of each category? More relevant is the question of how existing people 
in the bottom 3% of any of these categories are being treated. Do we ignore them, reject them, leave 
80 Liz Hepburn, "Genetic Counselling" in Junker-Kenny and Cahill (eds), The Ethics of Genetic Engineering, p.39. 
81 Rifkin, The Biotech Century, p. 147. 
82 See Ch.2.3 (Hi) c, above. 
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them on the scrap heap, simply because they are not normal? Moltmann recognises mat "the demand to 
be normal can be tyrannical unless we understand that the normal condition of our being together is that 
we are all different".8 3 
I f neither the standard of 'perfect' nor 'normal' is satisfactory, then perhaps the most appropriate 
and most helpful standard to use for all people is that of 'individual'. This recognises that people wi l l be 
different from one another, but makes no judgement about any person being more worth-while, more 
valuable, more significant than another. It is irrelevant to note that a short person could be a very 
talented artist, a deaf person compose beautiful music, or a severely disabled person be a brilliant 
physicist, this simply perpetuates success-oriented value judgements of people. What matters is that 
every individual has been given a past, a present and a future through the grace of God, and has the 
potential to reflect the image of the God to whom they owe their being. 
One of the ways in which 'different' people have been disadvantaged or discriminated against is 
in the labels used to define them. 
ii) Labels 
The terminology which we use to describe people with any sort of 'difference' is a reflection of, 
and self-perpetuates, the attitude of society towards such people. In his introductory chapter in Suffering 
Presence, Hauerwas himself struggles with terminology with respect to the 'retarded'.84 The same 
difficulty is inevitably to be found in terms of genetic illness or handicap. Medical journals, popular 
scientific books and daily newspapers all refer to genes as being 'bad' or 'defective', 'diseased* or 
'abnormal', 'dysfunctional' or 'unhealthy'.85 The people who carry such genes could easily take (or be 
given) these labels for themselves, and be treated very differently as a result. When in the 1980s 
'Political Correctness' became the vogue, especially in the United States, labels such as 'differently 
abled' and 'visually challenged' took the place of 'lame' and 'blind' . 8 6 But these labels did not 
83 The Power of the Powerless, pp.213f. 
84 Suffering Presence, p. 16. See also p. 161 which recognises terms are often reflections of social values. 
85 Although it is interesting to note that Francis Collins takes the effort to use the term 'misspelled'. ( "The Human 
Genome Project", in Kilner, Pentz and Young (eds), Genetic Ethics, p.95-103). 
86 Between 1982 and 1998 Jean Vanier moves from referring to the 'mentally handicapped' to those with 
'intellectual disabilities', The Challenge of L 'Arche and Becoming Human. 
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necessarily mean that those unable to walk or to see were treated any more positively. Labels in 
themselves wil l not change the way in which people are treated. What needs to be changed is attitudes, 
practices and institutions.87 One of the ways in which such changes may begin to take place is by 
individuals striking up personal relationships with other individuals seen to be 'different'. This can be 
seen in the experience of Moltmann and Young 8 8, and is the basis of projects such as those in Ireland 
which bring together Catholic and Protestant children. 
From her personal experience of bringing up her severely handicapped son, Young believes it is 
still important to be realistic about handicap. She finds the term 'learning disabilities' "a bit incongruous 
when dealing with someone so profoundly handicapped as Arthur", and it has to be recognised that until 
people's attitudes are changed, whatever term is used wil l , in the end, become derogatory.89 Similarly, 
she is uncomfortable with those policies which insist that there is no difference between the handicapped 
and other people, this can be both hurtful and dangerous.90 
Having recognised that all human beings are individuals, and that the labels we use to describe 
people can be unhelpful, I explore a distinctive Christian approach to genetic difference. 
iii) A Christian approach to difference 
The availability of genetic tests for an increasing number of inherited diseases has opened up the 
possibility for parents of prenatal' testing and subsequent 'therapeutic abortion'. The pressure on parents 
to produce the 'perfect baby' is'increasing; it may even be seen to be self-imposed competitive pressure 
('We want our baby to be better than the Jones's). As fewer children are born with any sort of disability, 
what is society's attitude towards such children going to become? Wi l l parents be discriminated against 
for 'choosing' to have a disabled child? Wi l l they be denied financial help towards their child's care 
because-they chose not to abort it? A similar situation could be arrived at through the ability to test for 
genetic disease years before any symptoms can be seen. Discrimination by employers, insurance 
87 in this context it is interesting to note that the BMA distinguishes between a disability and a handicap. A 
disability is a reduction in the ability to perform certain activities caused by disease, disorder or injury. A 
handicap is a social disadvantage resulting from an impairment or disability which limits or prevents the fulfilment 
of a normal social role. (Human Genetics, p.l7f.). 
88 See Ch.5.4 (i) a, below. 
89 Face to Face, Preface p.vii. and p. 176. 
9 0 p , 1 7 3 a n d p . l 7 5 . 
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companies, even social groupings is possible. Could the attitude of society lead to the annihilation of 
those who are of different ability or health through (passive or active) eugenics? 
A common thread to be found in all feminist theology, is an attack on the 'patriarchal, male-
orientated mind-set of domination', against any who are different to oneself. Such domination is seen as 
a dysfunctional, sinful relationship. Feminist theology calls for a new mode of relationship, a 
relationship which recognises value while affirming variety and particularity, a relationship of mutuality 
which allows us to affirm different ways of being, a relationship which celebrates difference." 
An attitude which is generally seen by feminists to appear along-side patriarchal domination, is 
the attitude of competition. I f someone/lhing is different from me, then it is either a case of defeating it 
or being defeated by i t 9 2 It is this attitude which has led to the subjugation of women, to racial 
discrimination, to the Nazi programme to eliminate Jews, gypsies, homosexuals, and the mentally 
retarded, and to the more recent horrors of 'ethnic cleansing'. Ecoferninist theologians recognise that 
ecological studies have taught us that absolute competition is not a 'Good Thing'. There is great value in 
difference, and there is a profound interrelatedness and interdependence of all living things.93 
Difference and variety are vital aspects of human existence, they are to be affirmed and enjoyed. 
Difference in others should engender responsibility and co-operation rather than domination and 
competition. /. 
3.6 On human genetic manipulation 
The theological understanding of what it is to be human has a number of implications relating 
directly to human genetic manipulation. These are discussed under four main sub-headings; those 
relating to the beginnings of human life, human embodiment, limitations and responsibility. 
91 Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p.20, and McFague, Super, Natural Christians, p.28. 
92 Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p. 179. This is also recognised by Moltmann, The Future of Creation, 
p. 100. 
93 Radford Ruether, Gaia & God p.56. 
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i) On the beginning of human life 
The dependence of genetic technologies on artificial reproductive techniques has been alluded to 
in a number of ways. IVF is necessary for the screening of embryos before implantation, would be 
necessary i f ever genetic manipulations were to be conducted on embryos, and has been the basis from 
which (animal) cloning has developed. The achievement of one's genetic end can depend on the rejection 
of 'defective' foetuses and embryos, and on experiments being conducted on embryos to develop new 
techniques. At the moment the only ways in which potential parents can ensure their children are free of 
a given genetic disease, is via IVF and selective implantation, or via natural conception and 'therapeutic 
abortion' after screening. A l l of these situations call into question the moral status afforded to the human 
embryo and foetus. A brief consideration of this matter is given below. 
The discussion concerning the moral worth of the human foetus is not a new one. Two extreme 
positions can be identified, and a whole range between. At the 'liberal' extreme one can find the 
philosopher John Harris and the feminist theologian Marjorie Maguire, neither of whom would regard the 
human foetus as having any moral status of its own. Harris takes a purely rational, utilitarian approach to 
the issue. He defines a person as "a creature capable of valuing its own existence", and argues that only 
persons are of moral value, on the grounds that only in depriving a person of their life would something 
of value be taken away.94 Humans (of whatever age) who are incapable of valuing their own existence 
are not considered to be persons^they cannot be wronged by depriving them of their life (because, by 
definition, they do not value it) but can be wronged by causing them needless suffering. Working from 
these principles, Harris believes it is far better to abort a human foetus with a genetic disorder, than to 
allow it to be born and experience needless suffering. It is highly significant that Harris' definition has 
implications not only for the begmning of human life, but also for its duration. At any point in one's life 
a human could become a 'non-person' through injury, or disease, or decay ( i f one's capacity to value 
one's life were destroyed). As soon as the human was no longer capable of valuing their life, then no 
harm would be done by depriving them of that life. This concept assumes that humans have no inherent 
value, only that which is 'self-imposed'. It also has implications for those who are suicidal, lacking in 
self-confidence and grief-stricken through bereavement. Are these people non-persons too, even i f only 
94 John Harris, Clones, Genes and Immortality; Ethics and the Genetic Revolution, p.87. 
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temporarily? More significantly, Harris never says how can one ever tell i f someone values their own 
life. On what practical basis wi l l this viewpoint be lived out? 
Maguire takes an entirely different approach. She argues that moral status should be given to a 
human foetus only i f the woman carrying it chooses to afford it status, by entering into a relationship of 
covenant love with it. Thus it is proposed that personhood begins when the mother accepts the 
pregnancy, and never begins i f the mother does not "consent" to the pregnancy.95 In this way any pre-
implantation embryos, and any unwanted foetuses (including those rejected due to genetic 
'imperfections') are seen as non-persons. Junker-Kenny points out the irony of Maguire, as a feminist, 
using an argument based on a "feudal relationship .... [having] one-sided power to elect" and denying any 
concept of mutuality normally seen in feminist theology .9* Equally ironic is Maguire's failure, as a 
Christian theologian, to recognise the value which is given each human being through the relationship of 
covenant love they have with God. 
Often it is our having been made in God's image, which is understood to confer moral value on 
human beings.97 An alternative understanding is that reflecting God's image does not confer value on us, 
it rather confers infinite value on those whom we love. 9 8 This idea could be thought to tie in with 
Maguire's concept that a foetus only becomes a person.when its mother enters into a relationship of 
covenant love with it. However, it is important to remember that God's love is unconditional. I f we who 
reflect his image are to love as he loves, then we wi l l recognise the infinite value in all those we come 
across find love, whatever their age, their health, their handicap. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum to Harris and Maguire are those who would afford absolute 
moral status to the human fertilized egg (and therefore embryo and foetus). This 'conservative' position 
(which includes that of the Roman Catholic Church) is usually based on the argument that a 'radically 
95 Junker-Kenny, "The Moral Status of the Embryo " in Junker-Kenny and Cahill, The Ethics of Genetic 
Engineering, pA5. 
96 Ibid. p.46. 
97 Nigel M de S Cameron, The New Medicine, p. 172. 
98 See 3.3, above. 
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new beginning' has taken place when one particular sperm fertilises one particular egg." There are some 
difficulties with this viewpoint; the embryo wil l develop into nothing unless it implants in a womb, not all 
the cells of an 8-cell embryo actually develop into the foetus (some become the placenta), and twinning 
can occur (giving rise to two individual people) at any stage before implantation. Affording absolute 
moral status from the point of fertilisation will have considerable implications for the use of much genetic 
technology. 
The Warnock Report illustrates one example of an 'in-between' view on the status of the human 
embryo. When considering the possibility of experimenting on human embryos, the committee were 
unable to make a decision about the actual status of the embryo. The Report recommended that 
experimentation could occur up to 14 days after fertilisation;1 0 0 This was not totally arbitrary. The neural 
streak of a developing embryo only begins to develop after this time-span, and such a restriction ensured 
that no pain could be experienced by the embryo. 
Space prohibits further consideration concerning the moral status of the human embryo and 
foetus. A brief outline of different view-points, and their implications, have been given. Taking the issue 
no further wi l l not prevent the exploration of other moral issues raised by genetic technologies. 
ii) On being embodied members of creation 
Feminist theologians have called to our attention the importance of embodiment. Humans are 
not just souls or spirits who have inhabited a body for a time. We do not have bodies, we are bodies. 
Our embodiment necessitates taking our afflictions seriously; they are not just temporary trials before our 
souls are set free. Feminist theology reminds us that suffering in this world is very real and that it 
matters. Yet at the same time it is not the perfection of our bodies, nor freedom from our body's 
limitations, for which we should be striving. McKenny suggests that it is our vain attempts to escape 
'fate or fortune' that have impoverished our moral lives, and that what we need is to rediscover the 
"moral significance of the body". Sadly he is neither clear enough nor (by his own admission) 
99 Junker-Kenny, "The Moral Status of the Embryo " in Junker-Kenny and Cahill, The Ethics of Genetic 
Engineering, p.48. 
•00 The Warnock Report, 11.20. 
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"sufficiently fine-tuned" regarding this moral significance to be able to make specific suggestions 
regarding the implications this understanding may have.101 
One of the realities of our embodiment is that we are complex organic beings, not just living 
machines. We cannot be considered to be simply the product of our own genetic make-up. We are more 
than the sum of our genes. We must be wary of any reductionist attitudes springing up as a result of the 
increase in our knowledge and understanding of the human genome. This wil l have implications 
regarding our attitudes towards people whose genes make them different from others.102 It also means 
that we need to take responsibility for our environment, our own health and welfare, and not simply 
blame our genes.103 We must explore ways of changing our environment, as well as exploring ways of 
changing our genes. I f people with gene K find it difficult to walk up steep steps, is it easier to remove 
gene K from the population or to lower our public steps? The discovery that gene J makes people less 
susceptible to a particular pollutant, should not allow companies to restrict employment to those with 
gene J and be lax with their attitude towards safety. It is our responsibility to use chemicals safely, rather 
than exploit people who appear to have a natural resistance to them. 
iii) On being limited members of creation 
One of the realities of our embodied state is that our lives are limited; this is our natural state. 
We are not of the same substance as God, but rather of the same substance as other living things. The 
reality of our mortality has been noted, as has our tendency to try to fight this limit. In the light of this 
recognition we need to be wary. Research wi l l continue to take place into the process of ageing, but what 
wil l we do with the results of this research? There is the possibility that cloning wil l be used by people in 
an attempt to 'defeat death' (irrespective of the reality that even a clone wi l l never 'be' a continuation or 
repetition of that person). Legislation may help protect against some of these attempts at 'immortality' 
(at least in those countries applying it) - but perhaps what is needed more is a change of perspective, a 
recognition that our 'three score years and ten' need not be prolonged mdefinitely. Other limits to 
1 0 1 To Relieve the Human Condition, p.226. 
102 See Ch.3.5, above. 
103 See Ch.3.4 (ii), above. 
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humanity need to be considered too, two are explored here. The former a 'natural' limit, and the latter a 
'practical' limit. 
Naturally, it is a 'given' that parents are totally unaware of, and incapable of controlling, the 
genetic make-up of their offspring. A child may be male; with his father's hair-line, mother's eyes and 
sense of humour and grandfather's predisposition to heart-disease. Or she may be a daughter; with her 
mother's colouring, her father's chin and singing voice, and long legs despite the short stature of both 
parents. There are so many variables, and so many possible combinations that the natural process of 
conception and child-birth could never predict nor control the outcome. The look, the nature, the talents 
of any child are a surprise, a recognition that new life is a gift. However, genetic technology is giving us 
ways of designing and controlling the make-up of our offspring. Embryos generated through F/F can be 
screened, and those that are wanted selectively implanted. Foetuses can be screened, and 'therapeutic 
abortion' used to prevent the birth of unwanted genotypes. Genetic manipulation could be used to 
'design' a child with a particular genetic make-up, or total control achieved through cloning. The more 
we move towards the design or selection of our children, the more we wi l l turn them into consumer 
goods, and the more we wil l treat them as such.104 Would our 'natural limit' imply that we should have 
nothing to do with any genetic foreknowledge of our children? To maintain the understanding of 'gif t ' , 
should our attitude be; 'you'U get what you're given, and like it'? What then of those potential parents 
who are both carriers for a serious, recessive disease, like Tay Sachs? What of the couple, one of whom 
carries a dominant gene like Huntington's disease? Are the only options open those of abstaining from 
having their own children, or taking the chance? Is it right, in any situation, to be in control of the 
genetic make-up of one's offspring? Part of the answer to these questions wil l depend on our 
understanding of the beginnings of human life, and the responsibility we have towards embryos and 
foetuses. I f it is seen as appropriate to overcome our natural limitations in the instances described above, 
when would it become inappropriate? This impinges on our understanding of human health and 
wholeness.105 
104 Xom Shakespeare, "Eugenics? Slipping down the slope", in Splice. 
I05seeCh.5.3,below. 
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The second limitation to be considered is the limitedness of our health resources. Genetic 
medicine and reproductive technologies are expensive. Any consideration of the use of these 
technologies has implications for the availability of other treatments (unless they are restricted to private 
medicine, and therefore only available to those who can pay, an issue of justice from a different angle106). 
The sociologist Tom Shakespeare argues that the huge amounts of money used in genetic research and 
medicine wi l l only benefit individuals, and that this money could be far more effectively spent on "social 
change, preventative medicine, and better welfare services".107 We are responsible, as stewards of our 
natural, limited resources, to ensure that our use of these resources best reflect the justice and the mercy 
of God. Shakespeare's words make us realise that there are alternative approaches; it wil l be important 
not to be blinded by the brilliance of genetic technologies. 
iv) On being responsible members of creation 
Ecofeminist theologians highlight the way in which the huge variety of life on earth exists 
within complex networks of interdependence. A l l living creatures are dependent on others for their 
survival. The balance between these networks is finely tuned. I f one species were totally wiped out, or i f 
one species came to dominate to the exclusion of others, the whole ecological balance could be thrown 
out of kilter. I f humans are to act as responsible stewards of God's creation, then it wil l be important that 
we do nothing to threaten this fine balance. McFague points to the value of science (ecology and biology 
in particular) to help understand.the ways in which living things interact and interdepend.108 
Considerations of ecological balance have been used to argue against releasing transgenic crops into the 
environment in Britain. This fine balance of interdependence and interaction must also be considered 
within single living bodies. 
Adding new genetic material to any creature could upset their metabolic or developmental 
balance. Clinical trials in human beings for gene therapy (in somatic cells) are already taking place. 
Taking responsible action in these situations wil l involve giving consideration to the complex interactions 
which take place within the human body. So complex are these interactions, we can never be sure that 
106 Maxwell Mehlman and Jeffrey Botkin consider the situation in the United States. They conclude that the only 
fair system for the allocation of genetic resources would be that of a 'lottery'. (Access to the Genome, p.125). 
107 "Eugenics? Slipping down the slope ", in Splice. 
'08 Super, Natural Christians, p. 154. 
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molecular biologists have all the answers. Some genes can only ever be 'turned on' by the action of the 
product of another gene, which in turn is dependent on the product of another gene. Sometimes more 
than one molecule is needed to act to 'switch on' a gene. Other molecules switch on one gene while 
turning o f f another. Meanwhile some enzymes (which catalyse reactions in the body) are also turned on 
or off by other enzymes. Complex patterns of interactions, including 'cascades', mean that the presence 
of a single enzyme can have a huge effect on the body's metabolism. The molecular interactions in a 
single body are as finely balanced as ecological interactions between a number of bodies. We must alter 
them only with caution. 
Similarly, there may be hidden or unexpected effects caused by removing a certain disease-
causing gene from a population. It has been discovered that those who are carriers for the blood disorder 
sickle-cell disease are resistant to malaria, and that carriers of cystic fibrosis may have some resistance to 
cholera. Removing all the copies of a certain disease-causing gene from the population may actually be 
harmful under certain conditions. The effect of doing so may not be felt for a number of generations. 
Harris suggests this is a risk worth taking; the advantage given to us genetically can be gained by other 
means.109 Others suggests a more cautious approach."0 
A responsible stewardship of genetic manipulation wi l l involve taking small steps at a time, 
ensuring sufficient, appropriate, in vitro and animal trials are taken, and always being aware that perhaps 
we do not know everything. This will be particularly necessary i f ever germ line manipulation is 
considered. ) 
Human beings are part of the created order, they are also unique within that order. Our 
uniqueness brings with it responsibility, responsibility to our Creator, responsibility for ourselves and our 
world. We are responsible to use our genetic skills and knowledge wisely. Could it also be that God 
intends us to use this technology to further his purpose? Is the Creator asking us to work with him, as co-
109 Clones, Genes and Immortality, p.200. 
110 SingeT and Wells, The Reproduction Revolution, p. 184. 
58 
creators, through our ability to manipulate DNA? This is the question the following chapter seeks to 
address. 
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Chapter 4: ON THE FUTURE OF BEING HUMAN 
4.1 Introduction 
Human beings are unique creatures in this world. Only humans (in being self-aware and self-
detennining) are capable of planning, predicting and even controlling their own future. We are beginning 
to understand how inheritance works at the level of the molecule. We have the ability to test embryos 
and foetuses for a growing number of genetic traits, and can choose those we wish to allow develop into a 
baby. We are exploring the possibility of altering a person's genetic make-up, for either therapeutic or 
enhancement purposes. It may even be possible to produce genetically identical clones of individuals in 
the future. We are now in the position of being able to direct the course of our own evolution. In this 
context language is often used which implies genetic manipulation wi l l be the source of human salvation 
or redemption: "the quest for Paradise Restored through human technology", "the eugenicist vision 
represents our human attempt to define ourselves and our destiny become masters of our own destiny 
... define ... improve... customize .... replicate ... redeem ourselves through our genetically enhanced and 
clonally produced progeny".1 Is directing our own evolution something we want to do, something we 
ought to do? Can genetic manipulation be the source of human 'salvation'? 
Utilitarian conclusions depend on the predicted consequences. Harris considers it our moral 
responsibility to use this technology in order to improve the human condition.2 The biologist Steve Jones 
believes that any changes we make to our genetic future wi l l have less impact than some of the 
evolutionary changes which happen without our realising it. Others refer to the horrors of Huxley's 
Brave New World4, or fear inequalities, injustices and discrirniriation far worse than at present.5 
What theological framework can we use to view the concept of humankind taking control of 
their own future? The image of God could become totally lost as humans choose to create themselves in 
their own image. Or we could simply be living out our God-given destiny, taking our stewardship 
1 Henk Jochemsen, Reducing People to Genetics in Kilner, Pentz & Young (eds), Genetic Ethics p. 81. 
Albert Mohler, The Brave New World of Cloning in Cole-Turner (ed.), Human Cloning, p.99. 
Also Lee M Silver, Remaking Eden. 
2 Clones, Genes, and Immortality, pp.203f. 
3 The Language of the Genes, p.298. 
4 Russo and Cove, Genetic Engineering: Dreams and Nightmares, p. 160.. 
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responsibilities seriously, working together with God towards his ultimate plan. In this chapter I explore 
theological approaches to the idea of humankind moulding their own future. Theologies of progress 
(represented by Karl Rahner, Theodosius Dobzhansky and ecofeminist theologians) regard it as 
humankind's responsibility to work together with God towards the fulfillment of his wi l l . Theologies of 
realism (represented by Reinhold Niebuhr and Oliver O'Donovan) recognise the reality of human failings 
and limitations, leaving us totally dependent on God's grace for our redemption. Finally, Jurgen 
Moltmann's 'theology of anticipation' is explored; a theology which holds together both realism and 
progress in a paradoxical whole, and offers a possible Christian approach to our new-found abilities. 
4.2 Theologies of Progress 
From a secular, utilitarian view-point, Fletcher regards it as our human responsibility to use 
genetic technologies as much as we are able. It is a moral imperative that we take responsibility for our 
own genetic inheritance, we are no longer able to 'blame God': "[tjbis is the direction of the biological 
revolution - that we turn more and more from creatures into creators".6 How should this view be 
considered from a Christian standpoint? Could it be that what God expects of, even calls human beings 
to, is to turn more from 'creatures into creators'? There are some who would believe this to be the case, 
that to grow, to progress, to improve the lot of humanity, is to work together with God in his ultimate aim 
for his children. 
/ 
i) Karl Rahner 
When considering the genetic manipulation of human beings in abstract terms, Rahner advocates 
the practice wholeheartedly. He sees it as the fulfillment of our freedom and responsibility. 
fM]an is characteristically the being who has been handed over to himself, consigned to 
his own free responsibility. In mis sense he must 'manipulate' himself. Freedom is the 
5 Rifkin, The Biotech Century, p.3. 
6 The Ethics of Genetic Control, p.200. 
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inevitable necessity of self-determination, by which man.... makes himself what and who 
he wants to be.7 
In the past this 'manipulation' has taken place at the level of the individual, in terms of the moral-
transcendent plane of convictions and conscience - but now man is able to manipulate himself through 
technology. Rahner twice states that he can see nothing immoral in the abstract concept of genetic 
manipulation.8 
In considering concrete examples, however, Rahner becomes much more conservative. 
Applying examples to Catholic principles of Natural Theology, he concludes that in practice genetic 
manipulation would be a violation of that which is sacred. The principle of the sanctity of all life would 
prohibit experiments involving foetuses or embryos produced through IVF. 9 The possibility of AID, 
which Rahner initially sees fi t to consider, is later seen as inappropriate as it involves the separation of the 
goods of human sexuality.10 Rahner also sees that it is important for humans to accept the gift of life, as a 
gift which is not totally within our control." He concludes, despite his original enthusiasm, with a 
negative reaction to human genetic manipulation.12 
On a separate occasion, Rahner recognises that humans wi l l never be able to engineer their own 
salvation; "Christians expect their fulfillment only from God whom they cannot create."13 Other 
Christians, however, do believe that humans could have their fate in their own hands. 
/ 
ii) Theodosius Dobzhansky 
Dobzhansky is an evolutionary biologist, writing from the point of view of a scientist rather than 
a theologian, but having been influenced considerably by the work of Teilhard de Chardin.14 
7 Theological Investigations, Vol.9, Ch. 14, "The Problem of Genetic Manipulation ", p.227f. Rahner's emphasis. 
8 Theological Investigations, Vol.9, p.229 & p.233 
9 Ibid, p.236. 
™Ibid, p.237 and p.246 
"Ibid, p.245. 
^Ibid, p.251. 
13 Theological Investigations, Vol.21,Ch.l, "Profane History and Salvation History", p.13. 
1 4 The Biology of Ultimate Concern, Ch.6, "The Teilhardian Synthesis " (referring especially to The Phenomenon of 
Man). 
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In The Biology of Ultimate Concern Dobzhansky's aim is to develop a Weltanschauung which 
includes the understanding of the world gained from evolutionary biology. 1 5 Scientifically, it has become 
obvious that the world is not fixed, finished or unchangeable; but engaged in evolutionary flow and 
development.16 Theologically, Dobzhansky relates this to Romans 8.19-22.17 Humankind is still in the 
process of evolving, which is of significance both biologically and theologically. 
Dobzhansky discusses three levels of evolution which have already taken place: cosmic 
(inorganic material, the universe, the stars), biological (organic, living things), and human (conscious, 
self-aware creatures).18 Transformation points occurred when evolution moved from cosmic to biological 
(with the origin of life), and from biological to human (with the origin of human beings). These radical 
transformation points Dobzhansky refers to as 'transcendent'.19 He then goes on to suggest that a third 
transcendent event wi l l occur (cf. Teilhard's 'megasynthesis')20, when humankind (through love) evolves 
into creatures capable of living harmoniously, finding unity in diversity (cf. Teilhard's Omega point).2 1 
Dobzhansky goes on to propose that humankind is in a position to contribute to this evolutionary 
process, to: "be its protagonist, and eventually its pilot". 2 2 This concept he also attributes to Teilhard.23 
Dobzhansky does not explore the practical implications of this theme in The Biology of Ultimate 
Concern. One wonders what genetic changes he thought would be needed in order to aid the 
evolutionary process culminating in humans being able to live together in perfect harmony. Two years 
15p.5. 
16 The Biology of Ultimate Concern, p.7 and p.l 10, see also Heredity and the Nature of Man p. 139. 
17 The Biology of Ultimate Concern, p;8. 
Wlbid, p40ff. 
Wlbid, p.50 
20 Ibid, p. 116 
21 Ibid, p. 134. 
2 2 Ibid, p.7, see also Heredity and the Nature of Man, p. 140 and p. 165. 
23 The Biology ofUltimate Concern, p. 137. I question Dobzhansky's interpretation of Teilhard. In The 
Phenomenon of Man, Teilhard does suggest humans will soon be able to "control the mechanism of organic 
heredity" and talks of "seizing the tiller of the world" (p.275). There is very little other reference in his work to 
humanity controlling its own evolution by genetic means. In Christianity and Evolution Christ is seen as the force 
behind, and the goal of, evolution (p. 180). 
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earlier however, he had published his initial thoughts concerning genetic manipulation in Heredity and 
the Nature of Man.™ 
In recognising that advances had been made in some forms of treatment for genetically based 
diseases, Dobzhansky points out that sufferers are now able to procreate and so perpetuate the disease-
causing genes. His chilling observation is; "[ i ] t is a depressing thought that we are helping the ailing, the 
lame, and the deformed only to make our descendants more ailing, more lame, and more deformed."23 
He therefore suggests that it is our human responsibility to replace 'automatic, blind, purposeless' Natural 
Selection with "the sound core of eugenics, the applied science of human betterment".26 The optimistic 
view is that humankind can choose to direct their evolution towards those purposes believed to represent 
the "wi l l of the Creator".27 However, it is highly significant to note that the 'Racial Hygiene' programme 
of the Nazi era began for a very similar reason.28 This observation calls into question our ability to 
know, and to work towards, the "wi l l of the Creator". This is discussed below.2 9 
iii) Ecofeminist theologies 
In line with current scientific understandings, the ecofeminists regard our universe as unfinished, 
dynamic, still in process. God is seen as a continuing creator.30 Human beings are not seen as the 
'crown and goal' of creation, but our consciousness and technical abilities mean that we have the 
knowledge and the power to destroy, or to help, the process of ongoing creation. This is a position of 
profound responsibility and of critical importance. 
In ecofeminist. theology, salvation is understood in very physical, embodied terms (both 
individual and global), and is concerned with the restoration of right relationships.32 McFague criticises 
2 4 Especially Ch.6 "Whither Mankind". 
25 Heredity and the Nature of Man, p. 159. Also Ramsey and Fletcher, Ch. 1.3. 
26 Heredity and the Nature of Man, p. 161. 
27Ibid, p.\63. 
28 Arthur Dyck, "Eugenics in Historical and Ethical Perspective " in Kilner, Pentz and Young (eds), Genetic Ethics, 
p.26. 
29 Ch.4.3. 
30 The Body of God, p. 105 
11 Ibid. p. 108. 
3 2 McFague, The Body of God, p.18 and p.23. Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p.215f. 
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Christianity for its 'otherworldliness', and its emphasis on the salvation of the individual. 3 3 Salvation, the 
continuing creation of the world, is suggested as being in our hands, it depends on human action as the 
"self-conscious, reflexive part" of creation.3'' This continuing creation, this evolution, would however 
appear to be cultural or moral rather than genetic.35 Radford Ruether sees embracing the Jubilee tradition 
of the Old Testament to be fundamental to this process.36 Both theologians draw up very practical 
strategies for working towards a redeemed world, strategies which include; city planning, nature writing, 
phasing out fossil fuels and human population control.3 7 
As the salvation of the world would appear to be in our own hands, it is not surprising that the 
ecofeminist theologians see Jesus Christ as little more than a 'good example' to us. For Radford Ruether 
the example of Jesus is but one example among many. We experience glimpses of the fullness of 
redeemed humanity within history in the lives of those whose own authenticity discloses the meaning of 
true personhood. It is through the example of Jesus, especially in his relationships with women, that we 
learn what it means to be liberated from hierarchical relationships.38 McFague speaks of the 'Christie 
paradigm', a paradigm of God's immanence, which shows that the direction of creation is "toward 
inclusive love for all, especially the oppressed, the outcast, the vulnerable."39 It is significant to note that 
this calling to solidarity with all creatures, especially the vulnerable and needy, could never have been 
envisioned by our common creation story or evolutionary science.40 
Ecofeminist theology has begun with the experience of women, and with the insights gained 
from ecological and scientific studies. As such it covers its 'ecofeminist' credentials, but there is an 
extent to which it sometimes seems an exaggeration to call it 'theology'. The role of God in creating the 
complex, fruitful, interrelated and interdependent world in which we live, and in being the source of its 
3 3 The Body of God, p. 102 and p. 109. 
3 4 The Body of God, p. 105 and p. 124. 
3 5 McFague, The Body of God, p.80. Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk, p.89 and p. 113. 
^Sexism and God-Talk, p.255, Gaia and God, pp.21 Iff. 
3 7 McFague, Super, Natural Christians, Chapters 6 & 7. Radford Ruether, Gaia and God, Chapter 10. 
3 8 Sexism and God-Talk, p. 114 and p.l36f. 
3 9 The Body of God, p. 160. 
40 Ibid, p.m. 
65 
life-giving energy, is acknowledged41 However, further than this the ecoferninists seem reluctant to go. 
God is powerless to do anything about the suffering of creation other than 'suffer with'. Jesus Christ 
becomes the 'Christie paradigm' whose death on the cross was but a supreme example of suffering with. 
Admittedly this theology is realistic about the presence of suffering within our world. But where is the 
hope of such theology? There is no purpose or direction to evolution, nor any way in which humans can 
be helped in their responsible role within creation. It seems simply that we have to pull ourselves up by 
our own bootlaces, something which we patently have been unable to do throughout history. The 
resurrection stories only instill a vague belief and hope "that diminishment and death are not the last 
word". 4 2 There is no sight here of any concept of God breaking into history and doing a 'new thing'. In 
stripping Christianity of its 'paternalistic, monarchical' view of God, ecofeminism seems also to have 
stripped Christianity of its hope. Christianity has always had a very strong theology of hope, more than 
simple wishful thinking. 4 3 Despite these critical comments, ecofeminist theology does have useful 
contributions to make to the debate concerning the ethics of genetic technology, in particular concerning 
human beings' responsible role within creation, embodiment and health, and attitudes towards 
difference.44 
Each of these theologies of progress has a major problem, an over-optimistic belief in 
humanity's ability to help itself. There is no recognition of the limitations of human existence. Rahner 
does recognise natural limits to human life, for example the unity of the relational and procreative goods 
of marriage, but says nothing of the human tendency to misuse power. Ironically, Dobzhansky illustrates 
the way in which human knowledge and ability can be used to the detriment, as easily as to the benefit, of 
others. Ecoferninists (by their own bias) highlight the emptiness of a hope based only on ourselves. In 
any consideration of the future of humanity, or of our ability to help ourselves, there also needs to be a 
realistic understanding of human failings. 
41 The Body ofGod.p. 151 ff. 
4 2 McFague, The Body of God, p. 191. 
43 See sections 3 and 4, below. 
44 See Chs.3.4,3.2, 5.3, and 3.5. 
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4.3 Theologies of Realism 
Theologies of realism are based on the understanding that human beings are limited; flawed, 
broken, fallen. On our own we are unable to help ourselves. The views of Niebuhr and O'Donovan on 
this matter have already been addressed.45 It is on the basis of such understanding that their beliefs about 
salvation and our future hope are founded. 
i) Reinhold Niebuhr 
Niebuhr sees the two World Wars as having destroyed the unfounded optimism of the nineteenth 
century. This optimism was based on the illusion that growth or progress could fu l f i l l the meaning of life 
and redeem it of its ills and errors, an illusion which assumed an exaggerated understanding of the degree 
of human freedom and power, and made the mistake of identifying freedom with virtue. 4 6 Niebuhr saw 
humankind as unable to help itself, only 'divine mercy' could provide a solution.4 7 
It is through the "self-disclosure of a divine love" that God is able to overcome the evil 
inclination to self-worship in the human heart, and to take the evil of history into and upon himself. 
Within history there is the possibility of the renewal of life and the destruction of evil "whenever men 
and nations see themselves as they truly are under a divine judgement, which is as merciful as it is 
terrible".48 Niebuhr recognises that the salvation of humankind, or the world, is not complete. There are 
still 'moral ambiguities' in history. The innocent still suffer, those who are evil still triumph, the 'justice' 
which is meted out in this life is not complete. Only when history is fulfilled wi l l ultimate justice be 
done, through the final judgement and general resurrection. This wi l l be brought about only through the 
divine mercy, not by human achievement.49 The concept of the final judgement is very important for 
Niebuhr, for it is when justice wi l l be seen to be done in a way never possible within the ambiguities of 
45 See Ch.3.2 (ii), below. 
46 Faith and History; A Comparison of Christian and Modern Views ofHistory, p.69. 
47 Ibid, p.126. 
48 Ibid, p. 125. 
49 7Z,/d>p.213. 
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history.5 0 The general resurrection is the fulfillment of the individual 'renewals' possible within history. 
These events form the fulfillment and the end of history, they cannot be found within history itself.31 
Nevertheless, Niebuhr regards it as important that a defeatist attitude is not taken up towards the 
possibility of renewal taking place within society, within history.5 2 It is the responsibility of the 
Christian to strive to allow the love of God to affect and influence society, whilst at the same time 
recognising that ultimately this work is something which we cannot achieve, and wi l l not be achieved 
within history as we know i t . 5 3 
ii) Oliver O'Donovan 
It is not natural to link O'Donovan's theology with that of Niebuhr, but both men are realistic 
about the failings of humankind. For all our apparent progress, O'Donovan believes we contribute 
nothing towards the salvation of our world. 5 4 The fulfillment of history wil l not be generated from within 
history - this is what the Reformers sought to safeguard with their sola gratia, solo Christo slogans. It is 
not just that God is at work within history, but he is also working 'from outside', doing something new. 
This means that the fulfillment of creation is in no way dictated by the nature of creation. Its destined 
end is not immanently present in the beginning or in its history. 
Where O'Donovan departs from Niebuhr, is in saying that God's salvation, brought about 
through Jesus Christ, w i l l involve the whole of creation rather than just humankind. Niebuhr sees 
ultimate salvation taking place outside history, involving the final judgement and resurrection of human 
beings. This could be seen'as a 'gnostic' hope of escaping the limits of our bodies. By contrast, 
O'Donovan talks of the redemption of creation, rather than redemption from creation, which he sees 
affirmed by God in the resurrection of Jesus from the dead.35 
50 Faith and History, p.232. 
51 Ibid, p.235. 
& Ibid, p.200. 
53 Ibid, p.213. 
54 Resurrection and Moral Order, Ch.3 "Eschatology and History ". 
55 Resurrection and Moral Order, p. 14. The concept of redemption from creation he refers to as 'gnostic' hope. 
Also, N.T.Wright, New Heavens, New Earth; The Biblical Picture of Christian Hope. 
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In contrast to those advocating theologies of progress, O'Donovan sees the created world as 
being "complete, whole and satisfying" at the end of God's six days of creative activity. 5 6 The world was 
seen as being "good", it needed no further improvement, and it contained within it natural teleological 
and generic ordering which gives coherence and totality to i t . 5 7 The completeness of creation does not, 
however mean that God is no longer at work in the world (contrast ecofeminist thought); God's work in 
the "providential government and redemption of history" is as yet incomplete.58 The ordering of creation 
remains important to O'Donovan when thinking of the fulfilment of creation. The God who rules the 
world is the same as the God who made it, and so the outcome of history wi l l affirm rather than deny the 
order of its making. 5 9 The place of humankind within the created order, the place which has been 
rejected by us all, has however been fulfilled in and through Jesus Christ. It is he who lived in perfect 
obedience to the Creator, he who reflected his glorious image, he who lived as beneficent ruler over the 
rest of creation, he who defeated death and gloriously sits at the Father's side.60 In Christ we see the 
order of the world to come, "the vindication and perfect manifestation of the created order which was 
always there but never fully expressed".61 
In parallel with Jesus Christ's resurrection and ascension, O'Donovan suggests that the final 
redemption wi l l involve both restoration and transformation. Humankind wil l be restored as ruler of the 
ordered creation mat God has made. However, this wi l l not be a matter of "returning to the Garden of 
Eden", or restoring the status quo1 ante - but rather it wi l l be a going on, to that place towards which 
creation had always been directed.62 The vision of humankind's eschatological hope can be seen in the 
.. •-•) 
risen and ascended Christ. However, the eschatological hope for the whole of creation is hidden from us. 
It cannot be guessed by extrapolating past history; it cannot be the work of philosophy. I f we are to know 
anything of the ultimate future for creation, it wi l l be a disclosure of prophecy.63 
56 Begotten or Made, p. 12, Resurrection and Moral Order, p.60.. 
57 Resurrection and Moral Order, p.3 If. 
58 Ibid, p.62. 
59 Ibid, p.44. 
60 Resurrection and Moral Order, p.54. 
61 Ibid, p.53. 
62 Ibid, p.55. 
63 Ibid, p.83. 
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Humanity can contribute nothing to the fulfillment of the created order, nor can we predict its 
nature, but we do have a responsibility to live morally in the meantime.64 The concept of ultimate 
redemption being both a restoration and a transformation influences O'Donovan in his moral thinking: 
we need to respect the natural structures of life in the world, while looking forward to their 
transformation.65 This is something we cannot strive for, nor achieve, on our own - but only through our 
participation in the life of Christ.66 
Both Niebuhr and O'Donovan stress humankind's inability to help itself. Technology, 
knowledge and skill may advance, but only the love and mercy of God is able to bring hope for the 
future. Until that ultimate future is realised, it is our responsibility to live morally within the present age. 
Niebuhr's understanding of our ultimate hope (not involving this physical world) leads him to suggest 
that the meaning of living morally involves striving for minor 'renewals' and justice in human terms, 
which are but foretastes of the final judgement and resurrection. A more biblically-based, understanding 
of ultimate hope involving the whole created order, leads to a fuller picture of our moral obligations 
within current history. 
O'Donovan suggests our moral values should be informed by the natural order of creation, but 
also by the Christian hope of its ultimate transformation. The nature of this transformation cannot be 
predicted, but wi l l only be revealed through prophecy, and achieved through our life in Christ. 
O'Donovan's work leaves me unsatisfied in two respects when applying his moral framework to the 
issues arising through genetic manipulation. Firstly, whilst he shows well the importance of being 
realistic about human failings, there can be the implication that human advances can do no good within 
the predicaments of this world. The implication would seem to be that genetic technology has nothing to 
offer humanity. Secondly, how should O'Donovan's moral framework be applied in the field of genetic 
manipulation? Is the 'natural order' of creation to be seen within the species boundaries of living 
64 Resurrection and Moral Order, p.76. 
65 Ibid, p.58 
66 Ibid, p.85. 
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things?67 Would it therefore be immoral to transfer a gene from a plant into a human being? How does 
one apply both the natural order of this world and the, unpredictable, order of the world to come in 
ethical situations?68 
A theological approach which seems to be able to combine both the optimism of progress, and 
the realism of human failings, within the context of today's technical advances, thus enabling a greater 
ethical understanding, is that of Jiirgen Moltmann. I shall refer to his ideas as a 'theology of 
anticipation'. 
4.4 A Theology of Anticipation 
i) Creation - open 
Together with those who propose a theology of progress, Moltmann recognises the world to be 
still in the process of evolving. Creation is not complete, it is open.69 Creation was not finished at the 
end of the sixth day only to be spoilt by humankind, it has not yet reached its end. This concept has come 
from both an understanding of recent scientific thinking about open systems70, and from recent biblical 
exegesis71. Creation is open, it is equally open to disaster and to salvation. This is seen in the account of 
creation, in that the chaotic forces of the night and the sea were only given boundaries, rather than totally 
destroyed.72 God's creative activity is thus not seen as a single event resulting in the 6-day creation of the 
world, but rather as a continuous/process. Within this continuous process God acts in the initial creation, 
67 He suggests that there is a natural 'generic' ordering within created life, an ordering which has not just been 
imposed by the ordered mind of human beings. (Resurrection and Moral Order, pp.36f.). 
68 See also 4.5 i i i , below. 
69 The Future of Creation, Ch.8 "Creation as an Open System ". 
70 The universe is no longer thought of as a static closed system at equilibrium, but rather as an open system with an 
unrepeatable history. The mechanistic views of Newtonian science have been absorbed into the dynamistic views 
of Einstein. Real systems are too complex for all the necessary variables to be taken into account in order to make 
mechanistic predictions concerning their behaviour. The flapping of a butterfly's wings can make huge 
differences to weather patterns on the opposite side of the world. Predictions can only be made according to the 
laws of probability. This means that the future is not completely inherent in the present, rather it includes 
randomness and unpredictability. God in Creation, p. 199ff. 
71 Bara, the unique word for the divine creation, is found used in the bible in the context of God's work of liberation 
and salvation within history far more often than in the context of the initial creation of the world. "So it is 
theologically inadequate if we restrict the divine creative activity to the beginning". (God in Creation, p.208, also 
The Future of Creation, p. 121). 
72 The Future of Creation, p. 120. 
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within history, and in the End-time.73 A l l of these actions are creative: "creatio originalis - creatio 
continua - creatio nova".1* 
ii) Humanity - limited 
Together with Niebuhr and O'Donovan, Moltmann is realistic about human failings. He 
regards 'being truly human' as a matter of relationships; relationships with God, with other humans and 
with the rest of creation.75 A l l people fall short of this ideal in all three areas of relationship. In breaking 
of f one's relationship with God, the open system of human life becomes closed. Instead of experiencing 
the open, creative, fruitful relationship of love with God, rebellious humans become petrified as a closed 
system, experiencing deadly self-isolation. This is sin and slavery.76 Human relationships are so often 
destroyed through fear, fear which turns to aggression.77 Moltmann recognises that progress, 
development, and increasing freedom, are not going to solve all humankind's problems.78 
Progress cannot change human nature. Moltmann also recognises that progress can be one-
sided, and not beneficial to all. What has been progress for one, has tended to be exploitation for another 
(whether human or nature).79 This can be due to a deliberate misuse of power, or even the result of not 
being able to predict or control the outcome of a particular advance.80 
iii) Humanity - co-creators? 
Having recognised these human limitations, Moltmann still suggests that the development of the 
human race is in our hands: ': 
Today, the direct continuation of the evolution that led to the origin of the human 
species on earth lies in the hands of human beings themselves. They can either destroy 
7 3 God in Creation, p.55, The Future of Creation, p. 119. 
7 4 God in Creation, p.208. 
75 Compare Ch.3.3. 
7 6 God in Creation, p.210f. and The Future of Creation, p. 122. 
7 7 The Future of Creation, p. 100. 
7 8 Ibid, p.53,also p.l22f. 
7 9 God in Creation, p. 138. 
80 The Future of Creation, p. 135. 
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this stage of evolution, or they can organize themselves into a higher form of common 
living than before, and advance evolution further.81 
In contrast to ecofeminist thought, Moltmann sees humanity's ability to be involved in its own evolution 
as entirely dependent on the prevenient work of God. People close themselves of f from God (in their 
rebellion), but God is never closed to them. They break of f communication with God, but God does not 
break off his communication with them. Thus the future of humanity is always kept open, no matter how 
closed or self-isolated we may be, there is always the possibility for conversion and new direction.82 
God's work of salvation liberates people from the slavery of their closed system, he brings about a divine 
opening of that which is closed and dead.83 Through God's salvation the Christian is liberated "from fear 
for hope, from self-seeking for love, and from the enslavement of evil for resistance to evil". 8 4 This 
liberation can be experienced in history (contrast Niebuhr) but is only a foretaste of the liberation which 
is to come.85 
iv) Future - new creation 
O'Donovan speaks of the redemption of creation involving both restoration and transformation. 
Moltmann's understanding is very similar, even i f not immediately obviously so. Salvation involves not 
just restoration (of the original good creation, of the broken fellowship with God, of man's disintegrated 
identity, of the peace of creation), but it also involves new beginnings. In redemption there is the 
beginning of a new creation, something new which has never been before is called into l i fe . 8 6 God 
created'the cosmos as an open system. The goal of the history of creation is not a return to its original 
condition, but the revelation of the glory of God. 8 1 This consummation will be a new creation (as seen 
through the prophetic theology of the Old Testament88, and the teaching concerning the resurrection and 
81 God in Creation, p. 196. It was perhaps this statement that led to some misunderstanding that Moltmann was 
proposing a salvific evolutionary process. Such a misunderstanding is clearly corrected in Moltmann's later book 
The Way of Jesus Christ. (Richard Bauckham, The Theology of Jurgen Moltmann, p. 194). 
8 2 God in Creation, p.210f. 
8 3 The Future of Creation, p. 122, God in Creation, p.2U. 
8 4 The Future of Creation, p. 102. 
S5 Ibid, p. 104. 
8 6 The Future of Creation, p. 149ff. 
8? God in Creation, p.56 and p.207. 
8 8 Ibid, p.209. 
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the Holy Spirit in the New Testament89), whilst at the same time must also be seen as the completion of 
the whole process of creation.90 It will be the fulfillment of the promise implanted in creation from the 
beginning, and yet wi l l surpass everything that can be told about creation within history.91 
Moltmann distinguishes two understandings of 'future'. There is the future in the sense of that 
which wil l be from what already is; a prolongation of being. This is a future which can be predicted, and 
is the sense of the Latin word futurum (from which 'future' is derived). There is also future in the sense 
of the arrival or coming of something new, as in 'the coming year'. This future involves something 
which has not been present, still is not present yet, and cannot therefore be predicted even i f it can be 
anticipated. This is the sense of the Latin word adventus (from which 'Advent' is derived).92 Christian 
eschatology can only be anticipated, not predicted.93 This anticipation has been given to us in Jesus 
Christ.94 
v) Present - anticipation 
For Moltmann the consummation of creation wi l l not supplant history, it is already to be found 
within history in the form of anticipation.95 Christians need not regard their ultimate future as being a 
matter indifferent to their present life, but nor can it be expected that we can bring about 'heaven on 
earth'.96 Living in the 'now already' in the midst of 'not yet', the Christian should distinguish between 
the future which can be predicted and the future which is hoped for. 9 7 
The paradox of 'both now and not yet' is complemented by the paradox of 'solely God's work 
and also man's'. It is only; through the creative acts of God that the new creation wi l l come about. Only 
through his opening of closed systems, only through his suffering of love, only through the death of Jesus 
8 9 The Future of Creation, p. 123 
Wlbid, p. 124. 
91 God in Creation, p.207. 
9 2 The Future of Creation, p.29f. and God in Creation, pl32f. 
9 3 The Future of Creation, p.55. 
9 4 Ibid, p.53. Compare O'Donovan above. 
9 5 The Future of Creation, p.l6f. 
9(5 Ibid, p. 17 and p.47. 
W Ibid, p.55. 
74 
on the cross.98 Moltmann also implies that liberation is both God's work for the ultimate future, and 
humankind's work in the present: 
Without faith's hope for the divine messianic future there is no hope in action which can 
stand its ground. Without hope in action faith's hope becomes ineffective and 
irresponsible." 
In a suggestion which turns on its head current attitudes towards success and achievement, Moltmann 
states that any expression of 'hope in action' wi l l involve taking on the cross of Christ in our own lives. 
Such 'hope in action' is therefore not to be found in the great advances and developments of humankind, 
but in identifying with, representing, loving, the victims of society's progress.100 The future of God is 
manifest in the crucified Christ, the anticipation of this future is therefore to be found in "representing 
those who have no future"; the hungry, the naked, the homeless, the unemployed, the imprisoned.101 
Moltmann suggests that the foretaste of the liberation which is to come, can be experienced 
through humankind's striving for liberation. This liberation is seen to take place in five areas: 
" (i) In the struggle for economic justice against the exploitation of man. 
(ii) In the struggle for human dignity and human rights against the political oppression 
of man. 
(iii) In the struggle for human solidarity against the alienation of man from man. 
. (iv) In the struggle for peace with nature against the industrial destruction of the 
environment: 
(v) In the struggle of hope against apathy in asserting the significance of the whole in 
personal l i f e . " 1 0 2 
98 The Future of Creation, p.52. 
M Ibid, p.m. 
100 Compare the ecofeminist suggestions, observed to go against the grain of natural selection (section 2 (iii), this 
chapter). 
101 The Future of Creation, p.54, also p. 17 and p.57. 
102 ibid, p. 110. 
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Each liberation is mutually interactive, true liberation must be pursued in all directions simultaneously. 
The list begins with economic liberation, but it finishes with the most important one which is religious 
liberation. Without the liberation from fear and apathy, any moves towards other liberations wil l only 
lead to oppression. 
vi) God - openness personified? 
The consummation of history has been described as the revelation of the glory of God. Creation 
was made an open system, by the God who redeems by opening up that which is closed; thus even this 
consummation, this fulfilment, must be open - in fact it must be "openness par excellence".™ It wi l l not 
be timeless eternity, but eternal time. Not the end of history, but the end of pre-history and the beginning 
of the eternal history of God, man and nature. Such openness wi l l lead to perfect communication 
between God and man and nature; the universal "sympathy of all things".1 0 4 This concept points towards 
a radical implication, which is that God can no longer be thought of in terms of "The (static) Perfect 
Being', but rather as "the transcendent making-possible of all possible realities".105 
The theologies of progress, realism and anticipation have been described, and their failings and 
useful insights discussed. The ways in which these theologies have implications for the use of genetic 
technologies wil l now be considered. 
(I 
4.5 Implications for genetic manipulation 
i) Realism 
The salvific language which is used in connection with genetic engineering has already been 
referred to. As the possibilities and promises of manipulating our own genetic future are dangled 
seductively before us, we wil l do well to remember the theologies of realism. Niebuhr knew of the 
limitations of human beings. We do not have unlimited freedom and power, we do not have total control 
over our own nature, let alone the rest of the created world. Niebuhr describes sin as a corruption of 
1 0 3 The Future of Creation, p. 126 and God in Creation, p.213. 
104 God in Creation, p.213. 
1 0 5 The Future of Creation, p.127 and Godin Creation, p.214. 
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freedom leading to the recalcitrance of the human heart and 'moral ambiguities' in history. For 
O'Donovan, sin is the refusal of human beings to adopt the divinely ordained position given to them in 
creation, which leads to confused moral knowledge. Moltmann describes sin as the rebellion of human 
beings against God, which leads to the closing down of open systems, to deadly self-isolation and spoilt 
relations between other human beings and nature. Each theologian gives a different nuance to the reality 
that human beings refuse the sovereignty of God and suffer the consequences. A l l the technological 
expertise in the world cannot solve our problems, so long as we struggle with recalcitrant hearts, and with 
a confused moral knowledge, which continually result in the closing of open systems. 
Without the grace of God, powerful techniques open up the possibilities of power for bad as well 
as power for good, whether through ignorance or our own deliberate fault. The last sixty years have 
highlighted ways in which the power of genetics could be misused. The experiences of the holocaust and 
more recently 'ethnic cleansing' in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, have illustrated this possibility 
only too vividly. Just as Jews and gypsies were taken to gas chambers by Nazis, Albanians driven from 
their homes by Serbs, and Tutsis slaughtered by Hutus, so the more sophisticated, more powerful, genetic 
technologies could be used to discriminate and eliminate more effectively. The limitations of humanity 
highlight the need for proper legislation in the use of genetic technologies. 
ii) Unpredictable future 
An additional problem with the concept that genetic manipulation could bring about our own 
salvation, is that the nature of our salvation cannot be predicted by the extrapolation of current history. 
Both Moltmann and O'Donovan agree that the ultimate fulfillment of creation wi l l involve something 
totally new. I f this is so, which scripture certainly seems to suggest, we cannot say: ' I f only we could 
design a human being to be more tolerant, more loving, more intelligent, more artistic then the 
world's problems wi l l be solved.' This is not something which we can predict or work out by 
extrapolation. Equally, no amount of genetic manipulation wi l l ever produce the 'perfect human 
being'. 1 0 6 Only Jesus Christ can be described thus, that is, until the fulfillment of time when that which is 
anticipated in Christ can be our experience too. Nor does the genetic manipulation of humans (alone) f i t 
in with the understanding that the fulfillment of history is to involve the whole of creation. 
106 SeeCh.6.4 (ii), below. 
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iii) Anticipation in the present. 
Moltmann and O'Donovan appear to have very differing views about creation and its 
fulfillment. I suspect they may be using different words to say the same thing. O'Donovan emphasises 
the complete nature of God's creative act. By contrast, Moltmann stresses the openness of creation. 
God's creative activity is continuous, working in the initial creation, within history, and in the End-time. 
Is this concept so very different from O'Donovan's, in which God is still working out his providential 
government and the redemption of history, even i f his 'creative activity' is complete? Similarly, although 
O'Donovan speaks of the sabbath in terms of the celebration of the completeness and integrity of God's 
creation, he also describes it as a sign looking forward to the fulfillment of history when all creation wil l 
be able to "enter into that completeness".107 It may be that the apparent differences between these 
theologians' views are a result of the different view-points against which they are arguing. Moltmann is 
coming from a Marxist background, and arguing against a 'pie in the sky when you die' attitude, and so 
stresses the creative work of God even within history. O'Donovan is more concerned about the false 
notion of salvation through evolutionary progress, and so stresses the transcendence of God. 
O'Donovan and Moltmann may be saying very similar things about creation and its fulfillment, 
but their approaches to the moral implications of living within history are very different. For O'Donovan 
it is the ordering of creation which is paramount, both in its teleological and generic forms. God created 
the world as "ordered totality", and the outcome of history wi l l affirm rather than deny this ordering, 
therefore such ordering should inform and direct our ethical decision-making. O'Donovan has never 
explicitly commented on this area (to my knowledge), but it would seem from bis argument that the 
ordering of the species may be of greatest importance when considering genetic manipulation. As 
species (by definition) do not inter-breed, it would seem to go against the ordering of creation to transfer 
a gene from one species to another. But is the species part of God's 'ordering' of creation, or is it a 
convenient way for human beings to describe the natural world? 1 0 8 Some 'species' are separate simply 
due to their geographic location, and i f brought together can inter-breed very successfully. As evolution 
continues even now, which pattern of species is God's 'creation ordering'? 
107 Resurrection and Moral Order, p.61. 
108 Note this is a question concerning generic ordering - rather than the issue of human-imposed teleological 
ordering {Resurrection and Moral Order, p.52). 
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One concept of O'Donovan's which may be helpful in thinking about how to live morally in 
history, is his understanding that our salvation wil l not be from this world, but rather it will include the 
salvation of this world. This implies (as with ecofeminist embodiment) that our material being is 
important; it is not just our 'souls' that wi l l be saved. In addition, it implies that our salvation wil l not be 
from the limitations of our physicality, but from the limitations of our fallenness. 
Moltmann's emphasis is not so much about moral living until such time as history is fulfilled, 
but rather he is concerned with the anticipations of the eschaton which are possible within history. But 
how can we work towards such anticipations i f the fulfillment of history cannot be predicted or 
extrapolated? How are we to know what is the desirable future, as against the predictable future? For 
Moltmann; "[fjhe anticipation of the coming kingdom of God has taken place in history in the crucified 
Jesus of Nazareth."109 Therefore our anticipations are found in our identification with the people whom 
Jesus called 'the least of his brethren'; not the progressive leaders, but their victims. This has radical 
implications for genetic technology. It implies that it is not through identifying ourselves with the 
famous scientists, the drug company directors, or the patent lawyers, that we can bring about an 
anticipation of God's kingdom. It wi l l not be through our promotion of the wonders of this modern 
technology to change our world and ourselves. Rather anticipations of God's kingdom wi l l be seen 
through our identification with the victims of genetic technology. So it wi l l be: 
- through our care for the disabled child who, despite the genetic testing results, was chosen by heT 
lj 
parents to come to birth, 
- through our defense, of Tnird world countries whose genetic inheritance is being pirated through the 
patenting work of multi-national drug companies, 
- through sharing the grief of the couple who choose not to have children because of their own genetic 
make-up, 
- through our love for those who are marginalised because of their 'genetic handicaps', 
- through our objections to Third world countries being used as testing sites for genetically manipulated 
material 
it w i l l be through actions such as these that we might bring about an anticipation of God's kingdom 
in our world. This is a concept which is very powerful and challenging. It may also seem rather 
79 
negative. It does not take into account the positive ways in which genetic technology could be used in 
the world. Alongside the concept of identification with the victims, I would therefore promote 
Moltmann's five areas of liberation."0 These areas could serve as a useful framework against which to 
measure any proposed genetic technique. Recognising that it is not always possible to predict the 
implications of any advance, a useful yardstick would be to ask what implications a particular advance 
may have for economic justice, for human dignity, for human solidarity, for peace with nature, and for 
the significance of the whole in personal life. 
Genetic manipulation wil l not be the solution to all our problems. This technology has, 
however, great power to solve some people's problems, even to bring about an anticipation of God's 
kingdom. It also has great power to create problems for many other people. In our use of this technology 
we must always be realistic about our human limitations, our human failings, our tendency to misuse 
power. The one true perfect human being is the one who laid down his power and became one with those 
who were downtrodden at the edge of society. It is his likeness, by the grace of God, that we must strive 
towards. 
Moltmann's five areas of liberation do not appear to include liberation in embodied terms, for 
example liberation from the limitations of illness or disability. Is this an omission on Moltmann's part, or 
is such liberation not part of the Christian hope for this world (or even the world to come)? Many genetic 
technologies raise issues concerning the nature of health, the role of medicine, social attitudes towards 
illness and disability. These are discussed in the following chapter. 
109 The Future of Creation, p.53. 
110 See section 4 (v), above. 
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Chapter 5: ON HUMAN HEALTH AND 
WHOLENESS 
5.1 Introduction 
Human beings cannot bring about their own salvation, nor the salvation of the world. Humanity 
can, however, work together with God towards his ultimate purpose for creation. Through the grace of 
God, we can help to bring about anticipations of God's coming kingdom. Moltmann suggests five areas 
of liberation which would work towards such anticipations, areas which do not seem to include a 
recognition of human embodiment In the light of God's promised salvation, how is the Christian to live 
with the limitations of embodiment? Is it right to attempt to solve our limitations, or should one simply 
accept them? Can medicine, genetic medicine in particular, be used to bring about anticipations of God's 
kingdom? What is it we should expect of medicine? How should a Christian approach the reality of 
bodily imperfections and mortality, of disability and premature death? 
These questions must be considered in the light of today's Western culture in which 'health' has 
become an idol, and people are obsessed with bodily perfection.1 I have noted how salvific language is 
often used in relation to genetic technologies. There is also a tendency to view medicine and/or health in 
a similar way.2 In this chapter I aim to provide a Christian perspective to these issues. Consideration is 
given to the appropriate expectations of medicine, to the meaning and significance of 'health', and to 
i! 
theological approaches which could enable one to live amongst disability and premature death. 
) 
5.2 Towards a theology of medicine 
A number of theologians believe that our expectations and our hopes of medicine today have 
become too great.3 This is the result of attempts by (Western, rich) human beings to escape their 
limitations; the limitations of finitude, of weakness, of age, of mortality. In a self-reinforcing circle, 
medicine has also changed its aim and emphasis. Traditionally medicine recognised death as its limit 
(and so withdrew or changed its strategy to that of caring), but now the primary task of medicine seems to 
1 McKenny, To Relieve the Human Condition, p.2. 
2 i6irf. p.201. 
3 Lammers and Verhey (eds), On Moral Medicine, Introduction, p. 3. 
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be "to extend our lives indefinitely".4 Medicine's other main aims are those of relieving suffering and 
increasing choice.5 In contrast, traditional medicine, based on the Hippocratic oath, was concerned with 
'healing' in the context of the sanctity of l ife. 6 The distinction between 'healing' and 'relief of suffering' 
may seem insignificant until a situation arises in which suffering can only be relieved through the 
cessation of life. Traditional medicine was based on the principle primum non nocere (above all do no 
harm).7 Hauerwas points out the irony that, in attempting to eliminate suffering, we can end up by 
eliminating the sufferer.8 
This approach to medicine is, at least in part, a result of holding a particular model of illness. 
The 'medical' model, which is most often applied in medicine today, is based on the assumption that 
illness can be fully accounted for by deviations from the norm of our bodily functioning.9 Something is 
seen to have gone wrong with our body, and medicine can correct it through drugs or surgery (rather as a 
mechanic would mend a broken-down car). As a result of this model, we are becoming increasingly 
dependent upon evermore sophisticated medical technologies. Twenty years ago Mich suggested such an 
attitude was having a disabling impact on people's health. He suggested medicine is often harmful to 
people's health and is leading to a new "iatrogenic epidemic"10. He claimed that the pain and disability 
resulting from technical medical intervention rivalled that due to traffic accidents or even rnilitary 
conflicts." No statistical support is found for Mich's claim, 1 2 nevertheless the reality holds that high 
technology medicine can cause more harm than good. This is due partly to the harmful effects of medical 
treatments,'3 and partly because the idolising of health, ironically, leads to a less healthy society.14 And 
yet, medical technologies continue to increase in number, scale and complexity. Towards the forefront is 
4 McKenny, To Relieve the Human Condition, p.30. Compare Hauerwas, Suffering Presence p.36 and Naming the 
Silencesp.101. 
5 McKenny, To Relieve the Human Condition, p.5. Cameron, The New Medicine p. 132 andp.48. 
6 Cameron, The New Medicine, p.59f. 
7 Ibid. p.60. 
8 Suffering Presence, p.24. The situation referred to was that of allowing an infant to die on the grounds that a life of 
suffering lay ahead - the irony is equally felt in the case of 'therapeutic abortion' 
9 Pattison, Alive and Kicking, pp.22ff. 
10 From the Greek; iatros meaning physician, and genesis meaning origin. 
11 Ivan Illich, Limits to Medicine, p.26. 
'2 Hauerwas, Truthfulness and Tragedy, p. 188. 
13 Hauerwas, Naming the Silences, p. 108. 
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the field of genetic medicine. The scrabble continues to identify the genes responsible for diseases and 
disabilities, to design tests, to screen individuals and populations, and to mend dysfunctional genes. A 
theology of illness, health and medicine is needed in order to establish how, and to what extent, such 
technologies should be used. 
Hauerwas suggests that the aim of medicine should be that of caring not curing. His 
understanding is that the primary aim of medicine is not to cure people of their illnesses (thus avoiding 
suffering or death), but rather it is to care for people in their illness. He observes that the pain of illness 
(not necessarily physical pain, but pain nonetheless) results in isolation from others and from oneself.15 
For this reason those who are i l l try to hide their sickness and pain in order not to be alienated, but this 
only increases their loneliness. Hauerwas concludes (with reference to Job's comforters) that the role of 
the medical profession is; "to be in the presence of those who are in pain", to be a bridge between the 
world of the sick and the world of the healthy, to care not to cure.16 I f the primary role of medicine is to 
care for people in their illness, rather than in striving to effect a cure, how could this principle be applied 
in the context of genetic disease? At first glance it would appear to suggest that no attempt should be 
made to cure people of genetic disease. Treatments which care for the symptoms of the genetic disease 
would appear more appropriate. Admittedly someone suffering from hereditary diabetes can live a 
normal life with regular injections of insulin, but most inherited diseases have no such effective 
treatment. Young people suffering from cystic fibrosis and muscular dystrophy are helped through 
physiotherapy and surgery, but premature, debilitating deaths are still inevitable. Babies affected by Tay 
.A 
Sachs syndrome, and middle-aged people who have Huntington's disease, have no treatments to ease 
their plight. For this reason the possibility of 'gene therapy' has been received with great enthusiasm. To 
cure cystic fibrosis by regular inhalations of a spray containing 'good' copies of the 'CP gene', to cure 
muscular dystrophy or Tay Sachs disease by the genetic manipulation of embryos, would seem far more 
beneficial than years of painful, and ultimately ineffective, treatments. Yet, this would definitely be a 
case of 'cure not care'. 
14 Moltmann, God in Creation, pp.273f. 
'5 Suffering Presence, p.75f. 
16 Ibid. p.78. 
83 
A closer look at the meaning of Hauerwas' words is needed. He most certainly does not suggest 
that caring for, being ' in the presence o f , those who are i l l , implies that no effective treatment should be 
sought.17 The slogan 'care not cure' was used in order to discourage the use of aggressive medical 
techniques, which can cause as much pain as they prevent, and result in the alienation of patients from 
their loved-ones and the medical staff. The slogan offers guidance in those situations where a choice 
must be made between aggressive alienating technologies, or the personal touch of human care. 
Hauerwas' concern was to treat the whole person, not just the sum of their symptoms, and he recognises 
that to do so may sometimes mean not working towards a cure.18 It would, therefore, appear to be 
possible to maintain the 'care not cure' attitude and yet to work towards gene therapy for debilitating and 
life-threatening diseases (on the condition that the gene therapy did not cause the patient significant 
suffering and alienation). 
Consideration must be given here to those people for whom gene therapy wil l never be possible. 
Babies who are born already having been affected by a genetic anomaly during their development in the 
womb, or those whose condition is caused by the loss or duplication of significant sections of one or 
more chromosomes, wi l l not be able to have their condition reversed by gene therapy. For these people 
the priority to 'care not cure' wi l l be vital. 
The primary role of medicine can be seen as that of caring for people in their illnesses. Such 
caring may, but wi l l not always, involve curing. In this light, technological medicine becomes part of a 
broader, practice of care. An understanding of the form such care should take wi l l inevitably be 
influenced by our understanding of what it is to be healthy. It is to a theological exploration of health 
that we now turn. 
5.3 Towards a theology of health and wholeness 
The WHO definition of health as: "a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being 
and not merely the absence of disease" has already been described.19 Many commentators today regard 
17 Suffering Presence, p. 81. 
18 'Care' in "Encyclopedia of Bioethics", (1978, pp. 145-150), in Lammers and Verhey (eds), On Moral Medicine, 
pp262-265. 
1 9 See Ch.2.3 (iii) c, above. 
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such a definition as an unattainable ideal, like 'heaven on earth'.2 0 Nevertheless, it is the WHO ideal 
which most people expect medicine to be able to meet, resulting in excessive expectations and demands 
of the medical profession.21 
At the opposite extreme, in terms understood by industrial society, is the definition given by 
Freud and others around the turn of the century. According to the values of production and consumption, 
health was seen to be "the capacity for work and for enjoyment".22 Is it possible to define 'health' more 
fully, even theologically, without arriving at the Utopian WHO definition which is so roundly criticised? 
A satisfactory theology of health would require the inclusion of two important aspects; a recognition that 
a healthy life wi l l still be a limited life, and a recognition than humans are more than living machines. 
i) Health within limitations 
Today the common concept of health seems to imply an escape from many of the limitations of 
human life. The pressures which are being put on the medical profession are the result of people not 
wanting to be restricted by their limitations, and wanting more choice about their 'quality of life ' . Barth, 
however, recognises that the healthy life is still limited; life has a beginning and an end, it is something 
over which we do not have complete control.2 3 Equally, in an attempt to escape the 'iatrogenic 
epidemic', Illich defines human health in terms of a task, a responsibility. This is a task which requires 
us to be able to live within our limited nature, with growing and ageing, with healing and suffering, with 
living and dying. The ability to .deal with pain, sickness and death are seen as natural components of a 
'healthy' l i fe . 2 4 Human beings are embodied, limited and mortal just as all animals are. However, our 
differences from all other living beings have given us the knowledge and the ability to develop high 
technology medicine. Our responsibility is to establish the appropriate way of using such medicine. Part 
of this is expressed in recognising that human beings are complex creatures, not just automated machines. 
20 Thomas Szasz, in Lammers and Verhey (eds), On Moral Medicine, p. 172. Also in the same publication, Leroy 
Walters, p. 157, and Daniel Callahan, p. 168. However, I recently heard a representative of the Department of 
Public Health Sciences say of the WHO definition; "to challenge is almost heresy" (Sarah Cunningham-Burley at 
the Church of Scotland day conference "Bio-Ethics for the Millennium" 12.1.99.) 
21 Moltmann, God in Creation, p.271. 
22 Ibid. 
23 From "Church Dogmatics IIU4 " in Lammers and Verhay (eds), On Moral Medicine, p. 156. 
24 From "Medical Nemesis " in Lammers and Verhey (eds), On Moral Medicine, p. 160. 
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ii) On being human as a whole 
The medical model of illness would see health simply in terms of all the parts of the human body 
functioning normally. Humans are healthy as long as there is nothing which has 'broken down'. A more 
helpful understanding of health may need to recognise that human beings are not just living machines. 
Karl Barth acknowledges the spiritual and bodily unity of humans by defining health as "the 
power to be as man exercised in the powers of the vital functions of the soul and body". 2 5 Tillich 
suggests that health should be considered under the multi-dimensions of: mechanical, chemical, 
biological, psychological, spiritual and historical, and that it is necessary to ensure that successful healing 
in one dimension does not imperil health in another dimension.26 Similarly, Moltmann suggests a set of 
dimensions involving the interaction between elements of human life which need to be considered; 
"Health" must be defined in several different dimensions i f the concept of health is to be 
conducive to the life of human beings. It must find its definition in the flux of history 
between persons and society, society and nature, past and future, immanence and 
transcendence.27 
Moltmann observes that health is a complex phenomenon, having social and biological dimensions, that 
healing takes time, that it involves past memories and future hopes as well as present predicaments. 
Perhaps most significant in Molrmann's words, is the recognition that there is a 'now' but 'not yet' 
element to health. Our health wi l l only ever be complete in the context of the world which is to come. 
This has tremendous implications for all those who strive for perfect health today. 
Each of these groups of dimensions are useful in as much as they recognise that a person is a 
complex, integrated being. Humans are far more than collections of organs functioning together. In 
rejecting the 'medical model', however, any definition of health begins to resemble that of the WHO. To 
25 From "Church Dogmatics m/4 " in Lammers and Verhey (eds), On Moral Medicine, p. 155. 
26 From "Perspectives in Biology and Medicine" (Vol.5, Autumn 1961) in Lammers and Verhey (eds), 
On Moral Medicine, pp. 162ff. 
27 God in Creation, p.271. 
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include mental, social and other dimensions to health can result in explaining away the world's problems 
in terms of 'sickness'.28 'Wholeness' may be a more appropriate model to use than 'health'. 
iii) On being a whole human 
Today people strive to achieve a healthy and long life, this is what matters. A better emphasis, 
an emphasis which has been held in the past, would perhaps be for people to strive towards achieving a 
'morally worthy', a 'good', l i fe . 2 9 There is no intention here to patronise those with illness or disability, 
but to recognise that health is not of supreme value in the human life, and until we begin to live our lives 
as God intends, we shall never be truly 'healthy'. Perhaps 'wholeness' is the term we can use in the place 
of health in this respect. 
In this connection, it may be helpful to read what Moltmann says about 'health' in terms of 
'wholeness'. Health (wholeness) is not so much an 'objectively ascertainable state of the human being's 
physical, mental and social well-being' but rather it is more 'a subjectively ascertainable attitude on the 
part of the person concerned to his fluctuating condition'. 3 0 Influenced by Barth's concept of the 
'power/strength to be as man', and a suggestion that 'Health is not the absence of malfunctionings. 
Health is the strength to live with them' 3 ', Moltmann produces the pithy definition: "health [wholeness] is 
the strength to be human." As with all pithy definitions, it needs spelling out a bit. 
The strength to be human is displayed in the person's capacity for happiness and 
I! 
suffering, in his acceptance of life's joy and the grief of death i f we understand 
health [wholeness]) as the strength to be human, then we make being human more 
important than the state of being healthy. Health is not the meaning of human life. On 
the contrary, a person has to prove the meaning he has found in his own life in 
conditions of health and sickness. Only what can stand up to both health and sickness, 
and ultimately to living and dying, can count as a valid definition of what it means to be 
28 Daniel Callahan quoted from "Hastings Centre Studies" (Vol.1, no.3, 1973, pp.77-87) in Lammers and Verhey 
(eds), On Moral Medicine p. 167. 
29 McKenny, To Relieve the Human Condition, pp.9ff. and p. 115. 
3 0 God in Creation, p.272. 
31 D.Rossler quoted in God in Creation, p.273. 
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human The strength to be a human person lies in the acceptance, the affirmation 
and the love of frail and mortal life.32 
The key to this passage would seem to be "Health is not the meaning of human life a person has to 
prove the meaning he has found in his own life ". To be whole is to live one's life aiming not at 
physical perfection, but at moral goodness. To be whole is to recognise one's limitations and the 
tremendous gift of life and love given through God's mercy. To be whole means living as one can, not as 
one cannot, in response to the love of God. This concept is explored further in terms of narrative 
approaches to death and disability.33 
This concept of wholeness brings with it a promise and a problem. The promise can be seen in 
terms of society's attitudes towards anyone who is i l l or disabled. I f wholeness is seen as 'the strength to 
be human', then it is perfectly possible to be 'disabled', or suffering from a hereditary disease, and yet to 
be 'whole'. What matters is one's attitude towards one's situation, not the mechanical functioning of 
one's body, "being human is more important than the state of being healthy". I f this understanding of 
wholeness were to gain wider acceptance, then society's attitude towards long-term illness and disability 
could be greatly changed. It is less likely that there would be pressure (explicit or implicit) to abort 
foetuses carrying genetic differences. Parents who choose to allow a handicapped child to come to term 
may not be discriminated against for their decision. People with mental or physical limitations may not 
be marginalised, but rather welcomed into society and encouraged to find that 'strength to be human'. In 
such a society there may well be a greater incidence of limitations and sickness caused by genetic effects, 
yet the attitude of this society could be far healthier. No longer would sickness or disability be feared or 
marginalised. A far healthier approach to life, pain and death could result. 
The problem with this approach, however, is that it could lead to a rather 'gnostic' attitude 
towards physical suffering. Would the 'strength to be human' imply 'grin and bear it'? I f health is more 
a matter of attitude than a matter of physical well-being, would it be better i f illness were simply accepted 
rather than fought? Where in this understanding of health would one find the place of medical treatment? 
Yet we are embodied people, the state of our bodies does matter. The reality of suffering caused by 
3 2 God in Creation, pp.273 & 275. Moltmann's emphasis. 
33 See section 4. 
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genetic diseases must be acknowledged. David Biebel writes from the personal experience of having two 
sons suffer, and die prematurely, from a severe inherited condition; 
[o]n a purely human level, to experience genetic disease in one's children is to be 
immersed in a boiling cauldron of almost pure pain, with a generous helping of surprise, 
confusion, disappointment, anger, and guilt thrown in . 3 4 
It wi l l be important in this connection to have a satisfactory theological approach to the reality of 
disability and premature death. 
5.4 Towards a theology of disability and premature death 
It is my intention in this section to consider two 'test cases', the cases of persons with 
disabilities, and of terminally i l l children. I present some theological reflections of those involved with 
such cases, and explore possible theological approaches to these situations. 
There are a number of ways in which genetic technology can impinge on the lives of disabled or 
terminally-ill children. More than half of all cases of severe mental disability have an inherited cause.35 
Many of these people also suffer from physical disabilities. Gene therapy wi l l not be able to help these 
people, but screening wi l l be able to detect embryos and foetuses affected by such genetic differences. 
Our attitudes towards the 'disabled'/(whether such disability is mental, physical or both) wi l l influence 
the number of such foetuses ever brought to term, and the way in which we treat disabled people 
throughout their lives. Mapy genetic diseases cause death in infancy, childhood or early adulthood. 
Through genetic advances, more effective medical treatments are being established for some of these 
diseases, and the possibility of gene therapy is always before us. In the meantime ' therapeutic abortion' 
and genetic counselling are used to prevent the birth of children affected by sucH genetic diseases. A 
consideration of .theological reflections prompted by contact with disabled people or with terminally i l l 
children may help approach these genetic situations* Reflections made by Stanley Hauerwas, Jiirgen 
Moltmann, and Frances Young are used. 
34 "pie Riddle ofSuffering" in Kilner, Pentz and Young (eds), Genetic Ethics, p.3. 
35 Jones, The Language of Genes, p.285. 
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i) Theological test cases 
a) The 'disabled' 
It is through considerable personal contact with handicapped people that theologians have been 
inspired to publish their own theological reflections. Having played an active part serving on the board 
of a 'Council for the Retarded', Stanley Hauerwas wrote the third part of Suffering Presence, entitled 
"Caring" for the Mentally Handicapped. Moltmann was involved in issues concerning the rehabilitation 
of disabled people for a number of years, before he gave his lecture "The Liberation and Acceptance of 
the Handicapped ", later published in The Power of the Powerless. It was the experience of loving and 
living with her son, Arthur, which led Frances Young to her own theological reflections concerning 
handicap.3* 
Hauerwas questions the assumption that the mentally disabled suffer so much that it would be 
better for them not to be bom. Firstly, he asks whether our desire to prevent/eliminate such disability is 
not because we are concerned about their suffering, but rather because their very existence causes us 
suffering. 3 7 This suffering is caused by our inability to sympathise with those who are different to 
ourselves, and also by the consequent fear this produces in us when faced with our own limitations. 
Secondly, he suggests that i f the mentally disabled do suffer, then it is not so much from being disabled 
per se, but rather from living in our society. Their suffering is caused less by their particular situation as 
by the way in which they are marginalized, ignored and handicapped by our society. Thus it is not that 
we should prevent suffering by preventing mental disability, but that we should change our world in 
order to prevent the needless suffering which we impose on these people.38 Finally, Hauerwas questions 
whether it is even right to attempt to eliminate suffering from our lives. The reality of life, healthy or not, 
normal or not, is that all wi l l suffer.3 9 I f a foetus should be allowed to die in order to prevent it from 
suffering, then none would ever be brought to birth. Suffering is not something we can eliminate, 
36 Face to Face; A narrative essay in the theology of suffering, Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1990. Arthur is profoundly 
mentally and physically handicapped. Note that an earlier book of the same title (Epworth Press, 1984) contained 
mainly their story to date, and little theological reflection. 
37Suffering Presence, p. 165. 
38 Ibid. pp. 171 f. See also Tom Shakespeare's comments Ch.3, p.25f. 
39 Suffering Presence, p. 168 and p. 172. 
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instead we must learn to live with i t . 4 0 Thus for Hauerwas the question of whether death could ever be 
seen to be preferable to suffering, or vice versa, is the wrong question. 
Rather our decisions must turn on what we think our lives are for, and not how much 
suffering they contain or how long we can avoid death.41 
This concept links in with the consideration of a moral life being a whole life, discussed in the previous 
section. A l l three theologians suggest the disabled have a unique (moral) role in reflecting the image of 
God to others. I f God's image is reflected through a person's relationship with him, rather than through a 
particular human attribute, then disabled people are not excluded from this occurrence.42 
Hauerwas suggests that in meeting mentally disabled people we meet God, and are also made to 
recognise our own limitations. 
The challenge of learning to know, to be with, and care for the retarded is nothing less 
than learning to know, to be with, and love God. God's face is the face of the retarded; 
God's body is the body of the retarded; God's being is that of the retarded. For the God 
we Christians must learn to worship is not a god of self-sufficient power, a god who in 
self-possession needs no one; rather ours is a God who needs a people, who needs a 
son That is why in the face of the retarded we are offered an opportunity to see God, 
for like God they offer us an opportunity of recognising the character of our 
neediness That the retarded are singled out is only an indication of how they can 
serve for us all as a prophetic sign of our true nature as creatures destined to need God 
and, thus, one another.43 
This suggestion is challenging both theologically and practically. It is not an orthodox/traditional view to 
consider God as not being self-sufficient. But here Hauerwas refers (with reference to the work of Arthur 
McGill) to the 'need' God the Father has of his Son, and the 'need' the Trinity has of a people to love. 
40 Suffering Presence, p.24, also p. 172. 
41 Ibid, p.35. 
42 Indeed, Vanier suggests the disabled may be particularly gifted in this capacity, as they are more aware of their 
need and more willing to trust God (Becoming Human, p.97). 
43 Suffering Presence, p. 178f. 
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The practical challenge is for people to see in the distorted faces and bodies of the disabled, the face and 
body of God. In the reflection of the 'neediness' of God, Hauerwas claims we also begin to see our own 
neediness. 
Moltmann suggests that disabled people act in a prophetic way, in that they "help us to achieve 
true humanity. For they compel us to stop basing our self-confidence on health and capability, and to 
seek it through trust in God". 4 4 Whatever mental or physical disability we may bear (and may continue 
to bear throughout our lives), this does not prevent us also from reflecting the image of God. Through 
disabled people, others can come to know "the real, the suffering, the living God who loves them too 
with an infinite love". 4 5 'Wholeness' is found in the experience of being loved by God, and reflecting 
his image. 
Human love looks for beauty and flees from what is ugly. But God's love makes sinners 
righteous and ugly people lovely. So because we are from all eternity God's beloved, 
we can also love ourselves, and find ourselves good and true and even beautiful, and can 
find pleasure in what we are. Everyone of us is a reflection of God in this world. 4 6 
We are encouraged to go beyond the external form of a body (be it beautiful or broken) and to see the 
internal person. The internal person is beautiful because they are loved by God. 
After twenty one years (of caring for, and living with, her son Arthur, Frances Young wrote the 
book which was both their story and her theological reflections of that story.47 She writes from her heart 
of her own experience of receiving something of God from Arthur, despite the hard work entailed in 
caring for him. 4 8 She sees this sense of the disabled contributing to others' lives as being of great 
importance. Rather than simply being the 'objects' of charity, they need to be allowed to help others; " i f 
they are to be persons, we must learn to 'receive' from them".4 9 Young goes on to explore a communal 
aspect to the reflecting of God's image. Rather than seeing individuals reflecting God's image each in 
44 The Power of the Powerless, p.145. A similar view is expressed in Young, Face to Face, pp. 179-182. 
45 The Power of the Powerless, p. 151. 
46 p . 149. 
47 Face to Face. 
48 Ibid, p.l78f. 
49Ibid. p.m. 
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their own way, she sees the fuller image reflected in the community of Christians, the 'body of Christ' 
(just as his image was fully reflected in the life of Christ himself). Each individual is important for the 
part they have to contribute to the total image "but no-one can claim to be the image of God on their 
own". 5 0 The reflection of God seen through the disabled is crucial, a reflection only they can give.51 
There is an important role for 'normal' people to play then, in being open and ready to receive 
from the disabled, to receive God, to receive value. This concept is not meant to be patronising, but 
realistic about the contribution the disabled have to make to other peoples' lives, and realistic too about 
the effort other people must make to strike up relationships sufficient to be in a position to receive. 
Including disabled people in a community (family, church, locality) wi l l not be an easy thing to do. 5 2 
Young admits; "no-one should imagine it is easy. Yet there can be no doubt that those who do not have 
the experience of relating to the handicapped have missed one of the most beautiful and transforming 
experiences of l i fe" . 5 3 
Faced with a severely disabled person one might be prompted to think about whether death 
could ever be preferable to suffering, but Hauerwas suggests the real question one should be asking is; 
what do we think our lives are for? 'To reflect the image of God to others' would seem at least part of 
the answer to this question. This ties in with the concept of a 'morally good' life, and challenges 
society's values today of success and achievement. To be able to reflect God's image requires us all, able 
and disable, to accept our neediness, to rely on God, receive from him his love, mercy and healing, and 
within our brokenness to share these gifts with others. 
,.-) 
It w i l l be important not to use these 'nice' theological concepts to cover over the reality of the 
struggle which is the lot of the disabled and those who care for them. Young writes of the very real anger 
and frustration of a mother who could not see how on earth her severely disabled, and deteriorating, son 
could bear the image of God. 5 4 She writes too of the painful road both she and Arthur have travelled over 
the years. One of the ways in which we can begin to take this reality seriously is by asking ourselves 
50 Face to Face, p. 192. Compare Moltmann, God in Creation, p.222. 
51 Face to Face p. 193. 
52 The role of the local church is explored in Ch.7. 
53 f a c e to Face, p. 183. 
54Ibid, p.m. 
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whether a person's disability is simply the result of their physical and mental limitations, or whether it is 
in any way a result of our attitudes and structures. 
We have explored something of the theological reflection sparked by relationships with disabled 
people, and turn now to that inspired by people whose lives are cut tragically short. 
b) Death in children 
Facing the terminal illness of a child is a particularly painful experience. This is partly because 
we feel that their death is so untimely, and partly because we are faced with our own limitations (both our 
own mortality, and our inability to help). Hauerwas suggests that the pain of such experiences can create 
silences which come between people, silences which cannot be shared. He suggests that modern 
medicine can be used as a desperate attempt to fill these silences,55 but only succeeds in isolating children 
from their families and the medical staff.5 6 
Hauerwas quotes extensively from the anthropological work of Myra Bluebond-Langner and her 
study of leukaemic children.5 7 She suggests that children, parents and medical staff each enter into 
relationships of mutual pretence, keeping secret the reality of the child's impending death. The mutual 
pretence is important because only in this way can each of them appear to fu l f i l l the roles society expects 
of them. The role for children is to grow up and to have a future, the parent's role is to be a guardian, a 
protector, and the medical staffs role is to cure illness. Only by mamtaining relationships of mutual 
pretence can these three groupings appear to fu l f i l l the roles expected of them, and so they can keep their 
places within society. But^the practice of mutual pretence is a very costly one, because it inevitably 
leads to children dying terribly alone - because only in this way can the mutual pretence be maintained. 
It is, however, important to note that there were two children in Bluebond-Langner's study who did not 
practice 'mutual pretence'. The families of these children appeared no better equipped to cope with their 
child's death than did the others.58 How is it possible to name those silences which terminal illness 
produces, rather than to hide them with aggressive medical intervention? Hauerwas suggests this can 
55 Naming the Silences, p.xi. 
56 Ibid. p. 127. 
57 The Private Worlds of Dying Children, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1978. Referred to in Naming the 
Silences, ppl26ff. 
58 Naming the Silences, p. 143. 
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only be achieved in the context of a 'community constituted by a truthful narrative that can comprehend 
such deaths without denying their pointlessness'.59 The meaning and significance of this statement is 
explored below under 'The Story of Tragedy and Hope'. 
Twisted bodies and clouded minds, young lives never given the chance to explore their fu l l 
potential, these situations have prompted much theological reflection. Does this reflection offer one a 
framework within which to set such lives and one's own life? Such suffering may seem totally 
meaningless and a complete waste, it may seem better never to have lived at all (the implication behind 
the offer of 'therapeutic abortions'). Is there a theological approach that can help us to cope with life's 
brokenness and limitations? The following section wil l explore two such approaches. 
iii) Theological approaches 
I explore two, quite contrasting, approaches; that of seeing disabihty as 'gif t ' , and that of a 
narrative context for illness. 
a) Disability as gift 
The disabled, by definition, do have their own (often severe) limitations. Nevertheless, the part 
which they can play in a community has already been explored. Perhaps more controversial, even 
shocking, is the concept that disability can be a gift. 
Moltmann suggests that, in thinking about those with disabilities, we are often too busy 
concentrating on what they have been deprived of, and this prevents us from recognising that 'handicap' 
can also be an 'endowment'.60 The gifts and energies of the Holy Spirit include "sufferings, setbacks and 
sorrows"41, and in the body of Christ (the church) it is to the ill-equipped members that God gives most 
59 Naming the Silences, p. 147. 
6 0 The Power of the Powerless, pp. 150f. 
6 1 With reference to II Cor.4.7ff. - although it could be questioned whether Paul is actually referring to gifts of the 
Spirit here. 
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'glory and splendour'62. It is in the light of this that Moltmann sees disability as endowment, an 
endowment which acts as a reflection of the image of God. 6 3 
Another example of disability being seen as gift, albeit from a slightly different theological 
angle, can be found in an address given by Dr. Mary Weir, a Canadian theologian who has been 
profoundly deaf all her l ife. 6 4 Weir has come to regard her deafness as a blessing, not an accident or a 
misfortune, but as 'created goodness'. Deafness is not primarily the lack of something essential to being 
human. I t is interesting to note that it is only in adulthood that Weir has come to hold this view, as a child 
she found her deafness hard as it cut her of f from other people. Despite this view of deafness as blessing, 
Weir is still realistic about the limitations deafness brings, referring to it as "a very human mixture of 
opportunity and dilemma, giftedness and limitation" and "to be accepted - and loved, even i f it cannot 
always be liked". It could be argued that the inability to hear is a fairly minor disability compared, say 
with the inability to organise one's thoughts, communicate one's feelings and control one's body 
movements. Significantly, Weir does not apply her theological understanding of deafness to other 
disabilities, but Harrison suggests that to do so would be perfectly valid. 6 5 Harrison does not expand on 
this thought, which is a shame because it is a very difficult concept. Can it truly be regarded as a gift of 
God that a child should be bora with Tay Sachs disease, and after two or three years of mental and 
physical deterioration, pain and isolation, give up his short life? Would David Biebel regard his 
experience of having two sons die of a genetic disorder as a gift? 6 6 Similarly, Young asks; "[i]s it not 
a 
i 
offensive that Arthur was born handicapped for my spiritual benefit?".67 The reality is that such a 
suggestion would be offensive to many. The concept of 'gif t ' is a difficult one when.put in terms of God 
deliberately making someone suffer from a particular disability for the benefit of others. God's 
providence is a mystery. Biebel provides what may be the key to this question in saying; " I have come to 
62 with reference to I Cor. 12.24. 
63 The Power of the Powerless, p. 151. 
64 Quoted in Ted Harrison, Disability; Rights and Wrongs, p.124-131. In this context it is also challenging to learn 
of a deaf couple who regarded deafness as superior to hearing, and specifically wanted a deaf child. (Liz Hepburn, 
Genetic Counselling: Parental Autonomy or Acceptance of Limits? in Junker-Kenny and Cahill, The Ethics of 
Genetic Engineering, p.36). 
65 Disability, p. 132. 
66 See section 3 (iii). 
67 Face to Face, p.216. 
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see both the experiences and what I have learned through them as a trust, a gi f t" . 6 8 In reflecting God's 
image, the handicapped have something unique to offer. This is God's gift to us, not a person's 
disability, but the gift of his image through the brokenness of disability.6 9 This may be a less shocking 
idea, but it still leaves us with a difficulty. I f God gives us a (unique) gift through those who are 
handicapped or i l l , is this a gift that should not be refused? Should one's attitude towards an inherited 
disease be to 'bear it patiently' (as instructed in the Book of Common Prayer), thus allowing God's gift to 
be given to others? Would any attempts at gene therapy, or even two carriers of a genetic disease 
avoiding having children together, be seen as thwarting the gift of God? 
b) The story of tragedy and hope 
Hauerwas suggests there are two different ways of looking at life, each resulting in a very 
different approach to illness. One view is to regard life as fundamentally constituted by cbronicity - a 
series of discrete events which are open to manipulation by ourselves and others. Such a view leads to 
the assumption that suffering, life and death have no real point. Alternatively, one can regard life as 
being fundamentally determined or constituted by narrative. According to this view life is not so much 
something which we create for ourselves, but rather it is something which we discover; it is a recognition 
that we are part of something far greater than the sum of our days.70 Hauerwas believes that it is this view 
which wi l l help us to understand illness and the purpose of medicine, and which wil l help us to be present 
to those who are i l l . 7 1 The narrative context for illness, ties in with Hauerwas' suggestion that what we 
need to ask about is the purpose of our life, not whether or not it may be worth living. 7 2 He says little 
concerning the nature of this narrative other than; "we are creatures of a gracious God". 7 3 Perhaps two 
features of the Christian narrative which are particularly relevant are the elements of tragedy and of hope. 
THE STORY OF TRAGEDY 
"The tragedy of this life is the intractability of human nature - or as has already been considered, 
6 8 "The Riddle of Suffering" in Kilner, Pentz and Young, Genetic Ethics, p.5. 
69 This is perhaps what Michael Beates means when he says; "Genetic anomalies.... are not good in an absolute 
sense. Rather, for believers they are good in an ultimate sense". ("God's Sovereignty and Genetic Anomalies " in 
Kilner, Pentz and Young (eds), Genetic Ethics, p.58). 
70 Naming the Silences, p.l 12. 
71 Ibid, p.108. 
72 Suffering Presence, p.35. 
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the lirnitedness of human nature.74 This concept is explored by Donald MacKinnon, reflecting on the 
tremendous technological achievement in splitting the atom and discovering nuclear power, and the 
outrageous way in which the knowledge has been used to create nuclear weapons capable of wiping 
humanity of f the face of the earth.75 He explores the theme of tragedy further in "Ethics and Tragedy", 
through reflections on the unsuccessful plot to assassinate Hitler in 1944 and on the works of tragedy by 
Shakespeare and Sophocles.76 He sees the "sheer intractability of human life" in a number of areas over 
which we have no control; that our moral responses can turn us into something we cannot foresee, that 
the issues we wrestie with are not within our power to solve, and that we sometimes do the right thing 
from the wrong motives or can even be tricked by our virtues into destructive courses.77 In other words, 
we humans are not of the same substance as God, we are of the same substance as all other creatures and 
are in limited control. The result of this reality is conflict, moral conflict. We find ourselves facing 
tremendous dilemmas, intolerable moral choices, often the conflict is between right and right, 
MacKinnon suggests we can but learn to count the cost and only then go forward. 7 8 
Hauerwas picks up on this theme of tragedy, recognising that; "honesty and faithfulness do not 
always lead to good results and consequences, but sometimes to tragic choices".79 He believes it is 
important to view medicine as a tragic profession, that it should be committed to "care in the face of 
death".80 Other examples of tragedy within medicine are to be found in conflicts between a doctor's 
commitment to his patient and to-the institution within which he practices, conflicts concerning the 
i 
preservation of life not knowing what quality the life may have, and recognising the reality of the limits 
to medical treatments.81 Thus the narrative context for illness should be "a story that can help us contain 
the tragic without trying to explain it away or find a solution for i t " . 8 2 Is part of this story not to be found 
73 Naming the Silences, p. 126. 
74 See Ch.3.2, above. 
75 "The Future of Man " in Explorations in Theology 5, p.6. 
76 Explorations in Theology 5, pp. 182-195. 
77 Ibid. p. 186, p. 187, p. 189, p. 190. 
78 Ibid, p. 185. 
79 Truthfulness and Tragedy, p.69f. 
Wlbid. p.l85f. 
81 Ibid. pp.l92ff 
82/furf. p.200. 
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in the Christian understanding that, despite all our wonderful discoveries and greater understanding of the 
way the world is, nevertheless, we are not god? Does not our story require a recognition of ourselves as 
created beings within a created order, creatures with responsibilities but also with limitations, creatures 
with mixed-motives we may not even be aware of, with the capacity to be corrupted and misguided, the 
capacity to dream dreams and also to make mistakes?83 
THE STORY OF HOPE 
There is an element of tragedy in the Christian story, but there is also an element of hope. There 
is an element of hope because neither we, nor our world, are irredeemable. There is an element of hope 
because the brokenness of this age is not all that there is to be. There is an element of hope because 
through the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, creation is to be both restored and transformed. God is 
creating even now, doing a new thing. There is an element of hope because a new heaven and a new 
earth is our promise in Christ, a place where there shall be no more death or mourning or crying or pain.8 4 
There is an element of hope because this promise can be anticipated even today through those who work 
together with God, who through their relationship of love and worship with him, reflect the image of God 
in the world. There is an element of hope. 
In the light of both the tragedy and the hope in the Christian story, Young suggests that neither 
optimism nor pessimism is appropriate, but rather the Christian virtues of faith, hope and love.8 5 Perhaps 
it would also be appropriate to ajid the Christian virtue of humility to this list. Humility is needed to 
recognise our limitations as people, but also (despite our great advances) the great limitations to our 
knowledge. For the Christian story to be of any value, for it to have any effect, it must be lived by a 
community of people.86 
There may be a way in which both these theological approaches may be seen as a whole. The 
concept of disability as gift is a difficult one. Should one instead think in terms of the gift which God 
gives through those who are disabled? In this there is both tragedy and hope. It is tragic that a person's 
life can be so much more limited, so much more painful, so much shorter than our own. It is tragic that a 
83 Also Young, Face to Face, p.l96ff. 
84 Rev. 21.4. 
85 Face to Face, p.215. 
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single change in a person's DNA can wreak so much havoc. It is tragic that despite our treatments, our 
drugs and our surgery, despite our prayers and our anointing, there are times when nothing makes any 
difference. It is tragic to be helpless. Yet within the tragedy there is hope. Hope is seen whenever we 
see something of God in the brokenness of disability. Hope is seen whenever we are prompted to laugh, 
to cry, to play, to dance, with someone otherwise unable to communicate with us. Hope is seen whenever 
another person helps us to see our own limitations and need of God, whenever we experience an 
anticipation of that which God has in store for us. The tragedy and the hope, the gift of God. 
Theological understandings of the role of medicine, the nature of health and wholeness, and 
approaches to disability, illness and premature death have been considered. Some implications for the 
use of genetic medicine have been discussed en route. Consideration wil l be given below to the question 
of the use of genetic medicine in principle. 
5.5 Implications for genetic medicine 
I recognised, in Chapter 2, a 'central tension, almost a necessary paradox', in the light of 
Christian belief, to our approach to medicine.87 Is illness to be regarded as being within God's 
providence and so accepted, or are we called to continue Christ's healing rriinistry in our love of our 
neighbour? This same tension or paradox, perhaps with increased intensity, is to be found when 
ft 
considering the possibilities of genetic medicine. Should we regard genetic anomalies as a gift from God, 
. i 
A 
not to be refused, or should we seek to prevent the (often acute) suffering of those affected by genetic 
illness? 
On the one hand theologians argue convincingly for the valuable, even crucial, role which 
disabled-people can play in our society. Bringing us unique reflections of the image of God, revealing to 
us our own limitations and neediness, and helping us to see that success and achievement are not the most 
important things in life - disabled people have much to offer i f only we are willing to receive. However, 
not all cases of 'genetic disability' are alike in their effects or their severity. Those affected by 
achondroplasia may have severely stunted growth and misshapen facial features, but they are otherwise 
86 See Ch.7, below. 
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whole in mind and body. Babies suffering from Tay Sachs disease suffer brain and muscle deterioration 
from the age of about six months and rarely survive beyond the age of four. Those with sickle cell 
amaemia can suffer chronic pain throughout their lives. Down's syndrome people have specific physical 
characteristics, and other physical and mental disabihties, the severity of the disability varying 
significantly from one individual to another. Can all situations of 'genetic disability' be understood in 
terms of a unique part of God's revelation? Perhaps it is easier to receive from those whose disability is 
less obvious, less distressing. Yet it may also be the case that those with the greater disabilities have the 
most to offer. 
On the other hand, the pain, frustration and loneliness which genetic disability can bring to 
sufferers and carers alike cannot be denied. The desire to love one's neighbour, to reflect God's mercy 
and healing power, can be expressed in our desire to use genetic technology to prevent or relieve such 
suffering. Genetic medicine appears to offer immense hope. It offers the possibility of having children 
unaffected by genetic disability. It offers the possibility in the future of being able to 'mend' genetic 
anomalies. It offers a greater understanding of the cause of genetic disability, and so opens up the 
possibilities of improved preventative medicine and conventional treatments. Genetic technology offers 
great hope through its great power. We must however treat this power with tremendous care, recognising 
the tragedy of the limitedness of the human condition. The tragedy is that we may misuse power, 
wittingly or unwittingly. The tragedy is that there may be some conditions over which we never can gain 
mastery. The tragedy is that we could possibly make genetic changes over which we subsequentiy have 
no control. The tragedy is that already we are turning health and perfection into the purpose of life. The 
dilemma we are faced with involves how much is it appropriate to grasp hold of and utilise the hope 
offered by genetic medicine. At the same time we must not forget to explore the (undoubtedly less 
dramatic) alternative ways in which the life of the disabled can be helped. Working towards 
inclusiveness in social conditions and attitudes, changing priorities in health-care allocations, conducting 
research on the prevention rather than the treatment of disease, can all contribute towards such help. 
So, how do we find the delicate balance between using genetic technology to bring about 
anticipations of God's kingdom, without worshipping health and perfection? How do we affirm that 
8 7 See Ch.2.3 (iii) a, above. 
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what is important in life is not its duration and physical quality (but rather finding the strength to be 
human, to know what the purpose of life is, to be able to reflect God's image to others), and yet use 
responsibly the knowledge that that certain genetic differences give rise to people with severely restricted 
lives, with a great deal of physical pain, and/or with tragic brevity of life? Should we ever do anything to 
prevent the birth of someone suffering from a genetic anomaly, or should we simply accept their life as a 
gift from God? Would it be appropriate for potential parents who have a significant chance of having an 
affected child to choose not to have children, or to seek egg or sperm donation? Would it be appropriate 
to screen embryos in vitro or foetuses in utero, and reject those who would be affected by genetic 
disability? Would it be appropriate to seek to prevent or treat disability through genetic manipulation? 
Should we ever seek to improve our genetic situation? Or would each of these actions be a rejection of 
God's gift to us through the genetically disabled? Space prevents a detailed investigation into each of 
these possibilities. It is the intention of the following chapter to consider the specific instances of the 
possibilities offered through genetic therapy and enhancement, with reference to the theological 
explorations made in these last three chapters. 
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Chapter 6: 
TOWARDS ETHICAL GUIDELINES IN THE USE 
OF GENE THERAPY 
Having explored theological themes relating to human nature, to deliberate evolution, and to 
health and wholeness, it is necessary to draw these themes together and use them to address a particular 
genetic technology. In the light of this theology I address the moral issues raised by the deliberate 
addition of DNA into the genetic make-up of human beings. Loosely the technology has been referred to 
as 'gene therapy', although it could involve genetic enhancement rather than the therapy of genetically-
based diseases. Genetic alterations could be made in a person's somatic cells (so that no change is 
inherited by future generations) or in a person's whole body, including their germ cells (so that the 
alteration is carried on into the genetic make-up of offspring). 
A brief summary of the theological conclusions made previously is given. These conclusions 
are applied to a number of issues relating to 'gene therapy'. I address first the principle of whether it is 
ever right to alter the genetic material of a human being. Subsequently, I consider the theological 
implications of using genetic manipulation to cure genetic disease and to enhance personal 
characteristics, either in somatic cells or germ line cells. Finally, I draw up suggestions for guidelines in 
the use of 'gene therapy'. 
6.1 Theological summary 
i) Human nature 
In exploring the theology of human nature in chapter 3, four major areas were addressed. 
Firstly, it was recognised that human beings are part of the created order. As such we are limited, we are 
mortal, we are embodied, and we are not in complete control (neither of ourselves nor of the world in 
which we live). Secondly, however, humans are unique in reflecting the image of God. This image is 
not substantial to human life, it cannot be identified as a particular physical or mental capacity. Rather, 
the image of God is relational, it is seen reflected in the relationship humans have with God (as a result of 
his grace) and (in consequence) with their neighbours. Reflecting God's image brings responsibility; 
responsibility towards one's neighbour, towards the rest of creation, and for oneself. This responsibility 
towards, stewardship of, the whole of creation was the third area explored concerning human nature. 
103 
Finally, it was recognised that difference and variety are vital aspects of human existence, as such they 
are to be affirmed and enjoyed. Difference in others should engender responsibility and co-operation 
rather than domination and competition. 
ii) Deliberate evolution 
In chapter 4 I considered two extreme theological views which could be taken towards the 
concept of humans altering their genetic future. The theologies of progress suggest that humans (unique 
in their capacity for self-examination and alteration) can work towards the improvement, even the 
redemption of the world. 
The theologies of realism destroy any such dreams. Human beings are not only limited like all 
other creatures, but they are also limited in their ability to do what is right. The human heart is 
recalcitrant, rebellious, selfish. Power tends to be misused, freedom tends to result in captivity, progress 
can in reality be slipping back. There is nothing humankind can do to save itself, we are reliant totally on 
God's grace. 
Some theologians are able to hold aspects of these two theologies in a paradoxical whole. The 
work of Moltmann illustrates one example. He sees the salvation of humankind as having been won now 
but not yet, the result of God's work alone yet together with the cooperation of human beings, something 
which is not predictable yet can be anticipated, including yet involving more than our physical nature. 
The 'theology of anticipation' is a paradox not easily grasped, nevertheless it may hold the key to 
approaching the genetic manipulation of human beings. The anticipation of our salvation is experienced 
in and through Jesus Christ, and in our striving for liberation in this life; liberation from exploitation, 
oppression, and alienation (alienation from each other, from the environment, and from God). This 
anticipation is found as we identify with victims, rather than with the strong and powerful. 
iii) Health and wholeness 
The treatment of disease can be seen both as a way in which God's image is reflected (in caring 
for our neighbour) and as an anticipation of our ultimate salvation (which will include our physical 
bodies). It is important, however, that 'health' (or physical perfection) does not become divinized, or 
our supposed source of salvation. 
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An understanding of health must include dimensions other than just the mechanical functioning 
of the body, but a Utopian understanding which would imply permanent happiness and well-being is not 
helpful. Limitation and suffering are a natural part of human existence. Wholeness of life is of greater 
importance than health of mind and body. In caring for those who are ill, the aim is to care for the whole 
person, rather than eliminate the disease irrespective of cost. 
The desire to cure people of disease does not imply that they, nor those suffering from incurable 
afflictions, are worth-less. All human beings can reflect God's image despite, or even from within, their 
disabilities. The Christian story of tragedy and hope provides a useful context from which to approach 
illness, disability and death. 
6.2 The principle of human genetic manipulation 
DNA has become something of an icon of our age, it is understood to make us what we are. 
Would it therefore ever be appropriate to alter the genetic make-up of human beings? This question may 
be asked for two different reasons. Firstly, it may appear that our genetic material makes us (humans as 
against other creatures) uniquely who we are. Secondly, each individual human has a unique, given, 
genetic make-up. For both these reasons it may be considered wrong to alter our self-defining material. 
Can science or theology help consider this issue? 
s 
i 
i) The uniqueness of humanity 
As creative, curious, and self-aware beings, who are capable of abstract thought, of handling 
tools, and of communicating through word and symbol - as these beings, humans have found themselves 
in the unique position of being capable of altering their own nature. If our very uniqueness is to be 
found in the sequence of human DNA, then should this DNA be considered sacrosanct? If we were to 
alter human genetic material at all, would this violate what it is to be human? 
SCIENTIFIC REFLECTION 
Recent investigations into the DNA from human beings and from other living things, have 
shown some remarkable results. It appears that human beings share a number of DNA sequences with 
other creatures, including (to varying extents) baboons, bears, butterflies, and even bacteria. In 
comparing different genomes, it would appear that humans and chimpanzees are more similar than 
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willow warblers and chiff chaffs.' Almost 75% of human genes have some counterpart in the genomes 
of tiny soil-dwelling worms called nematodes!2 
The uniqueness of humanity is not to be found in a particular length of DNA, certainly not the 
1.5% which differs between chimps and humans. Any living creature is more than the sum of their DNA, 
especially a creature as complex as a human being.3 John Habgood cautions us not to confuse the 
building blocks with the finished product.4 Molecular genetics highlights the common origins of 
humanity and all life on earth, rather than highlighting the uniqueness of humanity. 
THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION 
The theological understanding of the uniqueness of humanity ties in with the observations made 
above. The uniqueness of human beings is found in their ability to reflect the image of God. This ability 
is not found within the substantial nature of humans (not in physical characteristics, nor particular 
sequences of DNA), rather the ability is due to the grace of God, and is found in the relationship a human 
being has with God. 
Both scientific and theological insights suggest that the uniqueness of humanity is not to be 
found in a particular stretch of DNA. The human genome is not sacrosanct, it has very much in common 
with all other genomes. Altering aspects of the human genome will not necessarily mean that we are 
altering what it is to be human. 
/,' 
ii) The uniqueness of the individual 
The particular genetic make-up an individual is born with could be seen as a gift. A gift to be 
accepted graciously, not fought against or evaded, the life which God intends one, uniquely, to live. Is 
this a gift which should not be rejected? 
SCIENTIFIC REFLECTION 
A person's genome is the result of the chance meeting of chromosomes from two different 
people. Each person has two sets of 23 chromosomes. When reproductive cells are formed, each pair of 
1 See Ch.2.3 (i) b, above. 
2 "The greatest apes" in New Scientist, 15.5.99, p.26-30. 
3 See Ch.3.4 (ii), above. 
4 Quoted in Nelson, On the Frontiers of Genetics and Religion, p.92. 
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chromosomes separates and moves at random to opposite ends of the cell. Division occurs so that two 
sperm or egg cells are produced, each carrying one set of 23 chromosomes. The reproductive cells from 
one individual can thus carry a wide variety of combinations of the 23 chromosomes.5 When a sperm cell 
fuses with an egg cell a unique combination of genetic material occurs. It can truly be said 'there is no-
one like me'.6 Yet transplant surgery, which is now widely accepted, involves the transplantation of 
tissue with a different genetic make-up into a patient. This is the very reason rejection occurs. The 
uniqueness of an individual is not seen to preclude this medical intervention today. 
THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION 
Theologically, it is generally accepted that life is a gift from God.7 Health too can be regarded 
as a gift of God's grace.8 Should this theme be extended to understand one's particular genetic make-up 
as being God's gift too, a gift which should be graciously accepted? The particular combination of genes 
which result in inherent artistic or musical ability, natural athletic prowess or quick wit, can easily be 
considered a gift from God. But this would equally require one regarding the combination of genes 
which result in a person suffering from Huntington's Disease or muscular dystrophy, in someone having 
an increased likelihood of developing breast cancer or heart disease, or in having learning difficulties or 
physical deformities in one regarding these combinations of genes also as gifts from God. 
The Christian story of tragedy and hope help us to put the reality of genetic differences into 
context.9 It is tragic that a change event can bring about a particular combination of genes which 
seriously affects a person's health and wholeness (at least in this life). It is tragic that genetic disease can 
cause such suffering, that we can be so helpless in its presence, or even contribute to that suffering. Yet 
we see hope in the good which God can bring from the tragedy; in the revelations of himself and 
ourselves he opens up to us, in the ways we can receive from the brokenness of others. We see hope in 
the recognition that this life, and our physical state in it, is not of eternal significance. We see hope in the 
anticipations of the life to come which we can help bring about, even within this world, with the grace of 
5 If all combinations are possible, the number would be expressed mathematically as 2323-
6 Except in the cases of identical twins, when a single fertilised egg divides into two after a few rounds of cell 
division. 
1 Hauerwas, Suffering Presence, p.36. The Catholic Bishops' Report, p. 18. 
8 Barth, from Church Dogmatics m/4, in Lammers and Verhey (eds), On Moral Medicine, p. 155. 
9 See Ch.5.4 (ii)b, above. 
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God. This hope is God's gift to us from within the tragedy. It does not mean that God has 'chosen' 
people to be as they are, and that to change their lot would be to refuse his gift. It would not necessarily 
be ungracious to try to alter a person's genetic lot, but rather it may be a valid way to exercise our 
stewardship and to reflect God's image in caring for our neighbour. The difficulty may come in 
attempting to decide which applications of genetic manipulation are appropriate. This is explored below. 
6.3 Therapy for genetically-based diseases 
Those genetically-based diseases which are most suitable for gene therapy are those which are 
caused by a single gene defect. There are a large number of such diseases, but their occurrence is quite 
rare. Cystic fibrosis and SCUDS are examples of diseases for which gene therapy is already being 
explored.10 Issues relating to health, and the role of medicine, are raised by this technology. 
i) The reality of genetic disease 
Genetically-based diseases may be rare, but their effects are difficult to ignore." The death of 
an infant due to SCEDS or Tay Sachs disease, the struggle for breath of a child with cystic fibrosis, the 
wasting away of a teenager with muscular dystrophy, the fearful wait of a middle-aged person with 
Huntington's disease, and their subsequent mental and physical degeneration - each of these situations are 
tragic. Conventional medicine currendy offers little or no hope in relieving the inevitable fate of those 
with genetic disorders. 
!< 
ii) Caring through gene therapy 
High-technology medicine has rightly been criticised whenever its intensity results in a lack of 
care. Medicine can incur as much pain and suffering as it relieves. The research involved in developing 
gene therapy does, without doubt, involve high-technology; including isolating and sequencing genes, 
and developing methods for introducing DNA into appropriate cells. The actual treatment of gene 
therapy may be far less intensive. This could involve regular inhalations for cystic fibrosis, regular 
injections for muscular dystrophy, while for SCUDS a single bone-marrow transplant could be sufficient. 
The harvesting and transplanting of bone-marrow cells admittedly involve major operations, but this 
would involve less intrusive technology than having to live one's life in a sterile bubble. The technology 
10 See Ch.2.2 (ii) a, above. 
1 ' See also Ch.5.3 (iii), above. 
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of gene therapy is relatively simple and unintrusive. The results could be spectacular. If 'good' genes 
could be introduced into, and expressed in the tissues of those suffering from monogenic diseases, they 
could effectively be cured of their disease. 
iii) The dimensions of health 
Gene therapy as a concept depends on a mechanistic view of disease, the 'medical' model.12 
This model assumes that illness is accounted for by deviations from the norm of our bodily functioning, 
and that health can be restored by correcting the deviation. The principle of gene therapy assumes; 'Gene 
'X' has suffered a mutation which means that it no longer produces protein 'x'. The lack of protein 'x' 
means a vital structural or functional component is missing. The malfunction of the body caused by the 
lack of 'x' is called disease If only gene 'X' or protein 'x' could be introduced into the body at the 
right place at the right time, then the symptoms of the disease will not occur'. 
In many ways this mechanistic model of genetic disease is an appropriate one. For example, 
each step in the process has been identified in the case of cystic fibrosis. The ' C F ' gene has been 
identified and sequenced. The nature of many of the mutations causing cystic fibrosis have been 
identified, the most common involves a change to just one unit of information in the CF gene. From the 
sequence of the gene, it was possible to work out the structure of the protein which it encoded. This 
protein was found to have the sort of structure expected of a protein which spanned a cell membrane and 
acted as a pump between the inside and the outside of the cell. This function tied in with, and now 
explains, many of the symotoms observed in cystic fibrosis sufferers. If a good copy of the CF gene 
could be introduced into cells of the digestive system and the lungs, then the pump could be made for the 
cell membranes, and the sticky mucus would no longer accumulate in the lungs and correct digestive 
function would be restored. The cystic fibrosis sufferer would be cured. 
The dangers of reductionism through the medical model of illness, however, need to be borne in 
mind. Even cystic fibrosis has environmental factors which can influence the severity of the disease.13 
One of the dangers of the medical model is that a patient could become regarded simply as a defective 
12 See Ch.5.2, above. 
13 Francis Collins, "The Human Genome Project" in Kilner Pentz and Young (eds), Genetic Ethics, p.95. 
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gene. If only the gene can be mended then everything will be alright. It is important to remember 
Ramsey's injunction to treat a patient as a whole person.14 
iv) The limitations of gene therapy 
Gene therapy is described above as the introduction of a 'good' gene to compensate for a 
'defective' gene, thus restoring the normal functioning of a body. The restoration of 'normal' 
functioning is an important concept. The aim of gene therapy is simply to correct that which is defective, 
it is not to enhance that which already exists. Gene therapy is therefore limited to the usual lot of human 
life; not striving to defeat death, not aiining to create the 'perfect' human. It does recognise its 
limitations. 
Another limitation to gene therapy is that not all monogenic diseases could be cured simply by 
adding 'good' copies of a gene. For dominant diseases (e.g. Huntington's) all the copies of the defective 
gene also have to be destroyed. This would be a far more complicated, if at all possible, matter.13 
The limitations to gene therapy are also seen in diseases which are caused by a more complex 
genetic interaction, or the interaction of genes and the environment.16 For diseases such as these, it will 
not be possible to achieve a complete cure through gene therapy, either because of the environmental 
factors involved or because of the complexity of the genetic involvement. In addition, there will still be 
babies born with congenital disorders. These can be caused by chromosomal abnormalities or by 
environmental factors affecting the foetus17. For these individuals gene therapy will offer no hope. Even 
if gene therapy becomes a successful medical technique, it will not be able to cure all those people 
affected by a congenital or inherited disease. Disability something the human race will always have to 
live with. We cannot assume that gene therapy will cure all our ills. It is important, therefore, that we 
encourage those affected by disability to live their lives to the full, to find the 'strength to be human'. 
Equally it will be important not to stop seeking alternative approaches to the treatment and prevention of 
14 The Patient as a Person. 
1 5 See Ch.2.2 (ii) a, above. 
16 E.g. heart disease, diabetes. 
17 The developing foetus may be affected by exposure to certain drugs (eg. Thalidomide), or viruses (eg. Rubella), 
or lack of oxygen or certain nutrients. 
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illness. Rifkin argues for the use of ecological insights, and explorations of the interaction between 
genetic variations and the environment.18 
6.4 Enhancing human life through genetic alterations 
The possibility of 'mending' dysfunctional genes has led to speculations concerning the 
possibility of 'improving' our genetic lot. Human beings already 'improve' themselves (and their 
children) via a variety of means; education, exercise, cosmetics, surgery, and drugs. Genetic 
enhancement is unlikely to be feasible for complex characteristics like facial features, body form, 
intellectual ability and general fitness. There are other characteristics, however, more amenable to 
genetic alteration. Increasing our natural resistance to infection, delaying the ageing process, protecting 
the body against the toxic effects of pollution or cancer-causing agents, increasing our memory capacity 
are all possibilities.19 Would it be right to attempt to enhance our genetic lot? 
i) Striving for perfection 
Today's society is based on standards of success, achievement, perfection.20 It is in this culture 
that the possibility of genetic enhancement will be financially possible. Will we then strive to create the 
genetically perfect man and woman? 
SCIENTIFIC REFLECTION 
There are two immediate scientific comments to be made in response to such an idea. Firstly, it 
is impossible to define, let alone design, the genetically 'perfect' human being. Secondly, genetic 
variability is a vital part of all life on earth. 
If asked to define the perfect human being one would have to ask: 'perfect for what?'. Ebony 
may be the perfect skin colour for a person living in the heart of Africa, but fair skin is far better for an 
Icelander. A stocky build may be best for someone involved in regular, demanding manual work, but 
will be something of a handicap to a potential bighjumper. The butterfly-rnind and creative imagination 
of a poet will not necessarily be helpful to an accountant. A single copy of the gene for sickle cell 
1 8 The Biotech Century, p.228 and p.233. 
19 Ch.2.2 (ii) c, above. 
20 Vanier, Becoming Human, p.45. 
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disease has proved vital for those living in areas affected by malaria, but is of no value to those in colder 
climes. It is impossible for us to specify, even in theory, the genetic make-up of a perfect human being. 
'Biodiversity' has recently been recognised as one of the essential aspects of life on earth. The 
'Earth Summit' in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 collected together leaders from around the world in order to 
discuss strategies for preserving the great variety of life in existence. Not only can we see variety in the 
different species of creatures, but also in the genetic variation within species. This variation contributes 
to the diversity of life to be seen, but is also essential for the continuation of life on earth. Conditions for 
living are always changing; drought and flood, heat and cold, famine and plenty, different germs bringing 
infection, different predators aiming to kilL different places to inhabit. The only way a species (including 
Homo Sapiens) can hope to survive the many variations of life, is by having enough genetic variability 
within the species so that some members will thrive in any given condition. 'Perfection' is found in 
variety rather than uniformity. 
THEOLOGICAL REFLECTION 
Speaking theologically, human perfection will be found in a complete reflection of the image of 
God. Jesus Christ is the only perfect human being ever to have lived, only he has reflected the image of 
God to this extent. The image of God is a relational, not a substantial, matter.21 So Jesus' genetic make-
up is irrelevant. Human perfection does not require one to be of Middle-Eastern stock and male. Jesus 
bore the image of God in his earthly life through the love which he had for his Father, love which was 
expressed in obedience, even to death on the cross. Jesus' relationship with his Father was seen in his 
times of prayer, in his understanding of God's will, and in his relationships with other people; bringing 
them God's healing, wholeness and hope. Only through this was Jesus not blaspheming to declare: 
"anyone who has seen me has seen the Father" and "The Father and I are one".22 
There is a parallel (and yet a significant difference) to be found between the hopes of genetic 
enhancement and the promise of God's Holy Spirit. Perhaps we should concentrate not on DNA, but on 
the power of the Holy Spirit. Aiming not to bring about genetic modification, but rather spiritual 
transformation. Seeking not the products of genes which might change a person's character, but the love, 
21 Ch.3.3 (ii), above. 
22 John 14.9 and John 10.30. 
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the humility, the prayerful-life, the insight, which are the fruits and the gifts of the Spirit If human 
perfection is to be found in our reflecting the image of God, then genetic enhancement offers no hope at 
all, but the Spirit of God can bring about changes thought totally impossible. 
It is also significant at this point to recall Frances Young's suggestions about the reflection of 
God's image being a communal project.23 No individual reflects God's image on their own, but only in 
community with other, different, people. 'Perfection' will be found in variety rather than uniformity. 
ii) Enhanced health 
Even if we were to leave behind any thoughts of human perfection, then genetic enhancement 
can be seen as a means of enhancing human health. Genes could be used to increase resistance to 
infectious diseases, to offer protection from poisons or carcinogens, to delay or eliminate the debilitating 
effects of age. This is no striving for perfection, but an attempt to increase the health of the general 
population. Would this be a valid use of genetic enhancement? 
a) The limitations of health 
Good health has limitations. Even healthy people age and die. This is the natural process of life 
on earth, it is one of the realities of the created order. Life has a natural span and ends in death. To seek 
to prevent or treat disease (and its resultant pain and suffering) can be seen as working together with God. 
To seek to resist or overcome the limitations of ageing and death would be more like working to be as 
god. 
A recognition of the limitations to health is expressed in the widespread criticism of the all-
inclusive WHO definition.24 To be healthy does not necessitate experiencing complete physical, mental 
and social well-being (such perfection is not possible). Wholeness, rather than health, is of most 
importance. A person can be whole despite the limitations of disability or disease.25 
23 Ch.5.4 (i) a, above. 
24 Ch.5.3, above. 
25 Ch.5.3 (iii), above. 
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b) Anticipation not prediction 
The ultimate redemption of the world will involve both a restoration and a transformation of this 
world.26 A foretaste of our restoration may be experienced in any medical technique which 'mends that 
which is broken' (recognising the limits of mechanistic language!). Gene therapy, restoring gene 
function, is thus seen as a foretaste of our ultimate redemption. The transformation element of 
redemption, however, will involve something so new it cannot be predicted. Prediction is not possible, 
but anticipation is. 2 7 
The anticipation of our coming redemption has already been given to us in Jesus Christ. We can 
continue this anticipation, in Christ, by continuing his work. Moltmann sees this in terms of two 
activities; identification and liberation. Anticipating God's kingdom involves identification with the 
victims of society's progress, rather than with those at the forefront of that progress. Thus an anticipation 
of God's kingdom will be achieved more by our identification with, and our representation of, the 
genetically disadvantaged, rather than our striving to join the genetic elite. 
Anticipating God's kingdom also involves the work of liberation, the work of liberating others 
from exploitation, oppression and alienation. If genetic enhancement of health is available to all people 
equally, then perhaps there will be no need of such liberation. The far more likely scenario is that of rich, 
successful people being able to buy their own genetic health, which could in turn lead to the exploitation, 
oppression and alienation of thoSe unable to afford such treatment. This would be working against, rather 
'/ 
than anticipating, our future hope. 
••') 
c) Salvation of, but not from, creation 
A concept which may be crucial to our understanding of the morality of genetic enhancement is 
that of our ultimate salvation being 'of creation, not from creation'.28 The Christian promise of 
redemption does not involve the redemption of human souls from the created order. Our redemption will 
not simply be a spiritual experience. It is not the case that human souls will somehow fuse or become 
united with God, and the rest of creation will disappear or become unimportant. Rather, the Christian 
eschatological hope involves hope for the whole of God's created order. Redemption will not just 
26 Ch.4.3 (ii) and Ch.4.4 (iv), above. 
2 7 Ch.4.4 (v), above. 
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involve human souls, but also their bodies and the whole environment in which they live. This is why 
our bodies are important, and also why it is important that human beings exercise their responsibility of 
stewardship over creation. 
In as much as we are able to anticipate redemption within history, this anticipation will 
necessarily mirror the pattern 'of creation, rather than from creation'. Thus if we are able to bring about 
anticipations of redemption through genetic manipulation - it could be understood that the redemption of 
creation would involve restoring that which is dysfunctional (i.e. gene therapy). Any attempts to 
'improve' the genetic nature of humanity (i.e. genetic enhancement) could, by contrast, be understood as 
attempts to anticipate redemption from creation, and so should not be made. It could be argued that, if 
one understands our final redemption to involve "an end to death, and to mourning and crying and pain, 
for the old order has passed away"29 then any genetic alteration which fights death will be an anticipation 
of this. However, such a suggestion fails to recognise that our final redemption is to involve something 
far more than an end to death, but rather it will be a fulfillment of our created structures. 
6.5 Genetic alterations in somatic cells 
All the trials for gene therapy which are currently being made, involve treating only those cells 
which are known as somatic cells. This means that none of the genetic alterations which are made can be 
passed on to any subsequent offspring. In the case of gene therapy for cystic fibrosis, only the mucus 
cells lining the lungs (and possibly the gut) will be altered.30 To treat SCEDS through genetic 
manipulation, a child's bone marrow cells are removed, the extra DNA added, and men the bone marrow 
transplanted back. In neither case will the reproductive cells of the patient be affected. This approach is 
seen as being much safer, and to have far less implications in terms of eugenics. No difference is seen 
between this process and that of other medical treatments.31 In reality, this method of gene therapy will 
have implications for the genetic make-up of future generations. The birth-rate of children suffering 
from genetic diseases may increase as parents see gene therapy as a successful form of treatment 
28 See Ch.4.3 (ii), above. 
29 Revelation 21.4. 
30 The extra DNA is probably not even incorporated into the genome of the cells. (Storrar and Torrance (eds), 
Human Genetics, p. 16). 
3 1 Jones, The Language of Genes, p.294. The Catholic Bishops' Report, p.28. 
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Dysfunctional genes may be perpetuated in a population as people treated with somatic gene therapy live 
long enough to have children and pass on their faulty genes. Neither of these effects are likely to be 
hugely significant in numerical terms, and are therefore not sufficient to prohibit the use of somatic cell 
gene therapy. This is not necessarily the case when one comes to consider the manipulation of germ line 
cells. 
6.6 Genetic alterations in germ line cells 
Manipulating the genetic make-up of the reproductive cells of a person will necessarily affect 
their children, and subsequent generations. If the safety of this procedure could be guaranteed, would it 
be morally right to alter the genetic constitution of future generations? Utilitarian conclusions to this 
question have been presented.32 A theological perspective from which to look at this issue, which offers 
moral guidance is needed. 
Theologies of progress which suggest that humans are capable of contributing to the 
advancement of the world, even the world's ultimate salvation, are flawed.33 They are over-optimistic 
about human capabilities, and fail to take into account the human condition. Human beings cannot of 
themselves help themselves.34 However, the Christian story means that we need be neither over-
optimistic nor over-pessimistic. The Christian story is a story of tragedy and of hope.35 The tragedy is 
that human beings are limited creatures, we are not 'masters of the universe', the problems of our world 
/ 
!; 
will not be solved through changes to the human line of inheritance. The tragedy is mat with the best of 
intentions we could easily cause more harm than good, unwittingly bringing changes to the human 
genome which would wreak havoc in future generations, we could deliberately use the power of genetic 
technology to harm others, through discrimination, oppression, even destruction. Yet there is hope. 
There is hope because we have the promise of ultimate redemption, because we can bring about 
anticipations of this redemption here and now in Christ There is hope because we have before us both 
the possibility of changing our society (to be more caring, more open to disability and difference) and 
changing our genomes. The element of both tragedy and hope in the Christian story would seem to point 
32 Ch.4.1, above. 
33 Ch.4.2, above. 
34 Ch.4.3, above. 
35 Ch.5.4 (ii) b, above. 
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towards caution in advancement in terms of altering the genetic make-up of germ line cells. One way to 
keep this balance would be to limit germ line alterations to instances of single-gene changes for 
therapeutic purposes. 
6.7 Recognising 'grey' areas 
It is tempting to draw neat, clear-cut lines of moral guidance. Considering the anticipation but 
not prediction of redemption, that it is redemption of but not from creation, and considering the limited 
nature of health, one might conclude that it is appropriate to conduct gene therapy, but not genetic 
enhancement on individuals. Considering the theologies of progress, of realism and of anticipation, one 
might conclude that such therapy should be conducted in somatic but not germ line cells. This would 
provide moral guidance with a sound theological base and with clear boundaries. The reality, however, 
is that these boundaries are not always so clear. Genetic manipulation has grey areas just as many other 
moral issues do. These arise from difficulties in distinguishing between therapy and enhancement, and 
between somatic and germ line cells. 
i) Distinguishing therapy from enhancement 
There is an obvious difference to be seen between inserting an operational CF gene into the lung 
cells of someone suffering from cystic fibrosis, and inserting a gene promoting increased memory 
capacity into the brain cells of a 'normal' person. The former clearly involves therapy whilst the latter 
clearly involves enhancement Other genetic manipulations may not be quite so clear-cut. 
/) 
It may be possible to encourage the healing of severely broken bones by introducing, to the site 
of the break, multiple copies of a gene which occurs naturally and promotes healing.36 In a similar way, 
it has been shown that genes (normally only active in embryos) injected into the legs of patients suffering 
from blocked arteries can stimulate the creation of new blood vessels, thus preventing gangrene and 
amputation.37 A DNA-gel could be used to promote the growth of teeth in adults after loss due to injury 
or disease.38 In each of these cases medical problems would certainly be treated, but in none would it be 
a simple matter of replacing a dysfunctional gene. The healing of the broken bones involves 
36 "Broken bones heal better with DNA", New Scientist, 22.6.96. 
37 "Gene cure unblocks arteries in the leg", The Times, 10.11.97. 
38 'Teeth regrow to order", The Sunday Times, 28.2.99. 
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supplementing a functional gene. Promoting the growth of blood vessels, or of teeth, would involve 
turning on genes not normally functional during adult life. In a similar way it may be possible to treat 
cancer or AIDS through genetic manipulation involving the introduction of new sequences of DNA. 3' 
Are these situations to be understood as gene therapy or gene enhancement? 
if) Distinguishing somatic from germ line cells 
In any particular case of gene therapy, it may be the intention simply to alter the genetic make-
up of certain somatic cells, but it may also be inevitable that unintentionally germ line cells are also 
altered. To treat Duchenne muscular dystrophy with gene therapy would involve inserting enough copies 
of the dystrophin gene into all the muscles of the body. How will it be possible to ensure that the 
therapeutic DNA targets muscles cells and avoids reproductive cells? 
This difficulty will particularly be the case in any examples of gene therapy involving foetuses 
or embryos. One of the American pioneers in gene therapy (French Anderson) has suggested that to 
conduct genetic manipulation on foetuses is likely to be far more effective than attempts after birth40. 
This is partly because of the small size of the foetus, and partly because cells which stop dividing after 
birth may still be dividing in the foetus.41 Such early manipulation would be particularly useful for 
diseases which start to cause irreversible damage in the womb, for example Tay-Sachs. Suggestions have 
even been made that genetic manipulation could take place in embryos created through IVF and before 
implantation.42 <? 
. i 
A 
6.8 Conclusions 
The theology explored in chapters 3-5 has been applied to the principle of altering the genetic 
make-up of human beings, to gene therapy, genetic enhancement, and to the manipulation of somatic and 
germ line cells. Clear-cut distinctions between therapy and enhancement are not always possible. 
Equally, restricting some manipulations solely to somatic cells may be difficult to achieve. What 
conclusions are to be drawn? 
39 Ch.2.2 (ii) a, above. 
40 "Catch them young", M?w Scientist, 27.6.98. 
41 Some methods for introducing new DNA into cells depend on cell-division taking place. 
42 Nelson, On the New Frontiers of Genetics and Religion, p.57. 
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i) The regulation of genetic manipulation 
There is nothing wrong in principle with making alterations to the genetic make-up of human 
beings. This does not imply that everything that is possible is permissible. Realistic theology recognises 
the selfishness of human beings. Human nature tends to misuse power, for selfish reasons and at the cost 
of others. Genetic manipulation is a very powerful technology, containing the power to heal, to change, 
to discriinhiate, to elevate, and to dominate. Acknowledging human limitations in self-control and self-
discipline, regulations need to be formulated to impose recognised restrictions to the use of this powerful 
technology. Therefore, I make suggestions, in the light of Christian theology, as to the form these 
regulations could take. 
ii) The manipulation of somatic cells for gene therapy 
In the case of a serious disease, caused by a single gene defect, having no effective alternative 
treatment, I conclude that somatic cell therapy would be an entirely appropriate treatment.43 The medical 
technology is not greatly invasive and yet could be hugely effective. Such action would involve good 
stewardship of genetic knowledge, and an expression of love for one's neighbour. 
'Gene therapy' should be regarded, not only as the introduction of 'good' genes to function in 
the place of defective ones, but also as the introduction of new genes, and the turning-on of genes not 
usually functioning at a particular stage of life, for the specific purpose of treating medical conditions.44 
Babies and children could receive gene therapy to their somatic cells, with the permission of their parents 
or guardians, in the same way as they can be given drugs or be operated on. 
This form of manipulation will have no eugenic implications in the sense that no future 
generations will inherit the change. The use of gene therapy to cure monogenic diseases will benefit very 
few people (as the diseases are so rare). The perpetuation of their defective genes is unlikely to make a 
significant difference to a population. Nevertheless it would seem appropriate to offer genetic 
counselling to all recipients of somatic cell gene therapy when they consider having a family. 
Educating the public with respect to the limitations of gene therapy will be important. Firstly, in 
connection with attitudes towards disability, and secondly, in connection with one's own responsibility to 
4 3 Compare The Clothier Report, 4.3-4.4,7.4. 
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health. Gene therapy wil l not be a cure-all. There wi l l still be disabled, diseased and deformed people 
living in our world. The fact that some people can be cured of a genetic disability must not affect our 
response to those who cannot be cured. A l l human beings are of worth, are capable of reflecting God's 
image, deserve to be loved as our neighbour. In this respect I would consider it immoral for the health 
profession or an insurance company to discriminate against a person of disability on the grounds that 
their parents chose not to terminate their life during pregnancy. 
Many diseases which have a genetic factor also have environmental influences. It is not as 
simple as saying " I have gene X therefore I wil l develop disease x, and this can be cured by gene 
therapy". It is more like " I have gene X therefore I have an increased likelihood of developing disease x, 
especially i f I am exposed to environmental factors Y and Z". The danger with gene therapy, is that 
people wi l l assume that they can rely on it to avoid certain diseases. For the many cases of multifactorial 
diseases, it wi l l be important to educate people to understand that taking responsibility for their 
environment is likely to have more effect on their health than any opportunities for gene therapy. 
Making the effort to exercise, to eat a healthy diet, to be a non-smoker, can have far more influence than 
genetic manipulation. Gene therapy cannot be a short-cut to health. 
iii) The manipulation of somatic cells for genetic enhancement 
Individuals already work hard to enhance their appearance and nature through a variety of 
means, surgery and hormonal treatment being the most invasive. In the light of this reality, I believe it 
would be consistent to allow genetic manipulation for enhancement purposes within limited situations.43 
These limitations would be that only somatic cells are treated46, and only in consenting adults. In this 
sense the genetic manipulation becomes purely cosmetic. There should be no possibility that the 
enhancements could be passed to future generations, nor that enhancements could be inflicted on children 
without their knowledge or understanding. 
4 4 This begs the question of how to define a 'medical condition'. For all its limitations, perhaps the medical model 
of illness is the best one to use in this situation. 
45 Contrast the recommendations made by The Clothier Report (7.5) and the BMA {Human Genetics, p. 198). 
However, surgery is routinely accepted as a means of breast enhancement. If the same effect could be achieved 
safely with a hormonal cream, it would be welcomed. I do not believe that enabling breast tissue to generate its 
own hormone through the use of a DN A cream would be significantly different. 
46 Recall the DNA may not even be incorporated into the cell's genome (note 30). 
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Genetic cosmetics wi l l never be simple because of the complex genetic interactions involved, 
and the need for effective ways of introducing genes into specific cells. Possibilities in this area include; 
promoting the growth of a new set of teeth rather than having one's own capped and straightened, 
boosting one's metabolic rate and so decreasing the likelihood of laying down excess fat, preventing 
balding or greying hair. I f it becomes possible to increase muscular bulk through genetic cosmetics this 
wi l l have obvious implications for sports councils and competitions. DNA tests may become as 
widespread as those for drugs in competitors. 
The use of genetic manipulation for cosmetic purposes is not ideal, i t is likely to perpetuate 
society's hankering for perfection, and negative attitudes towards those not seen to be 'normal'. A far 
better emphasis would be that of the purpose of life. This cannot be legislated for, but the Church could 
reveal its value to society.47 
There may be occasions when distinguishing between therapy and enhancement is difficult. 
This is crucial (in the manipulation of somatic cells) only in cases involving children. Gene therapy 
could be allowed following parental consent, genetic enhancement could not. Consider the gene for 
human growth hormone (hGH). Children lacking this gene wil l have severely stunted growth. The 
addition of the gene for hGH would involve gene therapy. Other children may have a normal hGH gene, 
yet their projected height (due to a variety of other genetic and environmental factors) may be 
considerably below average. Would it be therapy or enhancement to give these children extra copies of 
the hGH gene? Similarly, in future the gene(s) involved in skin colour may be identified. I f a child is to 
be brought up in a racist area, would it be considered therapy or enhancement to alter her skin colour 
early in life? Short stature and dark skin do not in themselves constitute medical conditions, but it could 
be argued that the discrimination could affect mental health. To use genetic manipulation to escape 
disCTimihation, however, would not solve the problem, but rather perpetuate it. Therefore these are cases 
in which it is society which must be changed, not the genetic make-up of individuals. 
Whenever there is a difficulty in distinguishing between therapy and enhancement, it would 
seem appropriate to err on the side of caution. Until evidence to the contrary, these cases should be 
considered as enhancement and therefore restricted to consenting adults. 
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iv) The manipulation of germ line cells for gene therapy 
There wi l l be some cases in which gene therapy needs to occur so early in life, or so extensively, 
that it wi l l be inevitable that not only the somatic cells, but also the germ line cells of the patient are 
altered. It could be considered more effective to alter germ line cells anyway, to prevent the perpetuation 
of defective genes. The manipulation of germ line cells has obvious and far-reaching implications for 
future generations, implications to which these generations are incapable of giving consent. 
The first questions one asks in relation to the manipulation of germ line cells are concerned with 
safety. Any negative effect in such manipulation cannot easily be retrieved, and may not be apparent 
until after a number of generations have passed. For this reason caution is encouraged. I f one can be 
assured of the safety of such manipulation, what about the principle of altering the genetic make-up of 
future generations? 
I conclude that germ line therapy would be an appropriate thing to do in the case of serious 
monogenic diseases. SCDDS, Tay Sachs, muscular dystrophy, cystic fibrosis, could be treated in this 
way, and the perpetuation of defective genes prevented. Theologically this would seem to be a way of 
anticipating (rather than predicting) our ultimate redemption, as the genetic manipulation is repairing the 
defective (not designing anew). 
Possible alternatives to germ line gene therapy must always be kept in mind. Potential parents, 
both known to carry defective genes for a particular disease, do have alternative ways of having children 
free from genetic disease. They may choose to adopt, seeing the decision not to have their own children 
as the responsible stewarding of their particular situation. They may choose to have children via sperm 
and/or egg donation from non-carriers.48 Tay Sachs disease, among the Ashkenazi Jews, illustrates the 
way genetic disease can be reduced through screening and genetic counselling.49 
The limitations to germ line gene therapy must be acknowledged. Even i f germ line 
manipulation were used in all cases known to need it, this would not eliminate monogenic diseases. 
4 7 See Ch.7, below. 
48 The options of having their own children through IVF and screening the embryos before implantation, and of 
conceiving naturally but screening the developing foetus with a view to 'therapeutic abortion' are also currently 
available. These options depend on the assumption that it is better for an embryo or foetus to die than to develop 
into an individual with a genetic disease. 
49 Ch.2.2 (i) b, above. 
122 
Imagine all those couples known to carry defective genes for a particular disease had their babies 
screened and subjected to gene therapy i f necessary. This would reduce to nil those babies suffering from 
genetic disease bom to known carriers. But one also has to take into account the spontaneous mutations 
which occur all the time in the germ cells of individuals. It has been estimated that about a third of the 
cases of Duchenne muscular dystrophy arise from new mutations50. The mothers of such children would 
not show up as carriers, it just so happens that one or more of their egg cells, in development, acquired 
the mutation which causes this disease. As genetic diseases become less prevalent (due to gene therapy) 
it would become less worthwhile to screen all babies for spontaneous mutations, by the time the 
symptoms begin to show it may be too late for gene therapy. Even germ line gene therapy wi l l not rid the 
world of genetic disease. 
I f germ line gene therapy can be proven to be safe (through experiments with animals and our 
experience of somatic therapy in humans), then its use would seem appropriate in cases of serious 
monogenic diseases. Scientifically this wi l l serve to prevent the perpetuation of defective genes, and 
often wil l be the only means by which any gene therapy can be achieved. Theologically it may be seen 
as an anticipation of our redemption, in restoring that which is defective. Alternative options to having a 
family which are open to carriers of genetic defects must not be forgotten. The limitations of germ line 
therapy wi l l necessitate maintaining a positive attitude towards those who do suffer from genetic disease, 
and not abandoning research into alternative treatments. 
v) The manipulation of germ line cells for genetic enhancement 
The most extreme possibility of genetic manipulation in humans (barring cloning) is that of 
genetic enhancement to germ-cells. In order to maintain the advantage of any enhancements, individuals 
who have received new genes wil l need to inter-breed with each other. Otherwise the advantages wil l 
soon be 'diluted in the general population. The interbreeding of manipulated individuals wi l l produce a 
genetic elite. There are some who see no objection to this concept,51 but a number of theological reasons 
argue against it. These reasons include a realistic view of human limitations, matters of justice, and our 
ability to anticipate (but not predict) our redemption. 
50 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Genetic Screening - Ethical Issues, p. 109. 
51 In particular Harris (Clones, Genes and Immortality, p.203f.) and Silver (Remaking Eden, p.236). Both argue that 
we control all other aspects of our children's lives. 
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Genetic manipulation is a very powerful tool, the most powerful expression of it could create a 
special breed of people. It is this form therefore which is most open to misuse. The tragedy of the 
intractability of human life has already been discussed.52 As the power of nuclear fission was used to 
destructive ends, so too can the power of genetic manipulation be used. Human beings can be selfish, 
self-concerned, seeking to dominate rather than co-operate with those who are different. The possibility 
of creating people with special pre-ordained advantages wi l l only serve to increase this tendency. Those 
with power and money wil l seek to perpetuate their advantages throughout the generations, to the 
detriment of all others. Genetic manipulation could also be used to create disadvantages. In a worst case 
scenario similar to 1984, special breeds of people with reduced intelligence could be deliberately 
produced to CTeate a work-force with no rights. To engineer elite stocks of human beings (or even 
disadvantaged stocks) would deny the Christian principles of justice, mercy and love. Particularly 
pertinent at this point is Moltmann's belief that the Christian is called to identify not with the strong and 
the successful, but with the victim. 5 3 
Our inability to predict the nature of redemption also argues against the genetic enhancement of 
germ line cells. There is no possibility of us manipulating our species closer to perfection, to fulfillment, 
to God. It is impossible to decide which genes are necessary for the 'perfect' person. God is going to do 
a 'new thing', a surprising thing, his final redemption of the whole world wi l l be so different that it could 
never have been predicted. Our bodies wi l l be included in this redemption, but it wi l l not be achieved 
through any changes to our bodies. There are no simple genes for mercy, humility, love or self-sacrifice. 
A 
These are qualities which cannot be genetically manipulated in a person, they are the fruit of the work of 
God's Holy Spirit 
In the light of the theology above, I conclude that human beings should never seek to genetically 
enhance'germ line cells. 
52ch.5.4 (ii)b, above. 
53 Ch.4.4 (v), above. 
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vi) Summary 
1. The principle of modifying the genetic make-up of human beings is not in itself wrong. 
In recognition of the 'intractability' of human nature, there needs to be legal limitations to the use of the 
technology. 
2. The genetic manipulation of somatic cells for the purpose of treating medical conditions can take 
place, even in children with parental consent. This is an expression of good stewardship of our genetic 
knowledge, a means of loving our neighbour and working towards the restoration of creation. 
3. Genetic enhancement in somatic cells requires individual, adult, consent. It should not be permitted in 
children. I t is not ideal in as much as it wi l l perpetuate society's striving for 'perfection', but having 
purely cosmetic effects, it can be left to individual choice. 
4. Gene therapy which affects germ line cells should take place with caution, restricted to the treatment of 
serious monogenic diseases. The cautious approach recognises both the tragedy (human limitedness) and 
the hope (anticipations of redemption) of the Christian story. 
5. Genetic enhancement which affects germ line cells should not be permitted under any circumstances. 
To do so would be to attempt to predict, rather than anticipate, our redemption. It would ignore the 
reality of the limitedness of humanity. 
' Having made suggestions regarding the regulation of gene therapy and enhancement, I turn in 
the final chapter to consider matters which cannot be subject to legislation. I offer suggestions to the 
Church of ways in which the Christian story can be applied practically, and positively, to the reality of 
human genetic difference. 
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Chapter 7: A POSTSCRIPT FOR THE CHURCH 
7.1 Introduction 
An exploration has been made of theological themes which help us to consider the moral issues 
raised by human genetic manipulation. This theology has been applied to the situations of gene therapy 
and enhancement, and suggestions have been made regarding the possible legal boundaries in using such 
technology. Legal limits are protective measures, guarding against dangerous or mischievous uses of 
genetic manipulation, they do not represent the ideal situation. Allowing the addition of genetic material 
in adults for cosmetic purposes has already been acknowledged as less than ideal.' Such action would 
perpetuate society's hankering for perfection in individuals. There are, however, situations which cannot 
be legislated against. It is illegal to d^crirninate against someone, in terms of employment opportunity, 
on the grounds of their race or their gender, but it is not illegal to harbour racist or sexist thoughts in 
one's heart. This chapter is written as a postscript to the Christian Church, to those who form the body of 
Christ on earth today. It is written to apply some of the theology which has been explored, but which 
cannot be incorporated into laws of this country. It is written for those people, touched by the Christian 
story of tragedy and hope, who seek to obey not just the law of the land, but also the two great 
commandments; to love their God and their neighbour.2 Difference, disability and disease caused 
through genetic factors are the focus of this chapter, but matters discussed wil l obviously have 
implications for other areas too. ' The postscript begins with a consideration of purpose. 
7.2 The meaning of life 
For many people today 'meaning' is found in their lives through success, through achievement, 
through recognition, through being best. This results in those affected by disability and disease being 
marginalised.3 These people are not expected to achieve much, they have no future, others find them 
difficult to relate to. But the Christian story of tragedy and hope reminds us that the goals of success and 
achievement are in reality meaningless. The tragedy of human existence is that we do not accept our 
1 See Ch.6. 8 (iii), above. 
2Mk.12.30f. 
3 Vanier, Becoming Human, p.45f.. 
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natural limits. 4 We reject the way which is best and the One who is perfect. The tragedy is that we try to 
do it our way, and it does not work. We are not in control, we cannot do everything, even that which we 
can do we tend to make a mess of. So the dreams of Utopian master races result either in great suffering 
for those who do not ' f i t ' , or in a weak, isolated, inbred group of people.5 The 'sheer intractability of 
human l i fe ' means that perfection is not within our grasp.6 
The story of hope, however, tells us that meaning is to be found not in success but in failure, not 
in strength but in weakness, not in perfection but in a recognition of our brokenness. Meaning is given to 
us, not through achievement, but through the grace, the unconditional love, the forgiveness and the mercy 
of God. Meaning is given because of the value which God gives to our lives despite ourselves. Meaning 
is found not in a C.V. fu l l of achievements, but in the empty hands outstretched to receive from the 
abundance of God. Meaning is found as our lives reflect something of God, through our relationship of 
trust with him. Meaning is found as different members of the body of Christ together reflect the image of 
God.7 
Through this story of tragedy and hope, those people whose lives are severely restricted through 
disability or disease, are seen to have no less meaning to their lives than those who are apparently 
successful. Those who are weakest may find it easiest to trust God, to live in relationship with him, to 
reflect his image to others.8 Those who are most aware of their brokenness, are most in a position to 
receive. This understanding of meaning and purpose turns upside-down the standards of many in society 
around us. The Church has a vital role to play in living out this understanding; living it out for the sake 
of those in its midst who are more vulnerable, and also for the sake of society as a whole in challenging 
its values. What are the practical ways in which a local church can do this? What implications are there 
for those usually marginalised? 
4 See Ch.3.2 (ii), above. 
5 See Ch.2.3 (ii) a, above. 
6 See Ch.5.4 (ii) b, above. 
7 See Ch.5.4 (i) a, above. 
8 Vanier, Becoming Human, p.91f. 
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i) Towards the practice of meaning 
I f a local church is going to live its life believing that purpose is found not in being successful, 
but living a life of trust in God and reflecting his image to others, then changes may need to be made. 
The following suggestions are not exhaustive. 
CO-OPERATION NOT COMPETITION 
One human reaction to those who are different to oneself is that of competition.9 I f the meaning 
of human life is to be found in a relationship of trust with God, rather than in being better than everyone 
else, then this attitude of competition is empty and destructive. To live out this reality, local churches 
wil l need to let go of any desire to be a 'better, more successful' church. Often churches live as though 
they are competing with those around them, of the same, or different, denominations. We are affected by 
the success-orientated attitudes of society. To live in genuine mutual co-operation with other churches, 
not minding who gets the credit, or the extra members, would bear witness to the true meaning of the life 
of the church. 
Competition can also occur within churches. Which house-group has the most members? Who 
invited the most people to the last evangelistic event? Which member of the choir has the best voice, and 
sings all the solos? Who leads the intercessions, arranges the flowers, reads the lessons the best? Who 
has the best job, runs the best car, has the best behaved children? Even i f these questions are never 
articulated, they are asked in individual's hearts. To change the competitive attitude we inherit from 
i! 
society, to gain the Christian attitude of humility, mutuality and co-operation, wi l l demand a change of 
heart. This change wi l l come about when we discover anew our weakness, vulnerability and total 
dependence on God. Such a discovery can come about through genuine friendships with those who are 
more obviously weak and vulnerable (see below). 
'Competition can be expressed through jokes and ridicule at the expense of those who are 
different. Churches should be places of humour and fun, but such humour should never be expressed in 
order to put down others. To laugh about someone's big nose, bald head or excess weight is unchristian 
in itself, but also sets the precedent that one can also laugh at someone's mongoloid features, struggle to 
9 See Ch.3.5, above. 
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articulate or inability to control one's body. Attempts at fun would be far better made at laughing 'with' 
(and therefore including someone) than laughing 'at' (and excluding). 
ENCOURAGING INVOLVEMENT 
A l l members of a church are equally children of God, members of the body of Christ. Accepting 
that success and perfection are not important criteria for church life opens up an opportunity to enable all 
members to contribute to the life of the church. Receiving and valuing the contribution of all people, 
whatever their abilities, bears witness to their being part of the body of Christ.10 It is not only the 
prominent or most obvious parts of the body, but also the weaker, humbler parts which have a vital 
contribution to make to the whole." 
In our church, a partially-sighted person has read aloud, albeit haltingly, by having script 
computer-printed in large type. The congregation listened much more attentively than to others who read 
beautifully. A person affected by Down's syndrome acts as server or crucifer in another church. The 
congregation has come to accept that things in the sanctuary do not have to be perfectly executed. A deaf 
person could 'read' or pray in sign language, and be interpreted into the spoken word. I f contributions 
need to be made under supervision, welcoming people as they arrive, handing out service books, or 
helping with the offertory procession, are possibilities. Nor is it always in church services that members 
of the body of Christ have a contribution to make. Helping to distribute leaflets, folding the church 
magazine, looking after the gardens, helping in the kitchen, designing posters, would all add to the life of 
the church. There are many ways in which the church can recognise and value the contributions which 
•j 
all its members can make, thus helping them to feel they belong. 
REMOVING BARRIERS 
Many churches today make significant efforts to remove the physical barriers which exclude 
people from church life. Wheelchair ramps instead of steps, loop-systems to help those with deaf-aids, 
large-print hymn books for the partially-sighted, all help to include people. Sometimes, however, the 
barriers are more to do with peoples' attitudes than physical obstacles. People are made to feel 
unwelcome i f their behaviour is unusual. Uncontrolled movements or noises are tolerated in babies, but 
10 Young, Face to Face, p. 186. 
H ICor.12.12-27. 
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are often 'tutted', 'hushed' and not tolerated in a disabled child or adult 1 2 Disruption can be even more 
difficult to accept from an adult who has hitherto been a 'respectable' member of the church. This 
change could result from a stroke, or the onset of Alzheimer's or Huntington's diseases. The church 
needs to recognise that it is not the perfection of worship, but the ways in which it can include all its 
members, which is important. 
These are but a few examples of ways in which the local church can live out the belief that 
meaning is found not in success, but in a relationship of trust with God. To live in this way wil l result in 
the local church taking on a prophetic role within its local community, challenging others to examine 
their values. To live in this way wil l also bring about anticipations of the kingdom of God as we identify, 
not with the strong and successful, but with the weak and dependent.13 Other ways in which the church 
can bring about these anticipations are examined below. 
7.3 The Church and genetics 
The church can minister to those affected by genetic differences, bringing about anticipations of 
God's kingdom, through being a befriending , a supporting and a celebrating church. 
i) A befriending church 
The church can play a vital role in a community through being a place in which genuine 
relationships can be built with people often marginalised by society.14 The church can be a place where 
people of all abilities are welcomed, loved, included and valued. The development of true mutual 
•\ 
friendships allows people to get behind the labels, coming to know others for who they really are. 
There is often a fear in attempting to communicate with disabled or diseased people, because of 
uncertainty and not wanting to appear to fa i l . 1 3 In the safe environment of the church, where failure can 
be accepted, people can overcome their fear, and begin to receive as well as give. Intellectually disabled 
people are gifted in relationships, they have much to give in terms of love, trust and friendship.16 The 
12 Marsha Fowler, "The Church as a Welcoming Community" in KJlner, Pentz and Young (eds), Genetic Ethics, 
p.246f. and Young, Face to Face, p.95. 
13 See Ch.4.4 (v) and 4.5 (iii), above. 
1 4 Moltmann, The Power of the Powerless, p.153. 
15 Vanier, Becoming Human, p.76. 
l&Ibid, p.2. 
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image of God is reflected by disabled people in a unique way, they can bring gifts of the Spirit to a 
church community not possible through more capable or successful people. Disabled people also help us 
to see our own weaknesses and dependencies, our own need to live a life of trust.17 Forging such 
relationships, and including disabled people in church life wil l not be an easy process, and it wi l l be 
important to be realistic about each others limits and failings. 
There is much a church can receive by including in their fellowship those who usually are 
marginalised, and there is much the church can teach society through this process. Any situation which 
illustrates the value, and the contribution, of people with genetic handicaps, wi l l challenge the attitude 
that such lives are not worth living. 
ii) A supporting church 
A church which proclaims the equal value of all people, which proclaims that everyone is loved 
unconditionally by God and called to love their neighbours, such a church wi l l need to be a supporting 
church. 
Support wi l l be needed for those people caught up in the tragedies of genetic difference. The 
prospective parents who are faced with genetic knowledge which precipitates difficult decisions, and feel 
pressurised by the medical profession or 'what other people think'. The couple who choose not to have 
children because of their defective genes, and find it hard to remain childless. The parents who choose 
not to have their foetus genetically tested, or choose not to have a therapeutic abortion, and struggle to 
bring up their child suffering from Down's syndrome or cystic fibrosis. The parents who feel unable to 
care for a child with a disability, and so terminate their pregnancy, offer their child for adoption, or place 
their child in permanent care. A l l of these people wi l l need of a variety of support. Emotional support; in 
someone to talk to and cry with. Practical support; in offers to sit-with, meals made, washing done, 
transport provided. Financial support; allowing special equipment, or holidays, or care to be provided. 
Spiritual support; in dealing with feelings of guilt, inadequacy, anger, grief and frustration. The church is 
a place which can offer this support through its prayer, through its welcome, through its friendship and 
ministry. The wider church can also play its part. The Church of Scotland has a number of centres which 
offer residential and respite care to young people with profound mental and physical problems, and their 
17SeeCh.5.4(i)a,above. 
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families. They also provide care in small groups for adults who would otherwise be hospitalised for 
l i fe . 1 8 
Support is also needed for those people at the 'other end' of genetic technologies; the doctors, 
genetic counsellors and research scientists. It is vital that these people are not regarded as 'baddies'. 
They have tremendous skill and knowledge, and do their best to use it for the benefit of individuals and 
populations. They have difficult decisions to make, bad news to impart, limitations to accept. They can 
also have great hope to offer, good news to tell, new treatments to try. As the church becomes aware of 
the role which genetics plays in our lives, it should also become aware of the need to support those 
developing and applying this technology. These people need patience, wisdom, humility, and many other 
spiritual gifts in order to do their jobs. They also need the prayers of the church, and the personal 
support offered wherever appropriate. 
iii) A celebrating church 
The Christian story of tragedy and hope is celebrated, and anticipated, regularly in the form of 
the Eucharist. As bread and wine is shared, the church is reminded of the tragedy and the hope in God's 
relationship with humanity, in particular through Jesus Christ. There is tragedy in the love spurned, the 
generosity taken for granted, the gifts misused. There is tragedy in the mistrust, the rejection, the 
betrayal, and the denial. There is tragedy in the broken body and the spilt blood. Yet, within this 
tragedy we see the unconditional nature of God's love, something which can never be earned or won. 
Within this tragedy we see .God having entered into thebrokenness and the suffering of this world, God 
going before us in all we experience. Within this tragedy we see God doing a new thing, something 
totally unexpected, something unpredictable, something which breaks into the tragedy and brings us 
hope. 
We are given hope as we rejoice in Jesus' victory over death, recognising his resurrection as an 
anticipation of that which is in store for all. We are given hope as we come before God with empty hands, 
recognising our weakness and our failure, and recognising God as the One in whom we can trust. We are 
given hope as we eat the bread and drink the wine, recognising in our action an anticipation of the 
heavenly banquet still to come. We are given hope as we experience the healing presence of God, 
18 Storrar and Torrance (eds), Human Genetics, p.59. 
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recognising in our growth towards wholeness, anticipations of that day when all shall be made 
completely whole. 
"Christ has died. Christ is risen. Christ wi l l come again."19 The tragedy and the hope. This is 
our story, this is our celebration. Whenever the church meets at the Lord's table, we are reminded that 
true meaning in life is found not in success and winning, but in weakness and dependence. We are 
nourished and fortified, that we may go on trusting in God and reflecting his image to the world. We are 
sent out, in the name of Christ, to love and serve the Lord. 2 0 Our love and our service can be expressed 
to, and with, those with genetic disabilities; through our prophetic inclusion of all in our church life, 
through our loving relationships which involve both giving and receiving, and through our support of 
those caught up in the tragedy and the hope of genetic difference. In the name of Christ, let us love and 
serve. 
A 
19 From "The Order for Holy Communion: Rite A", The Alternative Service Book, p. 132. 
20 Ibid. p. 145. 
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Glossary 
AID: artificial insemination by donor. 
AIDS: acquired immune deficiency syndrome. 
amniocentesis: a foetal test taken between the 14th and 16th weeks of pregnancy. A needle extracts fluid 
from the cavity surrounding the foetus, this fluid contains a small number of foetal cells which provide 
genetic material for analysis. 
Ashkenazi Jews: Jews originally of central and eastern European descent. This ethnic group is 
particularly prone to the inherited Tay Sach's disease. 
carrier: a person with one normal copy and one altered copy of a gene associated with a recessive 
disease. Carriers are unaffected by the disease, but can pass on the altered gene to offspring. 
chorionic villus sampling: a foetal test taken between the 8th and 10th weeks of pregnancy. A needle 
removes a small number of cells from the developing placenta, these provide genetic material for 
analysis. 
chromosomal abnormality: arises during the formation of reproductive cells, taking the form of 
duplication or deletion of entire chromosomes, or parts thereof. Turner's and Down's syndromes are 
examples. i; 
congenital abnormality: found at birth or within a few weeks of birth. A genetic defect, chromosomal 
abnormality, or an environmental factor in foetal development may be the cause. 
cystic Gbrosis: a recessively inherited disease which affects mainly the Caucasian population (about 1 in 
20 are carriers, and 1 in 2,000 births are affected). Lungs and digestive systems are dysfunctional, 
sufferers being particularly prone to chest infections. The average life span is about 30 years. 
dominant: the form of inheritance in which a genetic disorder shows itself when only one of the two 
copies of the gene is abnormal (e.g. Huntington's disease). 
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Down's syndrome: a genetic condition due to the presence of an extra copy of chromosome 21. The 
seriousness of the condition varies, but is associated with specific physical characteristics and severe 
learning disabilities. The occurrence increases with maternal age, rising sharply for those over 35 years.. 
Duchenne muscular dystrophy: a disorder caused by a gene on the X chromosome, thus boys are 
affected, and girls act as carriers. Approximately 1 in 3,500 male births are affected. The disease is 
characterised by a progressive weakening of muscles and loss of coordination. The affect is first 
observed around 18 months of age, boys become wheelchair-bound and die in their early twenties. 
eugenics: the science of improving the quality of a species through selective breeding. Positive eugenics 
encourages the perpetuation of 'good' characteristics, while negative eugenics seeks to prevent the 
perpetuation of 'bad' characteristics. 
gene: a stretch of DNA occupying a fixed position on a chromosome, which contains the instructions for 
the production of a particular protein. There are about 100, 000 genes in the human genome. 
genome: the total genetic material of an organism. 
genotype: the genetic constitution of an individual organism. 
germ cell: the cells from which reproductive cells develop (sperm cells in males, egg cells in females). 
haemophilia: a group of blood disorders, in which the symptom is a reduced blood clotting ability. The 
disease is linked to the X chroniosome and so affects males, and females are carriers. The most common 
,•} 
type, haemophilia A affects about 1 in 10,000 live male births. Bleeding episodes can be limited by 
prompt infusion of the appropriate blood-clotting factor. 
H F E A : The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. 
H G A C : The Human Genetics Advisory Commission. 
Huntington's disease: a dominant disease which is lethal but does not begin to manifest its symptoms 
until middle age. Progressive dementia and loss of motor control result in death about 15 years after the 
onset of the disease. 
I V F : in vitro fertilisation. That which occurs outside the body, in a 'test-tube'. 
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monogenic: a disease or characteristic which is controlled by, or associated with, a single gene. 
phenylketonuria: (PKU) a recessive disorder affecting 1 in 10,000 live births. A missing or defective 
enzyme causes an inability to metabolise a particular substance, which in turn results in severe mental 
handicap. Screening all babies at birth, and following a strict diet for those affected, has reduced the 
effect of this disorder. 
recessive: the form of inheritance in which both copies of a gene must be defective for the disorder to 
present itself. Those with a single copy of the defective gene are unaffected, and act as carriers. 
SCIDS: severe combined immunodeficiency syndrome. A recessive condition, affecting 1 in 250,000 
births, in which the ability to fight infection is lost. Infant death is inevitable without treatment, attempts 
at which have included sterile living conditions, bone-marrow transplants or injections of the lacking 
enzyme. 
sickle cell disease: a recessive disorder most common in those of African origins, affecting 1 in 400 
African-Americans. An abnormality in haemoglobin causes the red blood cells to be misshapen. These 
cells are destroyed by the body, causing amaemia, or may block blood vessels and cause other 
complications. Death in early adulthood is likely. 
somatic cells: all body cells except the germ cells and the reproductive cells to which they give rise. 
Tay Sachs disease: a lethal, recessive disease occurring most commonly in Ashkenazi Jews (where it 
occurs in 1 in 3,600 live births). Developing a few months after birth, progressive mental and physical 
deterioration lead to death by the age of 6. 
thalassaemia: a recessive disorder affecting haemoglobin production for red blood cells. The most 
severe cases cause still births. The less severe cases develop chronic anaemia which can be treated with 
blood transfusions or bone marrow transplants. 
transgenic organism: one whose genetic material contains DNA from a foreign source which has been 
inserted artificially using genetic manipulation. 
136 
Turner's syndrome: a chromosomal disorder in which girls have only one X chromosome, rather than 
the usual two: It occurs in 1 in 5,000 girls, and causes short stature and heart defects. Intelligence is 
usually normal 
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